

FINAL REPORT

**ENHANCING THE IMPACT OF CITIZEN-LED TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE PROJECT**
(AusAID Agreement 63106)
Manila, March 2015

Activities, Outcomes, Impact, Sustainability and Lessons Learned

I. Background

On 1 August 2012, AusAID¹ and the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) entered into a Grant Agreement for the Enhancing the Impact of Citizen-Led Transparency Initiatives for Good Governance Project (the Project²). The grant amounted to \$200,000³. Following the execution of the Grant Agreement, PTF signed a Memorandum of Agreement with ANSA-EAP and the Coalition Against Corruption of the Makati Business Club (MBC-CAC), with each assuming responsibility for different parts of Project implementation. The Project was mobilized in September 2012. On 30 August 2013, PTF submitted the first Project Annual Report to AusAID. Progress reports were submitted in March 2013 and March 2014.

The main objective of the Project is to scale up the impact of citizen-led transparency initiatives for good governance in the Philippines. This was to be achieved through: (a) grant funding to selected CSOs to pilot CSO-initiated subprojects using social accountability approaches that can be adopted to enhance implementation of national programs, and (b) strengthening knowledge sharing of good practices both from the subprojects financed under the Grant and from the portfolio of activities already supported by PTF.

The Grant Agreement was amended twice. The first Deed of Amendment was signed in September 2013, extending the implementation period to 30 September 2014 and reallocating the Project budget. The second Deed of Amendment was

¹ Throughout this report the name AusAID has been used. The current name of the organization is Australian Aid.

² In several places in this report and its annexes the Project is referred to as the ETI Project (from Enhancing The Impact).

³ Unless otherwise indicated, \$ refers to US\$.

executed in August 2014 and further extended the Project implementation period to 31 December 2014.

As required under the Grant Agreement, this completion report discusses the Project's activities, outcomes, impact, sustainability and lessons learned. A separate document was prepared by ANSA-EAP containing the 'knowledge products' resulting from the Project (See ([ETI Outputs](#))).

II. Activities

The Project design included a small-grants component, a knowledge sharing component, and a Project management component. Activities under these components are briefly discussed below:

1. Small Grants Component.

In consultation with AusAID, it was decided to implement the Project in two regions. Northern Luzon was selected for the first year of Project implementation and the Caraga Region of Northeastern Mindanao for the second year.

Northern Luzon: On 12 October 2012, a partnership meeting was held in Baguio with member organizations of the Northern Luzon Coalition for Good Governance (NLCCGG) to brief them on the Project and to explore their interest in participating in it. On 29 and 30 October 2012, a strategy session was organized in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, to which those members ready to participate in the Project were invited. The session resulted in a request to four CSOs to submit project proposals (hereafter referred to as subprojects): RECITE, CCAGG, CVM and KARSA.

All four CSOs submitted proposals that were reviewed and commented on by PTF, MBC, and ANSA. Following further revisions in their designs, three of the subprojects were accepted and sub-grant agreements signed with the CSOs in February and March 2013. The proposal of CVM was not approved as the Project's Technical Working Group was not convinced that the right conditions existed in Tinglayan municipality for cooperation between civil society and the local authorities.

The three approved subprojects focused on citizen engagement in the Conditional Cash Transfer program of the Philippine government (RECITE in Mangaldan, Pangasinan), and on citizen engagement with local government (KARSA in Tabuk, Kalinga, and CCAGG in Penarrubia, Abra). The grant agreements and project documents are at Annexes 1, 2 and 3. The three subprojects were implemented during the remainder of 2013 and into 2014. For each project, a completion report was prepared with the last such report (that of CCAGG) received in April 2014. Copies of the three completion reports are at Annexes 4, 5 and 6.

Caraga: In October 2013, work started on the small grants activities for year 2 of the Project with the approval by AusAID of the Caraga region of Northeastern Mindanao as the location for the subprojects. A call for proposals was issued in December 2013. This was followed by a workshop in Cagayan de Oro in February 2014 to assist local CSOs with project development and design. Two proposals were selected with one focusing on benefit deficits in the Conditional Cash Transfer program in Cagayan de Oro (GROUP, Inc.) and the other on citizen monitoring of farm-to-market roads in the Agusan provinces (PAKISAMA). Sub-grant agreements were signed with GROUP, Inc. and PAKISAMA in March and April of 2014. Copies of the grant agreements and project documents are at Annex 7 and 8. The two subprojects were implemented during the remainder of 2014. The completion reports were received in late 2014 and early 2015 and are at Annexes 9 and 10.

A few highlights of the five subprojects are noted below (details are in their completion reports in the Annexes).

RECITE – Applied Social Accountability at the Community Level. This has been a successful subproject that demonstrated how the Family Development Sessions of the CCT program can be used to prepare citizens for a larger role in social accountability at the community level. The experience of this subproject provided the impetus for a much larger program in Northern Luzon that is currently being implemented with World Bank funding.

CCAGG – Enhancing the Impact of Citizen-Led Transparency for Good Governance. CCAGG, through its youth arm the YCCAGG, attempted to institutionalize youth engagement in participatory planning, budgeting and

monitoring at the barangay level. While this was to be achieved in nine barangays in the municipality of Penarrubia, Abra, the subproject only succeeded to achieve this goal in three barangays.

KARSA - Strengthening Local Capacities in Good Governance. KARSA aimed to start citizen engagement activities in five barangays of Tabuk City. Workshops were organized on social accountability and barangay monitoring teams formed in six barangays (one barangay was added during subproject implementation). These teams initially focused on the budget process in their barangays and later monitored over 30 projects implemented in their barangays.

PAKISAMA -Building Citizens' Capacity in Monitoring Road Projects. The purpose of this subproject was to build the capacity of ordinary citizens to effectively monitor government road construction projects and thereby creating effective demand for quality construction and on-time completion of these infrastructure projects. Key features were the building of capacities among citizen volunteers, the organization of monitoring teams and the building of relationships between citizens and the government agency concerned (the Department of Agriculture).

GROUP, Inc. - Citizen Watchdog for Good Governance: A Research and Monitoring Project for DSWD Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Cagayan de Oro City. In this subproject, GROUP, Inc. aimed to gain a better understanding of shortfalls in benefits received by CCT beneficiaries and the poverty impact of the CCT program. This was to be achieved through an extensive survey and social accountability activities. The subproject resulted in a series of policy recommendations to national government agencies (especially DSWD, DOH and DepEd), agencies of the city government of Cagayan de Oro, and CSOs.

Technical support was provided to the five CSOs on a scale not envisaged at the start of Project implementation. This resulted from the organizational capacity assessment undertaken during workshops held in 2012 in Dagupan City and in 2014 in Cagayan de Oro. PTF and ANSA-EAP concluded that more intensive technical support would have to be provided to ensure attainment of Project objectives and this was the rationale for the budget reallocation approved via the first Deed of Amendment.

2. Knowledge Management

This component of the Project was managed by ANSA-EAP. Key aspects of the knowledge management components were training and capacity building, technical advice, the conduct of knowledge-sharing workshops, preparation of case studies and the preparation of a number of knowledge products. A report on the activities under this component is attached as Annex 11. A separate file has been prepared containing all knowledge products prepared under the Project such as case study reports, project videos and a website ([ETI Outputs](#)). As a result of the first Deed of Amendment a new task was added to ANSA-EAP's responsibilities, viz. the secretariat of a newly formed Knowledge Consortium for Third Party Monitoring (see Annex 11).

3. Project Management

The Project was to be managed by three partners, PTF, MBC and ANSA-EAP. A MOA was signed amongst the partners that set out the responsibility of each under the Project (see section II of the MOA at Annex 12). PTF would coordinate Project planning, implementation and reporting and also coordinate with MBC on the management of the Small Grants Component.

MBC-CAC would coordinate with PTF and ANSA-EAP on the selection criteria for small grants, set up a grants selection committee, manage and monitor the implementation of the grants, and submit a midterm report and a final narrative and financial report.

The responsibilities of ANSA-EAP were to provide a project coordinator who would organize the workshops and produce communication materials, select experts for the preparation of case studies, provide technical input in other aspects of project implementation, and submit a midterm report and a final narrative and financial report.

A Technical Working Group was formed that met regularly to discuss implementation progress and address issues that emerged. Because of other

commitments, MBC was with some exceptions unable to discharge its responsibilities under the Project and these were assumed by PTF.

III. Outcomes, Impact, Sustainability and Lessons Learned

1. Key Outcomes

The main objective of the Project was to scale up the impact of citizen-led transparency initiatives for good governance in the Philippines. The Project document specified the following key outcomes of the Project:

- Corruption related to specific objectives of PTF grantees reduced
- Substantially expanded and more effective knowledge sharing among CSOs, including an enhanced role for media in covering successful PTF-supported cases

These two outcomes were to be achieved through grants to four to six subprojects that would be selected on their potential to generate knowledge of interest to the wider civil society community, accompanied by an active program of knowledge management. As described earlier, five subprojects were financed under the Small Grants component. These subprojects focused on three areas of citizen engagement: the Conditional Cash Transfer program (2 subprojects), local government engagement with civil society (2 subprojects) and citizen monitoring of farm-to-market roads (1 subproject). The main outcomes in these three areas will now be discussed.

The **Conditional Cash Transfer program** is the main vehicle for poverty reduction of the Aquino administration, but prior to the Project, only two instances of social accountability could be documented. Through the two subprojects in Penarrubia and Cagayan de Oro, the Project promoted interest in social accountability both on the part of the public sector (DSWD, DOH and DepEd) and in civil society. The Project also generated valuable experience with this form of citizen engagement, and directly contributed to growing interest in social accountability in this flagship program of the Philippine government. As one

result, a workshop was organized in March 2015 (outside the scope of the Project) to discuss best practices world-wide with respect to social accountability in conditional cash transfer programs. An international conference that would bring together practitioners from Latin America and other regions is contemplated for late 2015 in Manila.

The two subprojects addressing social accountability in the Conditional Cash Transfer Program have not been independently evaluated but their completion reports suggest that the Applied Social Accountability at the Community Level subproject implemented by RECITE in a municipality in Pangasinan was successful in engaging citizens in the CCT program (see Box and Annex 4). Particularly noteworthy is RECITE's work with Parent Leaders who, through the Family Development Sessions, are encouraged to assume greater responsibility for social accountability in their local communities. Outcomes are less clear in the case of the Citizen Watchdog for Good Governance subproject implemented by GROUP Inc. in Cagayan de Oro. The latter had a strong focus on understanding the benefit gaps in the CCT program and its impact on poverty. Some of the data gathered through this subproject are still being processed (see Annex 10).

Success Story. *Good relationships with CCAGG and RECITE were developed during Project implementation and they acquired extensive experience with the Conditional Cash Transfer program. (In 2011, CCAGG had received a grant from PTF for a project focusing on the integrity of the CCT program in Abra province - see ptfund.org/ for the evaluation of that project.) This prompted PTF to invite CCAGG and RECITE to join in a much larger initiative to ensure the integrity of the Conditional Cash Transfer program. This was occasioned by a World Bank announcement in 2013 inviting proposals for their Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA). A four-year project for Northern Luzon was submitted named i-Pantawid and a grant requested of \$800,000. In the event, GPSA received 219 proposals worldwide, of which 13 were from the Philippines. Of these, only 12 were selected from around the world, including i-Pantawid as the only proposal from the Philippines. The sub-grant provided to RECITE under the present Project was an important catalyst to mobilize this funding and the technical support provided helped build capacity to enable CCAGG and RECITE to implement this new four-year program. As a result, the work started under the present Project is now being replicated across Northern Luzon, while a proposal to extend this to Mindanao is being*

It cannot objectively be established whether there was in fact any corruption in the CCT program in the two municipalities covered but the subproject in Pangasinan is likely to have resulted in much greater transparency in the implementation of the CCT program. This is also anecdotally confirmed by the video produced on this subproject (see separate file with Knowledge Products at [ETI Outputs](#)).

One approach to knowledge-sharing under the Project was through the preparation of case studies which would attempt to document ‘what works and what doesn’t’ in a particular area of social engagement. The case studies would draw both on the experience of the subprojects and on similar projects implemented in the Philippines in the recent past. One such case study concerned the CCT program, which was prepared at the end of the first year of the Project (see separate file with Knowledge Products at [ETI Outputs](#)). The case study was discussed at a workshop held in Manila in December 2013 to which had been invited a cross-section of civil society, government and the international community.

Citizen engagement with local government has been a major reform area for the current Government. Through programs such as Grassroots Participatory Budgeting (previously Bottom-up Budgeting) and Seal of Good Housekeeping the government has attempted to stimulate the involvement of citizens in their local governance. A major issue here is the at times disappointing response of civil society to the openings offered by the government. The subprojects in Penarrubia and Tabuk City were supported to gain a better understanding of the issues involved.

The completion reports of the two subprojects are in many ways illustrative of the problems encountered in promoting citizen engagement at the local level (see Annexes 5 and 6). In Penarrubia there was distrust on the part of barangay officials in engaging CCAGG and the subproject objectives could only be achieved in three barangays (instead of the targeted nine). In those three barangays ‘people’s associations for social accountability’ were set up. In the case of Tabuk City six barangays were covered by KARSA instead of the original five. In all barangays in Tabuk City a system for citizen engagement was put in place (underpinned by an MOU with each barangay) and monitoring teams engaged their barangay on the budget. The completion report provides encouraging indications that the effort will continue.

As in the case of the CCT program, a case study was prepared documenting the experience with citizen engagement in local government using the two subprojects as well as three others projects implemented outside the framework of the Project. The case study was prepared at the end of the first year of the Project and then updated at the end of the second year. The case study (see separate file with Knowledge Products at [ETI Outputs](#)) was also discussed at the two end-of-year workshops mentioned earlier.

Monitoring road projects was the third area covered by a subproject. The subject was chosen both because public works are a frequent source of corruption and also because local roads are of very great interest to local people, making them an obvious subject of social accountability. In the Project's second year a grant was provided to PAKISAMA to organize citizen engagement related to four farm-to-market roads in the two Agusan provinces.

The completion report prepared by PAKISAMA shows an intensive process of engaging both local authorities and the Department of Agriculture, which is responsible for such roads (see Annex 9). Through the training of local volunteers, the capacity of local monitoring teams was built. An interesting feature here was the use of a CCAGG expert who shared the training manual, monitoring tools and on-the-ground experience acquired in Abra province. This is a good example of the benefits of knowledge-sharing within the CSO community (as is being pursued with the website designed and operated under the Project – see below). The completion report also suggests that through projects such as this the whole process of local road construction becomes much more transparent and hence the opportunities for corruption much reduced.

Through the preparation of a case study under the Project an attempt was made to extract lessons from the experience of this and similar projects (see separate file with Knowledge Products at [ETI Outputs](#)). Despite this sharing of knowledge and experience, the big challenge remains how to scale up such road construction monitoring. Each year hundreds of such roads are constructed and without the help and guidance of experienced CSOs like CCAGG and PAKISAMA it is difficult to see how the strength of local CSOs can be built and such local monitoring scaled up.

Turning now to the second outcome specified for the Project, an expanded and more effective knowledge sharing among CSOs, including an enhanced role for media. The key outcomes of the Project are the case studies, the knowledge-sharing workshops, the creation of a website that makes available learning materials, citizen monitoring tools, briefers on citizen rights and government services, social accountability project documents and synthesis materials (<http://citizensengage.info/>), the experiment with a bloggers competition and the creation of the Knowledge Consortium. The achievements on these points are documented in Annex 11.

2. *Impact*

In this section, four areas are indicated where the Project has had an impact.

The first area of impacts has been the *capacity of the sub-grantees*. Through the intensive area-based learning activities, the CSOs concerned have become more familiar with social accountability tools, with participatory planning and budgeting at the LGU level and with citizen engagement in the CCT program and road construction monitoring. During the implementation of their subprojects CSOs had the opportunity to immediately put this in practice.

A second area of impact has been *community level mobilization*. Often the grantees would work through, or even constitute local citizen groupings (e.g., CCAGG in Penarrubia and PAKISAMA in its subproject area in Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte) and working with local groupings they built local capacity for social accountability activities: (a) hundreds of parent leaders received training through the programs ran by RECITE and many more were targeted in RECITE's voter education program; (b) in CCAGG's three barangays in Penarrubia 'peoples associations for social accountability' have been set up; (c) in KARSA's six barangays in Tabuk City an active program of citizen engagement was developed; (d) in PAKISAMA's four communities in Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte citizens learned how to monitor the construction of local roads; and (e) in GROUP's five barangays of Cagayan de Oro citizens were actively engaged in monitoring the CCT program.

A third area of impact has been on *government authorities* at the LGU level who have been drawn into the activities under the subprojects. Changing local practices

of governance that had been in place for decades or longer is not simple. Barangay captains and elected city officials are not used to the direct form of accountability that is the essence of social accountability. Obviously local responses varied a great deal with some local authorities welcoming citizen engagement and others actively resisting it. It is PTF's experience worldwide that social accountability can only produce results if there is a constructive engagement between civil society and government. This was one of the criteria used in selecting the subprojects (and the reason CVM's subproject in Tinglayan municipality was not approved). Despite having judged that in the five approved subprojects the basis for constructive engagement exists, some problems were encountered where local officials proved less than cooperative (e.g. in a number of barangays in Penarrubia). Overall, however, the experience in the subprojects was positive and it is hoped that the subprojects will have a longer-term impact by having created the atmosphere for constructive engagement and demonstrated what can be achieved through it.

A fourth and final impact was reported in the three subprojects implemented during the first year of the Project. During the implementation of these three subprojects local elections took place. The three CSO partners (RECITE, CCAGG and KARSA) used this opportunity to conduct a *voter education program* and organize 'candidate forums' to engage citizens with those running for office. In Mangaldan, a Social Contract was signed by newly-elected local officials who committed themselves to honesty and transparency. These initiatives demonstrate the strong wish existing in local communities to move away from traditional politics and to actively engage elected officials.

The types of impacts discussed all relate to the subproject-specific level. Beyond that is the question whether these experiences will serve to enhance the impact of citizen engagement more widely. The Project has developed learning products and engagement tools that have the potential to do so. Noteworthy are the website for sharing third party monitoring resources (<http://citizensengage.info/>) and the knowledge consortium. Although the bloggers competition was only tried out once this is well worth considering repeating in the future.

3. Sustainability

Issues of sustainability need to be considered at the subproject and Project levels.

At the level of *subprojects* there is some confidence that what was initiated with respect to citizen engagement with the CCT program will be sustained. A grant from the World Bank's Global Partnership for Social Accountability received in 2014 will scale this up and carry it forward in Northern Luzon. Discussion have been initiated to launch a similar program in Mindanao (see Box at page 7).

With respect to citizen engagement in local governance, KARSA is determined to continue the activities initiated under the subproject and their completion report contains specific plans to that effect (see Annex 5). The picture is less clear in regards to Penarrubia, where significant problems were encountered in six of the nine barangays that were targeted. On the other hand, CCAGG is one of the most established CSOs engaged in social accountability and has been active in Abra province for nearly 30 years. There is little doubt that they will continue their advocacy for citizen engagement with local government.

The road monitoring subproject implemented by PAKISAMA was successful in mobilizing citizens to monitor the four farm-to-market projects that were being constructed in the subproject area. Whether this will translate in continued citizen monitoring in the subproject area in the future is presently unclear.

At the *Project* level the sustainability question is of a somewhat different nature. The question here is whether the Project has introduced novel practices to enhance the impact of citizen engagement.

Some innovations were introduced in that regard. The main one was the introduction of a new website, <http://citizensengage.info/>, which aims to provide resource material to CSOs planning to engage in social accountability and share experience. A second one was the creation of a knowledge consortium that brings together the major CSOs in social accountability (see Annex 11). A third innovation was the bloggers event that tried to use social media to support social accountability work. The longer term impact of the Project greatly depends on the question whether these efforts can be sustained: Who will manage the website? Who will sustain the Knowledge Consortium? And who will run future blogger competitions? This often, though not only, revolves around the availability of finance. At present there is no certainty that such finance will be available.

4. *Lessons Learned*

We highlight several important lessons:

First, it is clear that in any project of this kind, technical *and* financial support should go hand-in-hand, both in the project design and implementation phases. The capacity of local CSOs varies a great deal as does their familiarity with social accountability tools. Mentoring support to target CSO grantees and communicating comments during the subproject design stage resulted in proposals with stronger and more context-suitable social accountability approaches. For instance, understanding the local political economy context enables CSOs to more effectively engage with local government in local planning and budgeting processes. For example, the workshop hosted by KARSA on *Drawing out and Communicating Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives* enabled participants to capture emerging lessons from their projects and identify strategies for disseminating these insights to stakeholders and other practitioners.

PTF and ANSA-EAP tried to be pro-active in assessing the needs for support and providing this on a timely basis. Noteworthy also is the CSO-to-CSO technical support provided by CCAGG to PAKISAMA that was prompted by PTF. Through the website created under the Project many more opportunities for CSOs to benefit from each other's work and experience will be created.

A *second* lesson is that working at the community level always takes more time than planned. There will always be local officials who do not welcome civil society participation in local affairs and making them change their mind is sometimes not possible, and always takes time, as CCAGG experienced. The general experience of the Project's grantees, however, points to the huge potential in terms of getting people, especially at the community or barangay level, actively involved in governance and social accountability work.

Some conditions and strategies that contributed to this:

- *Increasing people’s awareness* of their rights and responsibilities as citizens, and governance processes that are open to their inputs. This is a key results area in social accountability and one which facilitates enthusiastic support and participation;
- *Using collaborative learning activities* on participatory governance, with both community members and barangay/local officials as participants; apart from enhancing capacities, this provides a “shared space” for discussing and ironing out existing problems in citizen-government relationships;
- *Enabling individuals* through training in social accountability who mobilized target groups and facilitated engagement with officials, allowing grantees to extend coverage and impact of their work(e.g., 4Ps Parent-Leaders for RECITE, youth and women volunteers for KARSA and CCAGG);
- *Using citizen monitoring tools* like the community score card provides a way to assess government performance that takes into account the perspectives of key stakeholders – service users and providers – and thus facilitates dissemination and consideration of findings; and,
- Using *citizen-led social contracting*, based on a vision and agenda crafted by community members and citizen groups, provides a good entry point for social accountability work at the local level.

A *third* and important lesson is the following. The RECITE subproject responded well to the Project’s goal of scaling up the impact of citizen-led transparency initiatives. They pushed the expanded Family Development Session (FDS+) technology further (to FDS++) and this will now be replicated in the whole of Northern Luzon and perhaps scaled-up nationwide through DSWD policies. On the other hand, CCAGG, KARSA and PAKISAMA essentially built on their earlier initiatives by expanding the scope of their monitoring (geographically, or in terms of the number of target beneficiaries). Not much weight has been given to the alternative of following up on the key findings from earlier monitoring initiatives and deepening the engagement with government. A key learning is that one should give priority to subprojects that clearly pursue scaling-up objectives.

A clear example is the *Building Citizens’ Capacity in Monitoring Road Projects* implemented by PAKISAMA in the Caraga region. There must be hundreds of

similar farm-to-market roads being implemented each year around the country. There is clearly much scope for scaling up. However this would require an extensive engagement with the Department of Agriculture to make social accountability a standard feature of its rural roads program. This in turn would require substantial financial resources to back up such an engagement. While there is a demonstrated readiness on the part of CSOs to undertake such a program, financial resources for doing so are currently not available.

A *fourth* lesson of the Project is that partnership building and strategic planning workshops result in (a) more in-depth assessment of the local social accountability contexts and organizational and technical capacities of target grantees, (b) learning/sharing of monitoring initiatives at the local level from other groups (such as G-Watch), which participated in the events, and (c) levelling off on the Project's overall results framework. These processes helped grantees in developing their subproject proposals and subsequent implementation planning.

A *fifth* and final lesson is that collaboration with grantees in the design and conduct of inception meetings ensured that all stakeholders (grantees' members/staff, volunteers, and local partners) were oriented on their respective subprojects and their roles as social accountability actors. These one-day, field-based meetings also provided venues for contact building with local government officials and frontline service providers who were identified as critical partners or actors under the grantees' planned interventions.

IV. Financial Report

The financial report on the Project is at Annex 13. That Annex also includes the audited financial statements of PTF and ANSA-EAP for the years 2012 and 2013. The audited financial statements of PTF and ANSA-EAP for 2014 will be forwarded as soon as available, most likely in April 2015. The five CSOs that received grants under the Project have each included a financial report in their completion reports (see Annexes 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10).

LIST OF ANNEXES

1. Grant agreement and subproject document for RECITE
2. Grant agreement and subproject document for KARSA
3. Grant agreement and subproject document for CCAGG
4. Completion report by RECITE
5. Completion report by KARSA
6. Completion report by CCAGG
7. Grant agreement and subproject document for PAKISAMA
8. Grant agreement and subproject document for GROUP Inc.
9. Completion report by PAKISAMA
10. Completion report by GROUP Inc.
11. ANSA-EAP report on the Knowledge Management component
12. Memorandum of Agreement amongst PTF, ANSA-EAP and MBC-CAC
13. Financial statements on the Project and audited accounts of PTF and ANSA-EAP for the years 2012 and 2013