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**List of Acronyms**

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Agrogoti Sangstha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDPC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRWSSP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Water Supply &amp; Sanitation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Community Action for Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>conflict affected person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARTA</td>
<td>Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>community based organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>community group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Center Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>community organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>citizen report cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>community score card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPE</td>
<td>Directorate of Primary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPHE</td>
<td>Department of Public Health Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOLIDAR</td>
<td>Department of Local Infrastructure &amp; Agriculture Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Democracy Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSP</td>
<td>Emergency Peace Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>Enhanced Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCN</td>
<td>Friends Service Council Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCOL</td>
<td>Infrastructure Development Company Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>information, education and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japanese Social Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>key informant interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBT</td>
<td>labor-based toolkit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>learning center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGD</td>
<td>Local Government Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGSP</td>
<td>Local Government Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>local peace committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJF</td>
<td>Manusher Jonno Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFALD</td>
<td>Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoPR</td>
<td>Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEST</td>
<td>Nucleus for Empowerment through Skill Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIU</td>
<td>project implementation unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>partner organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRAN</td>
<td>Promoting Accountability in Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Population Service and Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTF</td>
<td>Partnership for Transparency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAIDP</td>
<td>Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDRS</td>
<td>Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REREP</td>
<td>Rural Electrical Renewable Energy Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC</td>
<td>Resource Integration Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSC</td>
<td>Reaching Out of School Children II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs</td>
<td>rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Social Audit Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Sub-Project Completion Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>solar heater system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPP</td>
<td>Social Investment Program Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCA</td>
<td>Subproject Completion Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Scheme Supervision Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRP</td>
<td>School Sector Reform Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tk</td>
<td>taka</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>trainer of trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPM</td>
<td>third party monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>task team leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>union parishad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDRC</td>
<td>Vijaya Development Resources Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>ward committee</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

The Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability (CARTA) Program was funded by a US$1.9 million grant from the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF). The grant was managed by the World Bank. CARTA started in mid-2011 and will be completed by November 30, 2015 after it was extended by more than one year. The World Bank chose the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) to implement the CARTA Program. The CARTA Program objective was “to enhance the development impact, sustainability and client ownership of pro-poor projects financed by the World Bank in Bangladesh and Nepal, by promoting civil society organizations’ engagement, experience and capacity to demand better governance.” The subprojects are the main reason for CARTA, by far the largest component, and the component where impacts can be clearly assessed. As part of the grant agreement, PTF was required to contract an independent assessment of the subproject component of CARTA. This report is on that assessment.

This assessment was based on a desk review. The budget precluded fieldwork. It is based on a review of documents and interviews with a variety of stakeholders. The subproject completion reports (SCRs) were by far the most important source of information. They ranged from 41 to 123 pages. They used a standardized reporting format, which facilitated comparisons across subprojects.

There were twelve subprojects, six in Bangladesh and six in Nepal covering 11 World Bank financed projects (one Bank project had two subprojects because of its size). The subproject costs ranged from approximately US $70-150,000. The subprojects were quite short in duration, ranging from slightly less than one year to almost two years. Nepalese and Bangladeshi CSOs were selected through a highly competitive process to implement the subprojects.

Most CARTA subproject objectives were to: (i) ascertain the existing situation, (ii) diagnose the problems, (iii) provide grassroots feedback to authorities on project implementation, (iv) provide capacity building to community and committee members, and (v) provide remedies to the problems they had identified. Most subprojects had a combination of these objectives.

Subprojects aimed at promoting social accountability including: (i) third-party monitoring of Bank-funded project activities and results; (ii) promotion of access to project information and building of capacity of citizens to act on that information; and (iii) strengthening grievance procedures and feedback mechanisms to address perceived violations of project policies, procedures or practices.

Main Findings

The subprojects built a lot of capacity. While much of the capacity building was focused on village committees and other CBOs, subprojects also increased the capacity of the CSOs working in the Bank projects. Most of the capacity building, even of the CARTA CSOs, took place on-the-job.

Subprojects collected a large amount of information including quantitative data. This information was very useful to the government implementing agencies and the World Bank task teams in helping them understand how the projects were performing. The CARTA CSOs also collected a lot of information that helped demonstrate the impacts of their interventions.

Subprojects greatly increased transparency which had the impact of making service users, project beneficiaries, and communities more aware of their rights. The combination of training, information
campaigns, and transparency has made people much more aware and knowledgeable about projects. Practically every SCR mentioned how citizens and village committees now were much more aware and capable of performing their roles and responsibilities. As they became more informed and empowered, that increased their participation in projects.

Transparency and participation empowered citizens to make government more accountable to them. Subprojects increased the percentage of project beneficiaries that received benefits to which they were entitled as well as improved service delivery. Local governance processes became more responsive to the community. Grievance mechanisms are now functioning much better as a result of the subprojects.

One of the most important impacts was not well documented: the change in government mindsets. Government officials realize the value of the subprojects, but government does not have the money or capacity to replicate them widely. Findings from the reports and recommendations by the CSOs were used by the projects. Most of these types of impacts will become evident over time as the subprojects were completed recently, and there has been no post-subproject observations to confirm ongoing impacts.

CARTA should be seen as a learning experience. CARTA was a pilot program. It tested a model of supporting CSO social accountability work. It proved effective and efficient. There was a lot of knowledge sharing and learning among the CARTA CSOs.

The various stakeholders had different priorities, especially the government and the Bank. Turnover in Bank and government staff posed further challenges as people who inherited CARTA subprojects were not always as supportive as those who had initially agreed to the CARTA subprojects. Communication was not as good as it should have been.

CARTA was much more time consuming and the CSOs required more support than MJF, Helvetas, PTF or the Bank anticipated. PTF would have benefitted significantly from having an in-country presence to provide more sustained support to the CSOs. The first half of CARTA was much more frustrating and less productive than the last half, because the initial time needed for the World Bank to select projects to be supported and to reach agreement between World Bank, Project Implementing Agencies and the CARTA team on terms of reference and the scope of the subprojects. It is to everyone’s credit that they stuck with CARTA and saw it through to a successful conclusion.

Citizen empowerment is needed, not just community mobilization. A clear lesson is that empowerment and a culture of good governance reinforce each other, and monitoring should not be limited to procedures and achievement of results, but it should also address the issue of beneficiary empowerment and promotion of good governance in projects. This requires capacity building.

The value of third party monitoring by CSOs and communities as a “political” tool as well as a technical one should be recognized. It is a “political tool” in the sense that it focuses on beneficiary empowerment rather than measurement, and on promotion of transparency and accountability rather than project assessment. The CSOs were quite emphatic that the greater subproject impacts were due to empowerment, not the successful use of social accountability tools. The tools were the method, but it was the empowerment of people to use them that made the critical difference.
Recommendations
As CARTA is nearly complete, these recommendations are for future programs similar to CARTA.

The period for most subproject implementation should be longer than 12-18 months, probably 3-5 years. It would have been optimal if CARTA subprojects were coterminous with the implementation of the Bank-assisted project. The CARTA subprojects should have been part of the projects from inception.

The institutional arrangements were too complex. The “collaborative” project design requiring agreement between multiple levels of the World Bank, the governments of Nepal and Bangladesh (national, local, and project implementing agency), PTF, Helvetas Nepal and the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), made it institutionally complex. There needs to be better coordination and communication between all the stakeholders in these kinds of projects.

CARTA CSOs need more sustained and better support, especially in the early stages. This support needs to be planned, whether it is from the partner CSOs (MJF and Helvetas Nepal), PTF, or elsewhere. The CSO managing the project, PTF in this case, needs an in-country presence.

Sustainability and CSO exit strategies need to be built into the subproject action plan. There should have been some sort of transition to the government taking over. Also, many neighboring villages asked to be included in the subprojects, or at least to receive the same training, but there was no way the CARTA CSOs could meet this demand. That should have been anticipated and planned for.

The success of the CARTA project should be broadly disseminated, especially within the World Bank. CARTA has significant lessons for the World Bank’s current initiative on citizen engagement and beneficiary feedback. The CARTA model should move beyond a pilot project. The combination of dedicated CSOs implementing the subprojects—effective support by Helvetas Nepal, MJF, and PTF—led to very impressive outcomes and impacts despite all the obstacles.
1 Introduction to CARTA

The Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability (CARTA) Program was funded by a US$1.9 million grant from the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF). The grant was managed by the World Bank. CARTA started in late 2011 and will be completed by November 30, 2015.

The World Bank chose the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) to implement the CARTA Program. The CARTA Program objective was “to enhance the development impact, sustainability and client ownership of pro-poor projects financed by the World Bank in Bangladesh and Nepal, by promoting civil society organizations’ engagement, experience and capacity to demand better governance.”

CARTA had four components: (i) a sub-grant facility; (ii) on-the-job capacity building; (iii) learning and knowledge sharing; and (iv) program management. The first component was by far the largest. Twelve sub-grants were awarded, six each in Bangladesh and Nepal, for a total amount of US$1.29 million to support eleven World Bank-financed projects and programs in infrastructure, health, education, local government and social investment funds.¹

Given that PTF has no field offices in Bangladesh or Nepal, the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF) in Bangladesh and Helvetas Swiss Intercoporation (Helvetas) in Nepal were selected as PTF’s in-country partners to help select Bangladeshi and Nepali civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement the subprojects and to support those CSOs with training, capacity building and other support. After considering alternatives, PTF selected MJF and Helvetas on the basis of their experience with grant-making, knowledge of the local CSO communities and demonstrated capacity to manage complex projects.

Subprojects aimed at promoting social accountability including: (i) third-party monitoring² of Bank-funded project activities and results; (ii) promotion of access to project information and building of capacity of citizens to act on that information; and (iii) strengthening grievance procedures and feedback mechanisms to address perceived violations of project policies, procedures or practices.

The broad parameters of the subprojects were designed by the Bank project teams in collaboration with PTF, MJF and Helvetas Nepal. The subproject concepts were discussed with the project implementing units (PIUs of the governments of Bangladesh and Nepal). MJF and Helvetas Nepal then issued requests for proposals (RFPs) to interested CSOs. Those CSOs produced Concept Notes on how they would address the specified governance needs in those projects. MJF and Helvetas Nepal, with PTF, used technical criteria in evaluating the Concept Notes. These criteria included CSO capacity and experience in implementing these kinds of projects. The highest rated CSOs were invited to produce full subproject proposals. Later on, CARTA skipped the Concept Note stage, by evaluating CSOs and going directly to full subproject proposals without using the Concept Notes as part of the selection process. It appeared that some CSOs were using professional proposal writers and thus the Concept Notes were not a good basis on which to select CSOs for subproject implementation. The governments of Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as the World Bank, had to approve CARTA subprojects before they could proceed.

¹ One Bangladesh project, the Local Government Support Project (LGSP), had two subprojects (sub-grants) as two different countries, it was split into two separate projects.
² Monitoring in CARTA to implement subprojects in different parts of Bangladesh and Nepal.
The On-the-job Capacity Building component funded activities aimed at building the capacity of CSOs to interact with governments in constructive ways to promote transparency and accountability, including: (i) action-learning by CSOs through designing and implementing DFGG activities; (ii) regular interaction by CSO staff with experienced advisers skilled in project design, results frameworks and impact measurement; (iii) advice and assistance by experienced advisers on sub-project implementation to assist in solving problems and ensuring a continued focus on results; and (iv) interacting among CSOs to share lessons of experience and build mutual competence and confidence.

The Learning and Knowledge Sharing component funded activities aimed at building a body of knowledge and good practice in social accountability with lessons of experience and new methodologies and approaches including: (i) workshops (country-specific, sector-specific or activity-specific) to bring together the principal stakeholders/local people, governments and CSOs; (ii) publication of lessons of experience from South Asia; and (iii) international exposure to lessons of experience through media and information systems.

A separate report, to be prepared by PTF, MJF and Helvetas Nepal, will cover the entire CARTA program. This assessment is focused on the subproject component. The subprojects are the main reason for CARTA, by far the largest component, and the one component where impacts can be clearly assessed. It is difficult to assess the capacity building, learning, and knowledge sharing components. These are mentioned only as they relate to the subproject component and its impacts.

2 Methodology of the Assessment

This assessment was a desk review. The budget precluded field work. It is based on a combination of document review and interviews with a variety of stakeholders. This allowed triangulation of sources to compare findings and perspectives.

The documents that were reviewed include: eleven subproject completion reports (SCRs);³ subproject requests for concept notes, action plans, and project proposals; Helvetas, MJF and PTF progress reports, annual reports and semi-annual reports; the CARTA Operations Manual; the JSDF grant funding request; and minutes of meetings between MJF and government project officials.⁴

The subproject completion reports were by far the most important source of information. These ranged from 41 to 123 pages and averaged 70 pages. They contained lengthy annexes with details on the survey methodologies, questionnaires, case studies, etc. PTF provided a standardized reporting format which facilitated comparisons across subprojects. PTF also worked with the CSOs to improve the quality and clarity of the reports. They provided detailed information about subproject objectives, activities, tools and methods, challenges, project management, and mostly on outputs and outcomes. They were less detailed about project implementation although the various progress reports helped fill this gap.

To complement the document review, interviews, meetings, phone calls, and emails were exchanged with a range of stakeholders.⁵ The sources include: PTF advisers of subprojects in Nepal and Bangladesh, MJF and Helvetas Nepal program managers for CARTA, Bangladeshi CSO CARTA subproject managers,

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³ The SCR for the Nepal Community Action for Nutrition Project was not complete at the time of writing this report.
⁴ Annex 2 contains a list of the main documents that were reviewed.
⁵ Annex 3 contains a list of people interviewed, and a list of those that responded to emailed questions.
Bangladeshi government officials of the five Bank-assisted projects, and World Bank CARTA coordinator and task team leaders

Some caveats about the assessment methodology are warranted. First, without a field visit, none of the information was originally collected by the author of this report. Only observers at the community level would be able to know many of the impacts, and that would require observation over a period of time. Second, most of the information, such as the SCRs, is self-reported. Third, the April 25, 2015 earthquake and hundreds of aftershocks in Nepal precluded interviews of Nepalese CSO and government staff. Fourth, the author did not communicate with beneficiaries, but relied on the SCRs. Therefore this assessment is stronger on factual evidence, but is less certain of its qualitative and normative judgments.

3 Overview of the Eleven Subprojects

The original JSDF funding request envisioned up to 50 projects in India, Bangladesh and Nepal. India declined to be part of the CARTA program. By December 2011 that had been revised to 30 subprojects (15-20 in Bangladesh and 5-10 in Nepal). It quickly became evident that the process of preparing requests for concept notes and selecting CSOs was quite time consuming, and that in most cases there would be just one CARTA subproject for each Bank-assisted project. Ultimately there were six subprojects each in Bangladesh and Nepal, for a total of 12 subprojects. The subprojects lasted 12-24 months. Tables 1 and 2 list key information on the 12 subprojects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank Financed Project</th>
<th>Project Implementing Agency</th>
<th>CARTA CSO</th>
<th>Sub-project cost</th>
<th>Main Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization Project (RAIDP) | Dept. of Local Infrastructure & Agriculture Roads (DOLIDAR) | Sky-Samaj | $132,468 | • build CBO skills to monitor construction work, contracts, and payments  
• enable CBOs to register valid grievances |
| Poverty Alleviation Fund 2 (PAF) | Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) | Friends Service Council Nepal (FSCN) | $145,880 | • increase the community organizations’ (COs) abilities to hold their service provider partner organizations (PO) more accountable  
• strengthen CO support to their constituent communities |
| Enhanced Vocational Education and Training (EVENT) | Ministry of Education (MoE) | Vijaya Development Resources Centre (VDRC) | $120,549 | • verify the accuracy of reports about training of trainers, master trainers, etc.  
• assess the quality of training from the perspective of trainees |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP)</th>
<th>Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)</th>
<th>Samuhik Abhiyan</th>
<th>$110,335</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Objectives</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • assess the extent to which service providers are delivering the rehabilitation support to conflict affected persons (CAPs)  
• increase citizen familiarity with peace support packages  
• revitalize the local grievance mechanism  
• promote service provider accountability |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Action for Nutrition (CAN aka First 1,000 Days Project)</th>
<th>Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD)</th>
<th>Nucleus for Empowerment through Skill Transfer (NEST)</th>
<th>$73,408</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Objectives</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • increase access of stakeholders to rapid rural nutrition (RRNI) related information  
• verify that the project team has carried out all the activities for effective implementation of the RRNI projects  
• verify reports developed by the key service providers with the help of RRNI team |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Sector Reform Program (SSRP)</th>
<th>Ministry of Education (MoE)</th>
<th>Sky-Samaj</th>
<th>$66,937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| • verify the quantity of printed textbooks versus the planned quantity  
• report the number of textbooks received by students |

### Table 2: PTF CARTA Program in Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank Financed Project</th>
<th>Project Implementing Agency</th>
<th>CARTA CSO</th>
<th>Sub-project cost7</th>
<th>Main Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Local Government Support Project II (LGSP) | Local Government Department (LGD) | Democracy Watch (DW) | $149,948 | • promote local government responsiveness to community needs  
• mobilize and build capacity of UP representatives to engage communities in the open budgeting process |
| Rural Electrical Renewable Energy Project (REREP) | Infrastructure Development Company Limited (IDCOL) | Population Service and Training Center (PSTC) | $146,065 | • build capacity of local citizens to demand better service and support  
• provide information about service delivery based on the feedback from the users |
| Bangladesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Project (BRWSSP) | Dept. of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) | Resource Integration Center (RIC) | $97,000 | • monitor and compare the quality and outcomes of the social mobilization process in both the piped water supply and point source water supply components  
• Build capacities of BRWSSP partners for monitoring the provision of water supply |

7 This includes funds from CARTA but excludes contributions by the CSO itself which were less than $10,000 per subproject.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reaching Out of School Children II (ROSC)</th>
<th>Directorate of Primary Education (DPE)</th>
<th>RDRS</th>
<th>$80,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Investment Program Project II (SIPP)</td>
<td>Social Development Foundation (SDF)</td>
<td>Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Centre (BDPC)</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- verify the selection process for learning center (LC) location and school conditions
- verify selection of teachers and provision of training to the teachers
- verify the enrollment of students and their access to the benefits
- strengthen capacities of Center Management Committee (CMC) and parents to supervise and assess performance of the LCs
- accelerate and strengthen the social mobilization activities
- enhance and improve the transparency and accountability practices of the village level institutions

There was strong competition among CSOs for most of the subprojects. In Bangladesh, MJF received 80 concept notes for the LGSP subproject and 33 for the RERED subproject. Helvetas Nepal received 14 concept notes for the CAN subproject, 9 for SSRP, 16 for RAIDP, 25 for PAF, 8 for EVENT, and 33 for EPSP. One Nepali CSO, Sky Samaj, was selected for two subprojects, RAIDP and SSRP. The selection process was transparent, fair and successful in choosing highly qualified CSOs.

4 Subproject Objectives

CARTA was designed to fill governance gaps in Bank-assisted projects. Most of these projects had village-level committees to help monitor the project, give community voice and feedback, and to help implement the project. Often these committees and/or the community as a whole lacked knowledge about the project, its intended benefits, and the roles and responsibilities of the community, the committees, the project and the government. The government simply did not have the resources to train the large number of committee members. Even though they hired CSOs to do this work in some projects, it was not enough.

For example, in the LGSP, most of the surveyed Ward Committee (WC) and Scheme Supervision Committee (SSC) members had very limited knowledge of the LGSP. About 72% of WC and SSC members of targeted areas were unaware that the LGSP included their union parishads (UPs). The UP and LGSP did not provide the operational manual to the WC and SSC members, so they were unaware of policies and procedures. About 83% of UPs (in targeted areas) did not follow the operations manual. The UPs were generally not prepared to involve the public in the scheme implementation process. Information boards about the scheme implementation were displayed at only 5% of the sites in the two CARTA subproject districts. Similarly, in the BRWSSP, water-user committee members were not aware of their responsibilities. Water-users were generally not aware of the water-user committee in their catchment. The implementing agency, the DPHE, did not conduct project monitoring in the field.

Another frequent governance gap was that village level committees were not established or were not functioning properly. Two examples where the committees did not function well are SIPP and RAIDP. In the SIPP 2, many Social Audit Committees (SACs) were not functional. As a result, there was little
oversight of loan operations leading to insufficient transparency and accountability in loan withdrawal, disbursement, procurement, and fund management; inadequate information on the role and responsibilities of different committee members; absence of grievances mechanism at the village level institutions; and so on.

In the RAIDP, the CARTA project was initiated to resolve specific problems, including: the lack of institutionalized community monitoring, inadequate information on the role and responsibility of Village Road Coordination Committee (VRCC) and Local Roads User Committee (LRUC), limited understanding of civil works, a weak complaint mechanism, and the lack of user-friendly documents, particularly the Bill of Quantity (BoQ). The grievance registration system was primarily verbal: there were no records as to the number, type and status of complaints.

Therefore most CARTA subproject objectives were to: (i) gather data in the field, analyze the situation, and diagnose problems, (ii) provide community feedback to authorities on project implementation, (iii) provide capacity building to community and committee members, and (iv) suggest remedies to the problems they had identified. Most subprojects had a combination of these objectives.

Most subprojects were more focused on monitoring (either third party monitoring [TPM] or participatory monitoring by beneficiaries or the community) than capacity building, both to verify that intended procedures were followed and that services were delivered as expected. In the ROSC, the objectives of TPM were to verify: (i) the selection process for learning center (LC) location and school conditions; (ii) selection of teachers and provision of training to the teachers; (iii) enrollment of students and their access to the benefits (rural areas); and (iv) strengthen capacities of Center Management Committee (CMC) members and parents to supervise and assess LC performance by introducing Parents School Committees to the Community Score Card (CSC) tool. The EVENT subproject objective was to verify the accuracy of reports of outputs under component 1 of the project, which were used to trigger the disbursement of funds from the World Bank. The SSRP subproject aimed to verify the quantity of printed textbooks versus the plan, and to report the number of textbooks received by students. In the BRWSSP, it was to monitor and compare the quality and outcomes of the social mobilization process in both the piped water supply and point source water supply components. The EPSP subproject was to assess the extent to which service providers are delivering the rehabilitation support to conflict affected persons, increase the level of understanding on benefits and supports among beneficiaries, to increase citizens’ familiarity with peace support packages, and to revitalize the grievance mechanism at the local level.

Some subprojects focused on building community or CBO capacity to perform the monitoring. In the RERED project, it was to build capacity of local citizens to demand better service delivery of solar heater systems using public funds. In the RAIDP, the purpose of the CARTA subproject was to strengthen the capacity of about 80 community based organizations (CBOs) which monitor road construction projects, and to support CBOs in understanding and reporting any malpractice.

Three subprojects focused directly on making the government project more accountable to the beneficiaries. In the LGSP, the CARTA subproject objectives were to promote local government responsiveness to community needs in the implementation of LGSP schemes at the UP level, to mobilize and build capacity of UP representatives to engage communities in the open budgeting process, and to
strengthen the capacity of civil society and communities to monitor budget transparency, availability of information, participation, effectiveness of citizen engagement, inclusion, accountability, and citizen satisfaction with services and responsiveness of government. In the SIPP, the CARTA sub-project was designed to address the inadequate functioning of village level institutions, improper financial management and accounting of schemes at local level, the lack of transparency and accountability in procurement process, and absence of grievances mechanism at the village level institutions. In the PAF, the objective was to provide community organizations (COs) with information, knowledge and skills so that they could put pressure on their partner organizations (POs) to deliver services, according to their agreements. Table 3 lists the subprojects according to whether their primary objective was monitoring or capacity building and empowerment.

**Table 3: Primary Objectives of CARTA Subprojects**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary CARTA Subproject Objective</th>
<th>World Bank Financed Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Community Action for Nutrition (CAN)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enhanced Vocational Education and Training (EVENT)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reaching Out of School Children II (ROSC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization Project (RAIDP)</td>
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<td>Rural Electrical Renewable Energy Project (REREP)</td>
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<td>Rural Water Supply &amp; Sanitation Project (BRWSSP)</td>
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<td>School Sector Reform Program (SSRP)</td>
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<td>Empowerment and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Local Government Support Project II (LGSP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Fund 2 (PAF2)</td>
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<td>Social Investment Program Project II (SIPP)</td>
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**5 Main Subproject Activities and Methods**

This section provides a brief description of subproject activities to convey a sense of how the subprojects went about achieving their objectives. The subproject completion reports are quite detailed about the inputs and outputs of the subprojects. For example, in the SIPP subproject, the BDPC subproject had the following outputs:

- 17 people were recruited and received five days training on social accountability tools and orientation on the subproject methodology.
- A survey of perceptions and experiences of 400 beneficiaries and 400 non-beneficiaries.
- 800 members of 78 monitoring teams selected through a participatory process were trained periodically to conduct their own social accountability initiatives.
- Four-day refresher training on social accountability tools, such as input tracking and public hearings, were conducted with 14 staff.
- 18 public hearing meetings.
- 78 input tracking exercises in 78 villages.
240 quarterly meetings with monitoring team members which carried out input tracking, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and public hearings.

158 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with beneficiaries and committee members.

Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with beneficiaries, community leaders, and Social Development Foundation (SDF) officials.

BDPC was not an exception in terms of the variety of activities. Most of other 11 subprojects had similar activities. These included monitoring (of the effectiveness of citizen engagement in village committees, the availability of information to citizens, citizen satisfaction with services and responsiveness of government, road construction, delivery of textbooks, and the effectiveness of the complaint mechanisms), providing feedback to authorities on project implementation, awareness building among the communities (through interventions like mobilizing parents, explanatory meetings with local authorities and other stakeholders, orientation for community members of village committees), and so on.

To provide some sense of scale, these activities were undertaken with a significant number of communities. RDRS covered 135 learning centers in 27 union parishads of 3 upazillas. In the RAIDP subproject, SKY-Samaj (SKY) worked with 105 CBOs that monitored 27 road construction projects in 16 of 30 RAIDP districts. SKY implemented the SSRP subproject in 15 districts, collecting data from 150 community schools. FSCN implemented the PAF subproject with 120 community organizations (COs) in 10 Nepal districts. The six CARTA subprojects in Nepal had operations in 50 of Nepal’s 75 districts, so they were widespread if a bit thin in their coverage within each district.

Even so, the CARTA subprojects were dwarfed by the sheer scale of the Bank-assisted projects. For example, the PAF project involves more than 20,000 COs throughout Nepal, so the 120 COs of the CARTA subproject covered less than 1% of the project’s COs. The CARTA subproject for the LGSP covered 30 of the 4500 UPs covered by the Bank project, also slightly less than 1% of the total. Despite the significant efforts of the CARTA subprojects, they could cover only a small sample of the villages covered by the Bank projects. In financial terms, the CARTA subprojects ranged from $67-158,000, while the total costs of the government projects ranged from $40 million to $545 million. The CARTA subprojects always cost far less than 1% of the total project costs.

Therefore the subprojects should be considered as pilot or demonstration projects, to show what could be achieved in a small portion of the Bank project in less than two years.

The CSOs used a combination of standard information gathering methods such as focus group discussions and key informant interviews, typical participatory methods such as information campaigns and community mobilization, and social accountability tools such as input tracking, citizen report cards (CRCs), community scorecards (CSCs), and social audits. The choice of tools made sense and they were well executed. Sometimes there were some limitations because of geography, budget, and stage of the project cycle. Sometimes random controlled trials were not possible. Nonetheless, the CSOs demonstrated significant creativity and sophistication in their activities and choice of methods.

Multiple tools and methods were used in most subprojects which strengthened their effectiveness. For example, in the ROSC, a CRC survey was followed by key informant interviews and focus group discussions to verify the findings of the CRC survey and obtain greater depth of understanding of
responses. In the ROSC, FGDs and KIIs were with Upazilla Nirbahi Officers, Upazilla Education Officer, Headmaster of the mother primary school, and UP Chairmen and members during the CRC survey. Input tracking was used to gather information on supply side of operation of LC such as number of dropout students, teachers’ location from the LC, etc. The BRWSSP subproject also used a CRC and a CSC followed by FGDs and KIIs. Sky-Samaj surveyed 4,920 students using a CRC. SKY then organized 150 meetings at the school level with 2,642 participants.

VDRC monitored 67 training events with 1,544 trainees for the EVENT subproject. VRDC then used a satisfaction survey to assess the quality of the training from the participants’ perspective. VRDC also performed on-site monitoring of Training of Trainers programs in 20 districts. A total of 1,313 trainees from the five types of programs (32% of the total number of participants in the trainings observed) were interviewed in person or by phone. Finally, the subproject used fortnightly broadcasts by Vijaya FM of information on the third-party monitoring program and the progress and information about the activities of EVENT project.

Training was a key activity in almost all the subprojects. In the PAF subproject, FSCN provided 20 capacity development trainings and 360 on-the-job coaching and counseling sessions to CO members. A total of 120 PSRP workshops were held. Much of the training was to build CO capacity to use the social accountability tools. Public hearings were held in all 120 COs. The review tool developed by PAF was used by a total of 1,263 participants.

Sometimes the tools and methods had to be adapted to the circumstances. Community scorecards were very useful, especially the interface meetings in the ROSC subproject. However, in the LGSP the CSC did not work well because people did not have enough knowledge to do the scoring, so they shifted to a social audit and a survey by an external consultant. SIPP also shifted from a CSC to a social audit for similar reasons. The social audits included input tracking and 18 public hearings (one in each district). A total of 158 FGDs were conducted with beneficiaries and Committee members to identify the strengths and weaknesses of micro-credit institutions.

While it is difficult to assess the quality of these activities based on the subproject completion reports, there are some indicators that the quality was fairly good. First, some of the data, findings and recommendations produced were valued by the government and the Bank. Second, as the section on impacts shows, the activities were of good enough quality to make significant impacts. Third, PTF, MJF and Bank staff confirmed the quality of various activities, and the CSO work more generally.

6 Outcomes and Impacts

While the amount of subproject activities and outputs is impressive, especially given the short timeframe for subprojects, what really matters are their outcomes and impacts. This is the focus of this assessment report. Unfortunately, many of the impacts will become evident only over time. The subproject completion reports were written at the end of implementation, so they cannot capture outcomes and impacts that emerge after that. Even impacts by subproject completion are quite impressive in most projects, especially in terms of impacts on the communities.
The SCRs adopted two main methods to document impacts: (i) comparing responses from a baseline survey with responses from an end-of-subproject survey, and (ii) comparing responses of CARTA and non-CARTA communities, usually at the end of the subproject. PTF required the CSOs to monitor their impacts. This made sense given that most of the subprojects were already using surveys and interviews to document project beneficiary knowledge, practices and so on.

There are several types or levels of outcomes and impacts. First are the direct outcomes of training and education efforts that increase community and CBO awareness and capacity. Second are the impacts of the social accountability activities such as improving transparency, accountability and participation in the Bank assisted projects. Third are the longer-term outcomes on the projects such as using the findings and recommendations of the CARTA subprojects to improve the functioning of the projects. Fourth are the impacts on the government agencies involved in the projects.

There is no doubt that the subprojects built a lot of capacity. Practically every SCR mentioned how citizens and village committees now are much more aware and capable of performing their roles and responsibilities. In the ROSC, management training was provided to the CMC members and now most of CMC members are well aware of their role and responsibility and they organized regular meetings. In the RERED, after receiving training from the CARTA program, user knowledge increased about taking care of their solar heater home system. Those that received training in turn educated other users. Training activities in the SIPP subproject helped make community beneficiaries aware about income opportunities and jobs through proper utilization of micro credit schemes, as well as ensured their active participation to boost the level of transparency and accountability of village committees such as the SACs. Community members receiving training then trained other people so knowledge spread.

Training also increased capacity of the CSOs working in the Bank projects. For example, training increased knowledge and skills of community organizations in the PAF project, and this increased their ability to become members of larger thematic networks (e.g., land rights federation, savings associations, and cooperatives). Training helped project CSOs in the BRWSSP to develop tools to collect necessary information.

Subprojects collected a large amount of information including quantitative data. This information was very useful to the government implementing agencies and the World Bank task teams in helping them understand how the projects were performing. The CARTA CSOs also collected a lot of information that helped demonstrate the impacts of their interventions.

Subprojects greatly increased transparency that had the impact of making service users, project beneficiaries, and communities more aware of their rights. In the LGSP, local governments did not want to display information. Now detailed information on the LGSP is shown on UP notice boards: 90% of UPs in the Shatkira district now disseminate information through notice boards compared to 7% at the time of baseline survey. More information is also shared during the ward open budget meeting. Also, 93% of respondents in CARTA UPs reported that they are aware of the LGSP procurement process as detailed in the UP operational manual compared to 21% in non-CARTA UPs. Knowledge of grievance processes was higher in CARTA UPs – 73% compared to 16% in non-CARTA UPs. Awareness about development plans increased considerably among UP committee members (from 66% in the baseline to 97% in the second
survey). Awareness about the annual budget among UP committee members also increased (from 76% to 99% in the second survey).

The shift from keeping information restricted to disseminating it is one of the major achievements of the ROSC subproject. Now detailed information about the ROSC project is well known in each LC community. After good relations were established between the local governments and the learning center, 100% of LCs in the CARTA areas displayed annual plans.

The combination of training, information campaigns, and transparency has made people much more aware and knowledgeable about projects. The amount of communication among users, non-users and service providers has increased. In the RAIDP, the end-of-subproject survey revealed that 97% of the surveyed CBO members can fully explain environmental and social management framework provisions, 92% had knowledge of the quality of civil works and methods of community monitoring, and 84% of CBOs have assigned the responsibility among members for monitoring the construction of civil works. In the EPSP, the end-of-subproject survey showed that 96% of the beneficiaries knew about EPSP compared to 56% in the baseline survey.

Another significant outcome has been increased community and committee participation in projects. The degree of WC and SSC member engagement in LGSP has increased due to the CARTA Program. Now 100% of committee members participate in the scheme selection decision-making process whereas 55% of the UP committee members in the baseline survey attended meetings regularly. In CARTA UPs 97% stated that they participated in scheme implementation, compared to 29% in non-CARTA UPs. In CARTA UPs, 98% of the committee members reported that the community participated in the scheme implementation, compared to 24% in non-CARTA UPs.

Just getting the WUCs functional in the BRWSSP was a major accomplishment. Citizens are raising their voice and developed action plans through the CSC process. Citizen engagement is now well-accepted by the government officials and UP representatives. Decisions in the ROSC are now made in a more participatory manner. The CMCs are now making the people more interested to participate in improving their learning centers. Previously CMC meetings were not held regularly. Most CMCs are now carrying out their responsibilities.

Transparency and participation are mainly means to the end of empowering citizens and making government more accountable to them. The CARTA subprojects have made progress on this outcome as well. In the LGSP, because citizens are aware of their rights and the purpose of this decentralization project, they have become more active, demanding more accountability from their local government. In the ROSC, service providers now have to be more accountable for their decisions in meetings. It was clear to CMC members that LC teachers are now more responsive to committee member and community. In the BRWSSP, people realize they have the power to make service providers accountable. RIC reported constructive communication between users and the CSO/DPHE in all areas. The BDPC said that their main impact in the SIPP was creating internal accountability in the village committees that did not exist before. In the EPSP, community members’ perceptions of the responsiveness of service providers and their quality of service increased from 0% in the baseline survey to 60% by the end of the project. The end of project survey showed that 80% of eligible CAPs received rehabilitation services
support, compared to 21% in the baseline. In the EVENT project, 96% of the participants and trainers believed that the presence of third-party monitors led to improvements in the quality of the training. As a result of the PAF subproject interventions, COs demonstrated improved capacities to make demands, interact with POs, and draw concerned stakeholders’ attention towards their demands and grievances.

Grievance mechanisms are now functioning much better. For example, in the RAIDP, 187 grievances were registered during the subproject duration and 89% of the grievances were addressed. Prior to the CARTA subproject there were only verbal grievances. The District Development Committee had no records of the number, types, or status of grievances. By the end of the PAF subproject, 45% of COs registered written grievances compared to 5% at the beginning. In the EPSP, out of 65 grievances raised in the public hearing program, 60 were resolved during the subproject.

The impacts have benefitted government as well. The Deputy Project Director of LGSP expressed his appreciation of the constructive citizen engagement in the scheme implementation process in several meetings. Findings of the TPM reports were used by the LGSP project. The LGSP team arranged capacity-building training for WC and SSC members after reviewing the findings from the subproject first survey. The LGSP project team recognized the role of CARTA subproject on LGSP project implementation. One very positive result of increased citizen awareness has purportedly been an increase in local tax collection to support future projects. According to Democracy Watch (a CARTA CSO for the LGSP), in 12 of 30 UPs in Jessore, tax collection rates are gradually increasing. One surprising result that PTF heard from all UP chairpersons is that the increased transparency has not made their job more difficult, but has simplified their work. Now, there are fewer “unreasonable” requests because the villagers know what the budget allows and what the village projects will be for the next year.

In the RERED project, commercial vendors who supply the solar heater systems (SHS) have found that the user groups actually helped them make more sales. After receiving training from the CARTA program, user knowledge increased about taking care of the SHS. Based on interviews, users who are better trained and more informed make better use of the equipment, have better results, and then become more positive about recommending the SHS to other potential buyers. The percentage of households experiencing problems with their SHS unit decreased from 28% to 5% of household users, and from 16% to 1% of business users. The response time to fix problems also improved from “31-60 days” to “1-15 days.” Sales have increased.

One more outcome has been increased citizen satisfaction with services, projects and government. In the ROSC, the satisfaction level with overall CMC performance is considerably higher in CARTA areas (80%) than in non-CARTA areas (50%). The people who experienced the subproject repeatedly said that without this intervention change would have happened more slowly, or not at all. ROSC schools appear to be competing with the local public schools rather than augmenting the public system. Similarly, in the PAF, by the end of the subproject completion, 92% of the COs were satisfied with the services provided by POs compared to the baseline figure of 60%.
7 Capacity Building, Knowledge Sharing and Learning in the Subprojects

Although the capacity building and knowledge sharing components of CARTA are not covered by this assessment of CARTA, there was significant capacity building and knowledge sharing in the subproject activities. In fact, perhaps most of the capacity building and knowledge sharing took place in the subprojects. Most of the capacity building, even of the CARTA CSOs, took place on-the-job. Certainly the CSOs involved in CARTA benefitted from gaining experience and knowledge. This was confirmed by interviews with CSO managers and staff.

There was a lot of knowledge sharing and learning by the CARTA CSOs. For example, VRDC developed a dissemination strategy for knowledge sharing. VRDC shared the outputs of the EVENT subproject with concerned stakeholders to continue monitoring work beyond the subproject period. Good practices, success stories, lessons learned and the results of third-party monitoring were shared with CARTA partner organizations during the sharing meetings and a dissemination workshop. Working with the media was fundamental in disseminating the subproject’s success stories including public opinions and perceptions. Vijaya FM played a major role in disseminating the subproject’s success stories and the need for the third party monitoring in other projects. In the RAIDP, an exit meeting was organized with CBOs and district stakeholders in each district. During these meetings, good practices were shared.

The CSOs thought that knowledge sharing and learning was very important, especially in sharing lessons on how to overcome government resistance to CARTA. They found the knowledge sharing workshops very beneficial and a good way to share experiences and lessons.

8 Replicability and Sustainability

Although pilot projects like CARTA are not expected to be sustainable, if their approaches are adopted by the main project or other projects, their impact is multiplied. Any assessment of CARTA should not penalize it on these grounds because that was never part of its objective, but to the extent that CARTA’s work is carried forward by others, that should be factored into an assessment of its impact. In fact, the subproject completion reports indicate that is already happening.

The use of the labor-based toolkit (LBT) in the RAIDP subproject has been adopted in other RAIDP road projects. Many other CBOs in non-CARTA locations have asked for training on the use of the LBT. CBO members of other road subprojects have visited CARTA sites to learn from CARTA. IEC materials developed under this subproject are now being used by CBOs beyond the CARTA subproject areas. The LGSP also reported that other CSOs are adopting methods developed by CARTA. The EPSP report noted that nearby village development committees became aware of the CARTA subproject and asked for similar capacity building and awareness raising activities.

Similarly, when implementing agencies accepted the recommendations from CARTA CSOs, it vastly increased their impact. For example, PAF accepted many of FSCN’s recommendations. DOLIDAR (the Nepal roads department) valued Sky-Samaj’s work on the RAIDP, as did the Ministry of Education value VRDC’s work on EVENT. In fact, the government of Nepal valued VRDC’s monitoring of EVENT training so highly they wanted VRDC to continue monitoring for another year but there were no funds for that. This was after the government initially saw no value or need for VRDC’s monitoring.
On a much larger scale, several Bangladesh CARTA CSOs noted that the Bangladesh Sixth Five Year Plan introduced participatory monitoring by CSOs as an option. The government developed guidelines for Third Party Analysis based on the experience of CARTA, the Global Partnership for Accountability, and the World Bank Citizen Engagement Framework.

9 Subproject Implementation Challenges

The impressive accomplishments of the subprojects were achieved in the face of significant obstacles and challenges. The most significant and frequent challenge was government skepticism and even lack of cooperation in some subprojects. Local political pressure and interference was another common obstacle. The lack of community knowledge and capacity meant that subprojects often had to do significant training and capacity building before they could begin the social accountability work. The short time frame for subprojects exacerbated the challenges. Government or local people that did not value the CARTA subproject knew time was on their side and they could wait CARTA out.

Some government, project staff, and other officials did not see the value of the CARTA subprojects, at least at first. The EVENT sub-project probably faced the worst start-up delays because of the need to explain the sub-project to government officials. The LGSP PIU did not think they needed to be monitored. It took several meetings with MJF and Democracy Watch to convince the LGSP PIU to appreciate CARTA as a complement to LGSP work. The government CSOs hired to establish WUCs in the BRWSSP were very negative about CARTA and TPM which they saw as competition and that they might have negative findings about their work. RDRC found negative ROSC project staff attitudes about TPM that they saw as investigative work.

Sometimes the skepticism led to political pressure and even interference. RDRS reported many challenges occurred during subproject implementation including some political pressure and negative attitudes of learning center teachers and CMC members. A number of learning center teachers did not like the participatory and democratic decision making process or mass community engagement. Most of the CMCs were formed by the single decision of learning center teacher, neglecting CMC members. As a result most of the members were unaware their role and responsibility, monthly meetings were not held regularly, selection criteria of students were not observed, and the ROSC did not follow participatory decision making rules. There were occasional pressures to influence decision making time during interface meetings, data collection, and the key informant interviews. Democracy Watch also reported political pressure to influence the decision-making process of scheme selection in the LGSP.

BDPC faced significant interference from the Social Development Foundation (SDF), the implementing agency of the SIPP project. That interference was mainly in one of the two districts where BDPC worked, so the problem may have been specific personnel within SDF, not an SDF-wide problem. In fact, two SDF officials, while not enthusiastically endorsing BDPC’s work, did state that it was useful. The SCR states that SDF’s attitude was that the Bank and SDF were already doing monitoring, so SDF wondered why a CARTA subproject was necessary and what it would add. In the district with problems, SDF frequently stalled the CARTA subproject by making requests that compromised the independence of the monitors. BDPC believes SDF had some misunderstandings about the role and value of third-party monitoring. The BDPC report said that SDF tried to choose the villages where TPM would occur, select the villagers for
the TPM committee, insist on pre-notification of BDPC visits to villages so they could approve the meeting, blocked BDPC visits in one village group, insisted on reviewing data before it was released, prevented villagers from coming to certain meetings, accused BDPC of holding private meetings in the village, and instigated a negative reaction to TPM by spreading rumors.

Some village members also interfered with BDPC’s work. In most of the villages, committee leaders were reluctant to provide passbooks and they only provided passbooks to those who were close to them. When BDPC asked people to bring some of the passbooks they said that those passbooks were kept at the office, but the committee leaders did not acknowledge it most of the time. They said that the person who has the passbooks was unavailable that day. They did not want to show all the documents without the permission of SDF officials. Eventually MJF and BDPC were able to overcome SDF skepticism about TPM. SDF became cooperative when it saw that the village committees were not functioning properly. SDF came to realize that BDPC was improving village level project operations, not threatening SDF.

At the beginning of PSTC’s subproject in the RERED, the POs were unwilling to share information publicly because they believed exposure would reveal problems that would hurt their future business. POs also thought that monitoring would be too expensive. It took some time and effort to convince community members and representatives about the nature of the project and its relevance for efficient and effective service delivery. As mentioned earlier, users who are better trained and more informed make better use of the equipment, and then become more positive about recommending the SHS to other potential buyers.

SKY faced a similar problem in the RAIDP. The reluctance of some authorities like DDC/DTO to provide contract agreements and the Bill of Quantity (BoQ) was addressed through regular coordination and interaction. Where governance structures have been weak for a while, usually any groups or committees formed for monitoring are treated erroneously as activists. The information gap with DDC/DTO about CBOs in various road subprojects had to be sorted out by visiting the road catchments.

Another major challenge CARTA CSOs faced when they started projects was the level of community and local committee ignorance about their roles and responsibilities. In the SIPP, most villagers had little education, many were illiterate, and they failed to keep track of explanations given during meetings. There was confusion about roles: most villagers could not distinguish between CARTA and government project activities.

Sometimes community and committee members were not motivated to participate. In the LGSP, WC, SSC and CG members are not paid by the project. Therefore a sense of volunteerism and local ownership had to be cultivated. It was challenging to keep people involved in community engagement activities over a long period. RDRS staff also found that “outsiders” such as themselves are often unaware of the history and social relationships in a small community. It takes time to learn how community politics works and to gain their trust, time that was quite limited in the subprojects.

A combination of a large number of stakeholders to coordinate and a consensus-based approach to decision-making led to significant delays in CARTA’s implementation. Each subproject required cooperation and agreement between the World Bank task team, the Bank focal point for CARTA, their managers, various levels of government and the project implementing agency, MJF or Helvetas, PTF, the CARTA subproject CSO, and various other local CSOs and CBOs involved in the subproject. These
stakeholders often had conflicting priorities. For example, Bank staff wanted to use the subprojects as a form of monitoring, but that complicated relations with the government. In some subprojects, government officials and Bank staff were not that eager to be involved in a CARTA subproject.

Additionally, the World Bank TTLs as well as the government counterparts were often not sufficiently familiar with CARTA and sometimes did not give priority to processing proposed CARTA subprojects. Government counterparts were suspicions and reluctant to accept CARTA and recognize CSOs as legitimate and independent monitors. Furthermore, there was a need to more clearly differentiate between CSOs facilitating participatory community involvement in projects and third party monitoring where CSOs are themselves conducting independent external monitoring.

Sometimes government and Bank staff had turnover, so while earlier staff might have supported CARTA, new staff inherited the subproject and had very little ownership of the CARTA subprojects. Turnover of Bank TTLs was a significant problem for CARTA. Sometimes, however, just like government staff in subprojects, Bank TTLs would change their opinion of CARTA after seeing the results. One Bank TTL that initially was very skeptical about CARTA became so impressed that a CARTA type component was added to the next project. Given all the different and sometimes competing interests and priorities, it is impressive that the subprojects were able to achieve as much as they did.

CARTA subprojects were added to Bank-assisted projects already under implementation. They were not part of the original project design. That did not leave much time for building rapport with the major stakeholders. It was challenging to find projects that were both willing and capable of integrating CARTA subprojects into their implementation. Sometimes Bank and government staff had to be persuaded to accept a CARTA subproject. CARTA projects averaged about US$100,000, so that often did not seem worth the time and trouble to Bank and government staff managing projects that cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.

The fact that CARTA was “outside” the project to some extent meant that subproject findings could be dismissed. Some Bangladesh government staff were suspicious of CSOs, so it made it more difficult for CSOs to report negative findings to the government. Even when CSOs performed well and produced useful recommendations, it was not always appreciated and often they were not given positive feedback. Being independent has both advantages and disadvantages, and that affected subproject impacts. Nonetheless, the CSOs maintained their integrity and faithfully reported what they saw even if that made their relationships with the government more difficult. Therefore the fact that CSO funding was independent of the government probably helped.

PTF, MJF and Helvetas provided technical support for the CSOs. MJF had senior technical experts on social accountability, but for various reasons, those staff did not spend much time on CARTA. Most PTF advisers were not social accountability experts. CSOs said that PTF support was greatly appreciated, especially in negotiating with the government and the World Bank, but they would have liked a much greater and more sustained PTF presence and support, including field visits and meetings with the government and Bank to discuss subproject progress and findings. With 12 PTF visits over a four year period, PTF presence was relatively limited. PTF support was from Washington. Because neither MJF nor PTF was providing sufficient technical support for the Bangladesh CSOs the first year or two, the World Bank hired a consultant based in Dhaka to provide that support. The CSOs greatly appreciated her
support and that of the Bank CARTA TTL, which they found “very, very helpful”. Eventually MJF provided increased technical support to the CSOs and the Bank consultant was no longer necessary. Some CSOs felt that their relationship with MJF needed to be more based on principles of partnership rather than as subcontractors.

CARTA took much more time than MJF, Helvetas, PTF or the Bank anticipated. That led to some tensions as organizations were asked to contribute more resources than they had budgeted. There were also tensions because each organization had its own ideas of how CARTA should operate. Communication was not as good as it should have been. Some CSOs were very good at grassroots development work, but not at articulating their work and accomplishments, either verbally or in written reports. PTF emphasis on good quality reports also caused some tension and frustration. It took a lot of time to resolve all the differences.

Bank TTLs reported that they sometimes found CARTA CSO presentations and reports not very clear or insufficient. For example, after receiving some reports from SKY, the World Bank RAIDP team in Nepal requested additional information, felt that SKY had not fully met their needs, and that SKY’s findings and recommendations were too general. The World Bank project team was under time pressure to obtain information as an input to its appraisal of a follow-on project. SKY representatives and Helvetas staff met several times with the Bank team to draw lessons from the subproject. PTF spent a great deal of time developing the subproject completion report format and working with the CSOs through multiple revisions of the SCR. CSOs that are excellent at doing community level social accountability work are not necessarily equally talented at reporting their activities, findings, analysis, and impacts. While this was one more challenge, it also implies that the CSO subproject work itself was quite good for the impacts to overcome this challenge.

### 10 Lessons

The subproject completion reports contain a large number of lessons. In fact, the recommendations from several SCRs were strikingly similar. Many of these lessons are for the government projects, and thus were directed to the PIUs. This report is more interested in the lessons about implementing the subprojects, enhancing their impact, and the CARTA project more generally. Most of these lessons were about the training and capacity building that stakeholders needed, tips on how to provide that training, and how to work with various stakeholders. There are also implications for designing projects like CARTA.

Several SCRs mentioned that citizens need more knowledge about projects and their rights. Citizen lack of knowledge can lead to lack of confidence. The inability to understand technical details reduced their confidence which led to less participation. During subproject implementation, citizen group members were reluctant to get involved in monitoring activities because they did not know their responsibilities. For more specialized tasks, such as budget monitoring, the problem is more acute. Long term capacity building for community group members is necessary for in-depth, input-tracking. That is why so much effort was devoted to educating people about the project and their role before the social accountability work began.
Begin early to build awareness to internalize ownership and sustainability. SKY’s experience reveals that delayed awareness and focus on service delivery resulted in limited ownership of the project, with high expectations which were difficult to accomplish. This subproject therefore ensured early awareness through consultation with stakeholders on project basics. This resulted in the project being internalized and stakeholder buy-in. Stakeholders’ early involvement creates commitment, organization, and skills for implementation during the project. The CSOs thought it was not possible to implement a TPM project without trust between the various stakeholders.

Citizen empowerment is needed in addition to community mobilization. Beneficiary empowerment is necessary for monitoring. CARTA CSOs cautioned against assuming that users understand the benefits of establishing users’ groups. Instead of separate good governance training, CSOs learned that mainstreaming governance issues with empowerment and awareness-focused trainings was fruitful. Empowerment and a culture of good governance reinforce each other, and monitoring should not be limited to procedures and achievement of results, but it should also address the issue of beneficiary empowerment and promotion of good governance in projects.

The change from an essentially non-participatory governance system at the local level to a participatory process involving traditionally marginalized members of the community is a long process that needs to be frequently discussed and re-imagined. Many of the problems and challenges were resolved through meetings, coordination and discussion with stakeholders.

The SCRs had lessons on how to do training. They stated that participatory training and orientation creates a conducive environment for implementing later activities and increases trainee knowledge and capacity. Frequent and extensive training with community groups increases their knowledge and capacity.

User-friendly, simple documents work well with CBOs. For example, IEC materials that use pictures are understood better than IEC materials with text which are not understood by illiterate people. The SCRs urged preparing visual training materials whenever project components target multilingual communities. Visual materials can become communication tools during meetings, and these materials can be used by community members in the absence of trainers. On-site coaching, if financially feasible, is the best means for capacity building with this group.

Training has to be an iterative process, not a one-off exercise. The CBOs and village committees need ongoing training. It appears that a single training session is not enough for members to completely grasp the nature of their activities, roles and responsibilities. More “refresher” training for CBO members supports knowledge and skill retention. Using adult-learning education principles to train community members improves performance; a manual is insufficient. Refresher training should be part of subprojects to ensure better understanding and smoother implementation of the subproject.

Many of the subprojects used CBOs as partners of the CARTA CSO. Partnering with and mobilizing local staff makes it simpler to implement a project against a tight schedule. The CBOs are aware of the local situation. When new CBOs were necessary, CSOs said that investing in the organizational development
of new CBOs enables them to become more effective. Organizational development for new CBOs can make them more committed because they are organized and functioning. This means that CBO training costs need to be factored into subproject costs.

There were several lessons about working with government. Since the concept of third-party monitoring of government projects by CSOs is not a familiar concept, such monitoring threatened some project implementing agencies. They thought the subproject intended to extract information, rather than to collaborate. The capacity-development components attracted the PIUs but governance concerns tended to alienate them. Therefore, special understanding and expertise on the part of the subproject CSO and its personnel are necessary. Coordination helped to improve confidence and trust among stakeholders; misunderstandings can be resolved through transparent discussions of issues.

One important area of lessons was about the media. The SCRs noted that the media has a role as “watch-dog” to promote good governance. The media can help in raising awareness, sensitizing people on good governance practices, and motivating all concerned stakeholders including contractors to be transparent and to carry out good quality work. Media have proved to be an important vehicle for communication including setting the agenda and exposing malpractices. The media can provide access to report grievances, and to assist people in understanding any malpractices. Media has an important role to play in building awareness among citizens and in providing a forum for resolution of issues. The media has helped to generate awareness among project beneficiaries through interactive programs and information dissemination. For example, in the EPSP, CAPs listened to the local radio for information related to the peace process, the role and responsibility of the LPCs (local peace committees) and other service providers, and other information that was useful to them. Working with media was fundamental in disseminating the subprojects’ success stories.

There were a number of lessons about the timing of subprojects. Third party monitoring can be more effective if it is part of the project from inception. Third-party monitoring is very effective for promoting accountability and empowering citizens and should be carried out in parallel with service delivery, i.e. be part of the project from inception. It should also last the duration of the project.

Social accountability approaches including independent third party monitoring require time, resources, expertise and patience to implement and be accepted. Empowerment and capacity strengthening are time-consuming and resource intensive processes. Such constraints and limitations need to be taken into account while designing social accountability interventions. Two years is not long enough for most subprojects. It did not leave much time for building rapport with the major stakeholders.

In designing future projects, clustering COs improves efficiency because in a small program, geographical factors and community-selection criteria must be considered together. For example, FSCN selected COs in the PAF according to the criteria in the subproject TOR. One of the criteria was that COs had to be comparatively mature. To meet this criterion, COs were scattered widely in several districts; it took four days for some of the district coordinators to make one round trip visit to a CO. Instead of using district boundaries, COs could be selected according to geographic clusters to facilitate project activities.
The value of third party monitoring by CSOs and communities as a “political” tool as well as a technical one should be recognized. It is a “political” tool in the sense that it focuses on beneficiary empowerment rather than measurement, and on promotion of transparency and accountability rather than project assessment. The CSOs were quite emphatic that the greater subproject impacts were due to empowerment, not the successful use of social accountability tools. The tools were the method, but it was the empowerment of people to use them that made the critical difference.

11 Summary and Conclusions

CARTA was relevant in that it addressed critical governance gaps in Bank projects. Many CARTA subprojects looked like assessments or monitoring at first, but ended up more like citizen engagement, community mobilization and empowerment. Multiple tools and methods were used which strengthened their effectiveness. The choice of tools was appropriate, but sometimes the tools and methods had to be adapted to the circumstances.

There is no doubt that the subprojects built a lot of capacity. Even when the main activity was monitoring service delivery, there was a lot of training and capacity building of CBOs to conduct the monitoring. Most of the subproject communities had low levels of existing capacity, so capacity building was necessary before the monitoring and other activities could begin. While much of the capacity building was focused on village committees, it also increased capacity of the CSOs working in the Bank projects. Most of the capacity building, even of the CARTA CSOs, took place on-the-job. Much of the training had an IEC dimension. People needed to learn about the projects, their rights and responsibilities,

Subprojects greatly increased transparency which had the impact of making service users, project beneficiaries, and communities more aware of their rights. The combination of training, information campaigns, and transparency has made people much more aware and knowledgeable about projects. Practically every SCR mentioned how citizens and village committees now were much more aware and capable of performing their roles and responsibilities. As they became more informed and empowered, that increased their participation in projects. This knowledge not only increased their ability to perform roles in the subprojects, but also become members of larger thematic networks (e.g., land rights federation, savings associations, and cooperatives).

Transparency and participation empowered citizens to make government more accountable to them. Service providers now have to be more accountable for their decisions in meetings. Subprojects increased the percentage of project beneficiaries that received benefits to which they were entitled. Local governance processes became more responsive to the community. Grievance mechanisms are now functioning much better as a result of the subprojects.

Subprojects have benefitted government and the Bank as well as community members. Findings from the TPM reports and recommendations by the CSOs were used by the projects. Most of these types of impacts will become evident over time as the subprojects were too short to ascertain these impacts, the subprojects were completed recently, and there has been no post-subproject observations to confirm ongoing impacts.
One of the most important impacts was not well documented: the change in government mindsets. This was not an explicit objective of the subprojects. In fact, it was hoped or assumed that the government was supportive of the CARTA subprojects because they had agreed to the subprojects. In reality, the government staff that had to interact with the CSOs in CARTA often were highly skeptical of CARTA and what the subprojects would contribute. It took a lot of meetings, communication, coordination and experience over time to change the attitudes of government officials, but most of the subprojects achieved this. That they could do this in a subproject of 2 years or less is quite remarkable. Government realizes the value of the subprojects, but it does not have the money or capacity to replicate them widely.

In sum, subprojects had significant impacts in a short period of time. They identified a lot of problems and were able to solve many of them. This was very helpful to the government projects, as problems in the CARTA component probably existed in other parts of those projects as well. The outcomes and impacts were often significantly greater than what the small subproject budgets might suggest. One wonders whether additional resources were committed beyond the budgets, either by the CSOs, PTF’s partner CSOs, or the people themselves. Using community volunteer labor, especially for the many village level committees, certainly expanded what was possible within the existing budgets.

CARTA should be seen as a learning experience. The impacts, as impressive as they are, still pale in comparison to the scale of the projects. CARTA is appropriately judged as a pilot program. It tested a model of supporting CSO social accountability work. It proved effective and efficient. There was a lot of knowledge sharing and learning among the CARTA CSOs.

The institutional arrangements were quite complex, probably too complex. The various stakeholders had different priorities, especially the government and the Bank. Turnover in Bank and government staff posed further challenges as people who inherited CARTA subprojects were not always as supportive as those that had initially agreed to the CARTA subprojects. Communication was not as good as it should have been.

CARTA was time consuming and the CSOs required more support than MJF, Helvetas, PTF or the Bank anticipated. PTF would have benefitted significantly from having an in-country presence (a field office) to provide more sustained support to the CSOs. In Nepal, PRAN (Promoting Accountability in Nepal) helped provide some of this kind of support, but there was no equivalent organization in Bangladesh. The first half of CARTA was much more frustrating and less productive than the last half. It is to everyone’s credit that they stuck with CARTA and saw it through to a successful conclusion.

12 Recommendations

Given that CARTA is now completed, these recommendations refer to any CARTA-type programs in the future. The recommendations are based largely on the subproject completion reports and interviews.

The period for subproject implementation should be longer than 12-18 months (except for one-off exercises like monitoring one round of textbook printing and distribution). The complex institutional arrangements required a lot of meetings to get the government and Bank to agree to the CARTA subprojects. Then it took time to establish good relations with the community, educate them about the
CARTA subproject, train them to perform their roles, and then implement the subproject. Longer subproject implementation periods would provide a more natural sequencing of activities (instead of doing them practically simultaneously), allow pilot testing and starting small, and then naturally expand the scale of subproject implementation as the methods were refined. Training has to be an iterative process, not a one-off exercise. All this requires more time. It would be optimal if CARTA subprojects were coterminous with the implementation of the Bank-assisted project, say 3-5 years.

CARTA type programs could accomplish more if they were designed as part of the government projects and began when the projects started, not well into project implementation. CARTA de facto was a tool for mid-project corrections when governance gaps were identified. That is one way to use CARTA, but it appears that a CARTA-like approach could have helped prevent these governance gaps from arising in the first place. That would imply making the CARTA subproject part of the project from inception.

There needs to be better coordination and communication between all stakeholders in CARTA type projects. The “collaborative” project design requiring agreement between multiple levels of the World Bank, the governments of Nepal and Bangladesh (national, local, and project implementing agency), PTF, Helvetas Nepal and the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), made it institutionally complex. The Bank and government need to be onboard with the subproject or it does not make much sense. There are enough projects that want and need CARTA subprojects that pushing them on reluctant government departments and Bank TTLs is unwise. Even after the government and Bank agreed to CARTA subprojects, sometimes there was ongoing reluctance to embrace the subprojects. Once the Bank and government have agreed to a subproject, they need to ensure that any staff turnover does not undermine the subprojects. The CARTA CSOs should not have been at the mercy of government and Bank staff turnover.

CARTA CSOs need more sustained and better support, especially in the early stages. It was a new concept and to get it up and running took political capital. This support needs to be planned and fully budgeted, whether it is from the partner CSOs (MJF and Helvetas Nepal), PTF, or elsewhere (e.g., the Bank consultant that stepped into the breach). The CSO managing the project, PTF in this case, needs an in-country presence.

Although CARTA was a pilot project with no objectives regarding sustainability, sustainability and CSO exit strategies need to be built into the subproject action plan. The CSOs developed very significant operations in hundreds of villages for a year, but then there were no arrangements for what would follow after the subprojects closed. This is not fair to the citizens and communities that provided so much volunteer time, or to the CSOs that developed relations with the communities only to have to leave so soon. There should have been some sort of transition to the government project taking over the activities, or at least funding someone to do so. Also, many neighboring villages asked to be included in the subprojects, or at least to receive the same training, but there was no way the CARTA CSOs could meet this demand. That was a lost opportunity that should have been anticipated and planned for.

The success of the CARTA project should be broadly disseminated, especially within the World Bank. CARTA has significant lessons for the World Bank’s current initiative on citizen engagement and beneficiary feedback. The CARTA model should move beyond a pilot project.
Annex 1: Terms of Reference

A. BACKGROUND

1 The Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability (CARTA) Program, funded by a US$1.9 million grant from the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) through the World Bank started in late 2011 and will be completed by June 30, 2015.

2 The CARTA Program objective was “to enhance the development impact, sustainability and client ownership of pro-poor projects financed by the World Bank (WB) in Bangladesh and Nepal, by promoting civil society organizations’ engagement, experience and capacity to demand better governance.” The Program had four components: (i) a sub-grant facility; (ii) on-the-job capacity building; (iii) learning and knowledge sharing and (iv) program management.

3 The CARTA Program is being implemented by the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) in partnership with the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF) in Bangladesh and Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation (Helvetas) in Nepal. Twelve sub-grants were awarded, six each in Bangladesh and Nepal, for a total amount of US$1.29 million to support eleven World Bank financed projects and programs in infrastructure, health, education, local government and social investment funds.

4 Based on terms of reference agreed with the Project Implementing Agencies (PIA) and the World Bank (WB), PTF and its local partners selected CSOs using a competitive bidding process. While the PIAs and WB were informed about the selection and contracting of the CSOs, they were not involved in the selection and evaluation of bids neither were they a party to the sub-project contract. The CARTA Program was unique because it provided an independent source of financing thereby assuring an arms-length relationship between the selected CSOs and the PIAs. During sub-project implementation, PTF Advisers and the local partners provided technical and implementation support and various training, capacity building and peer learning activities were conducted as part of the CARTA Program.

5 The sub-projects differed in scope, but can be grouped in four categories: (i) empowerment by providing information to communities about government projects and programs (funded by the World Bank and helping citizens obtain benefits and/or entitlements; (ii) capacity building of community groups; (iii) independent Third Party Monitoring (TPM) and; (iv) helping to create or strengthen grievance mechanisms. Capacity building of communities and beneficiaries were key objectives, but ultimately, the objective of all sub-projects was to help improve the implementation and development impact of World Bank financed projects.

B. Scope of Assignment

6 The assignment has two components: (i) an independent assessment of Sub-grants and (ii) assistance with the finalization of the final report of the CARTA Program

(i) Independent Assessment of Sub-Grants

The scope of the Independent assessment was defined in the Operational Manual of the CARTA Program as follows:

“6.08 – Subsequent to the release of the final tranche of the sub-grant, the PTF will arrange for an overall independent ex-post assessment of sub-project’s performance and results. The objectives of the Sub-Project Completion Assessment (SPCA) are to: (a) assess the extent to which the sub-grant’s purposes were achieved and funds used as provided in the Sub-Project Grant Agreement; (b) assess the extent to which the sub-grant contributed to achieving the CARTA program outcomes and outputs based on the Monitoring and Results Framework (Annex 3); (c) draw lessons of experience
for application to future activities; and (d) ensure transparency and accountability in the activities of the Program. PTF in consultation with the Local Partner would engage a qualified person who has had no prior involvement with the sub-grant or the CSO to prepare the SPCA.

6.09 – The Subproject Completion Agreement (SPCA) will be based on (i) a review of sub-project material (final sub-project proposal and agreed budget, the Grant Agreement, relevant email exchanges with PTF and periodic reports from the CSO including SCR, etc.) and (ii) if possible, a brief site visit to the CSO and interviews with its staff and other stakeholders involved in the sub-project. As far as possible, the SPCA should make an independent assessment of all the areas covered by SCR (paras. 6.06-6.07).

6.10 – After satisfying itself with respect to the completeness and independence of the SPCA, the Local Partner will provide the CSO with an opportunity to comment on the draft SPCA, particularly with respect to factual data and information. If the CSO disagrees with the SPCA’s findings, the independent assessor is not obligated to accommodate the CSO’s views, except to correct factual data and information. The next step will be for the Local Partner to submit the SPCA, along with the CSO’s comments, to the Program Director, who will send it to PTF management for information and posting on PTF website. “

(ii) Assistance with the preparation of the final report

7 PTF, together with the local partners will organize a final workshop in Bangladesh and Nepal in early June 2015. The primary purpose of that workshop is to discuss the findings of the sub-grant projects and to draw lessons learned from the implementation of the CARTA Program. The independent assessment mentioned under (i) will serve as an input to the final workshops. PTF, in cooperation with its local partners will draft a final report and the consultant will review, comment and edit the final report to ensure it is ready for publication.

C. Work methodology, expected output and timing

8 The consultant will conduct a desk review of available reports which will include but are not limited to: legal and other agreements with the World Bank, the local partners and sub grantees, progress reports of the sub grantees local partners (MJF and Helvetas Nepal) and PTF and well as the sub project completion reports. The work may include telephone or direct interviews with persons involved but no field trips are anticipated.

9 The consultant will prepare an “independent assessment report” which will respond to the scope outlined in paragraph 6, provide a comparative analysis of outcomes and outputs achieved under the sub grants and provide lessons learned and recommendations for a possible follow up operation. PTF will make the necessary information available as soon as possible and it is expected that most if not all information will be available by April 15, 2015. An outline of the report is to be submitted to PTF by May 1, 2015. The draft assessment report is to be submitted to PTF by May 15, 2015.

10 The second part of the assignment (review of the final report) is expected to start by mid-June 2015.
Annex 2: List of Documents Reviewed


CARTA, “School Sector Reform Project (SSRP) Project Sub-project Terms of Reference for Concept Notes”, 2012.


Annex 3: List of People Interviewed

**Partnership for Transparency Fund**
Jeffrey Kass, Advisor, Emergency Peace Support Project and School Sector Reform Program
Frank McNerney, Advisor, Local Government Support Project and Social Investment Program Project
Tjaarda Storm van Leeuwen, CARTA Program Director
Laura Tashjian, Program Manager, Bangladesh and Nepal
Fred Temple, CARTA Nepal Program Manager; Advisor, Community Action for Nutrition

**Manusher Jonno Foundation**
Shahin Kauser, CARTA Program Manager

**Helvetas Nepal**
Badri P. Manandhar, CARTA Program Manager

**World Bank**
Saurav Dev Bhatta, Task Team Leader, EVENT and SSRP
Luiza Nora, CARTA Program Task Team Leader

**Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Centre (BDPC)**
Muhammad Saidur Rahman, Director
Nasrin Aktar, Project Coordinator

**Democracy Watch (DW)**
Mohammed Moniruzzaman

**Population Service and Training Center (PSTC)**
Sumon Maitra

**RDRS**
Mohammad Abdur Rahman
Monju Sree
Mohammad Hossain

**Resource Integration Center (RIC)**
Abdur Rashid
Mohammad Hanif

**Social Development Foundation (SDF)**
Md. Golam Faruque, Regional Director, Rangpur
MIM Zulfiqar, MIS Specialist
Annex 4: Case Study Examples from the Subprojects

Enhanced Vocational Education and Training (EVENT) Project Case Study

"Honesty and hard labor makes people successful in a short period". This statement is reality for 32 years old Prakash Babu Shrestha from Khairahani-4, Parsa, Chitwan. After completing I.Com from Tribhuwan University, he tried to find suitable job in Nepal. Tired of finding suitable job within the country, he left for Saudi Arabia to earn his livelihood. After two long hard years in Saudi Arabia, he returned back to his own country after a bitter working experience. He did not want again to go Saudi Arabia because of many threats and his own family disintegration problem. With a little bit of savings from Saudi Arabia, he made plans to live in his own country and establish a new business in Nepal. Mean a while, one of his friends informed him about mobile repairing training and he was easily accepted to take part in the training at Creatives Sales and Services Pvt. Ltd.

After completing the 3 months training, he applied for the skill level 1 test exam and then he also started mobile repair shop in his own house. He joined for the advanced training in mobile repairing after successfully completing the test for Skill Level-1 in Mobile repairing. After the advanced level training he again upgraded his skill to Level-2. After completing the skill level-2, he worked as Assistant trainer in the same Training Institute where he learned the skill.

He started his business as a mobile repair and sales center and gave up the idea of going to another country for job. In 2011/12, he was selected for Skill Test Assessor training conducted by TITI. He developed his professionalism in mobile repairing through different training and also worked as Skill Test Assessor.

Prakash is the efficient trainer of Chitwan and its periphery area. During the course of conducting the Beneficiaries Satisfaction Survey PIT of VDRC-Nepal, he gave all the credit to Mobile Repair Training for his busy life. After taking the Skill Test Assessors' Training, he helped NSTB as a Skill Test Assessor in Parsa and Chitwan District in eight different test events. Nowadays, in the morning and evening, he is busy in his own shop New Shuvalaxmi Electronics and...
during the day time he is busy in Creative Sales and Service as a trainer. When he read the advertisement of ToT for Assistant Trainers to be conducted in School of Health Science, Bharatpur and organized by EVENT project, in Kantipur Daily News of 2070/06/06, he felt himself very lucky to join in that training.

Among 150 applicants, TITI selected only 20 applicants according to merit based selection test. He got 3rd position in that test and participated in the training. After two weeks training, he found the training very beneficial for him. He gave credit to the third party monitoring done by VDRC-Nepal for fair selection of the participants. Strict maintenance of time schedule, equal and respected behavior of the trainers are some of the changes he found in that training, he credited those changes to on-site monitoring by VDRC-Nepal as the third party. He had heard that many other training was ended before the scheduled time but this training was very standard. It was started and ended on time; trainers followed the schedule of the training. Equal and respected behavior towards participants, use of participatory methods, use of multimedia, pre-test and post-test evaluation were the strong aspect of training. The training was conducted for 10 working days and paid allowance of 10 days with certificate of participation. He said that all these things happened because VDRC Nepal was monitoring the training onsite as a third party.

In a nutshell, Mr. Shrestha is not only a skilled technician but he also is a social leader in his society. His family claimed after their economic progress their social status was elevated. Mr. Shrestha said that with his continuous hard labor drastically changed his economic level within the last three to four years. Now, he has an account in Himalayan Bank and Narayani Bikas Bank and is also saving Rs. 500.00 daily in 3 different cooperatives each. He bought a new motorbike recently and his son was admitted to a popular boarding school and planned to construct a new house. His wife told us their family is very happy with their economic status. He realized that one day he will get the fruit of success if one follows honest and continuous dedication to his work. He is a good example of successful entrepreneur through his skill to improve his livelihood staying in own country rather than opting for foreign employment.
Local Government Support Project (LGSP) Case Study

Eliyas Hossain is a member of no. 5 ward of no. 7 Churamonkathi Union Parishad. He participated in training on LGSP project arranged by Democracy Watch.

As a Citizen Group (CG) member Eliyas has been proactively updating the UP notice board, sorting the information by the LGSP scheme name, allocation and list of ward committee and scheme supervision committee. Mr. Hossain also has been capturing the images of flat finishing, tube-well construction, school-bench construction, and several other development initiatives; he has shared them with leaders, and other respective ward members. He also conducted a meeting on yearly allocation of LGSP, and he requested others to attended Ward Shava and open budget sessions. Sometimes he arranges meeting to make people aware to ensure proper completion of all the tasks in his own ward. Needless to say, everyone is satisfied and more well-informed because of the activities accomplished by Elias. His work has influenced others. Women in another ward were inspired by these initiatives, and are now quite keen to be involved and help him in the future.
Reaching Out of School Children II (ROSC) Case Study

The CARTA project implemented by RDRS Bangladesh completed the CSC interface meeting at Horin Chora Younis Alir Bari Anondo School at Khuniya gass, Lalmonirhat Sadar, Lalmonirhat. There is eighteen predefined indicator have discussed in the meeting. Two indicators such as safe drinking water and sanitary latrine has taken seriously to resolve because in the LC, there was no tube well and sanitary latrine to use for the children. UP member give assurance to resolve the problem in the interface meeting.

After that, CMC member and parents of students continuously communicate with the Union parishad member to arrange a tube well and sanitary latrine. Few days later, in the date of 23/06/2014, Md. Abdul Hakim, Union Parishad member presented at LC with a tube well, He then installed the tube well at his presence. At present 4/5 family along with the student of LC is drinking the water and using it for them. LC surrounding Community and CMC member expressed their happiness to get the tube well for the student. The suffering for the safe water and sanitary latrine has been removed from this LC. Student now do not need to go nearby houses to drink water, they can drink water of their own tube well.
Rural Electrical Renewable Energy Project (REREP) Case Study

Biva Majumder is a successful young woman in Samsadi village of Garulia Union. She is an honor student in her second year studying marketing at B. M. College in Barishal. Besides attending college, she earns money to support her family. Unfortunately, the village has no electricity from a pollybidyuit, because the geographic location of the village households can’t support it.

Biva, like so many students of the village, dreamed of leading a modern life with electricity in the house. But the darkness of the village spoiled these dreams. To remove the darkness, solar energy could be the solution.

Debashis Majumder, brother of Biva is a school teacher. Thinking about his sister, he decided to buy a solar unit. He made a down payment of 4,275tk for a 50 watt unit in June, 2012. The package value of the unit was 28,500tk, with monthly installments of 880 tk.

With the light of kerosene lamp, Biva started a business; she began to earn money by teaching the children of neighbors. She gave lessons in the evening until 9:00 p.m. Afterwards, she continued her studies until midnight. Now her family does not have to support her study cost—she bears all expenditure as even provides some necessities for her family. She has changed her life style with the help of solar energy that she could not imagine before.