

Partnership for Transparency Fund

“Good Governance: Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption”

*Supported by World Bank financing under the
Development Grant Facility*

Four grants of \$400,000 were made to support the PTF small grants program funding civil society organizations to promote transparency and fight corruption from 2007 to 2012. This evaluation covers the 3-year period 2010-2012, since the last evaluation.

Final Evaluation

John D. Clark, June 2013

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| DGF Grant Numbers | 501610 / 11 / 12 |
| Short Title of Program | Good Governance: Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption |
| Name of Lead Institution | Partnership for Transparency Fund |
| Start date | 01/20/2010 |
| End date: | 03/31/2013 |
| Amount of DGF Funding: | \$1.2 million |
| Brief Summary of Program: | The program provides both small grants and technical support to CSOs fighting corruption and promoting good governance in public services and institutions. It has supported 42 direct action anti-corruption projects implemented by 36 partner CSOs in 22 developing and transition countries during 2008-2013. |
| Countries where activities have taken place and implementing partners in each country | See Annex 1 |
| Target groups- wider beneficiaries | Various--specific groups of poor people, or specific local communities, or institutions or sometimes the whole population, depending on the particular project. |
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Glossary of Acronyms

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|------------------|--|
| AC | Anti-Corruption |
| ACCU | Anti- Corruption Coalition of Uganda |
| ACT! | Act, Change, Transform (PTF coordinating partner in Uganda) |
| BPL | Below Poverty Line |
| CAC | Citizens Against Corruption (the DFID-funded PTF program) |
| CMCC | Citizens Mobilizing to Combat Corruption (the World Bank-funded program) |
| CFAR | Centre for Advocacy and Research (Bangalore-based PTF partner) |
| CIPPEC | Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (Argentina) |
| CSO | Civil Society organization |
| DELNA | Transparency International, Latvia |
| DGF | Development Grant Facility (funding program of the World Bank) |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| FE | Final Evaluation |
| FOI / RTI | Freedom of Information / Right to Information (transparency-related legislation) |
| FONTRA | PTF regional program in Latin America – partly financed by DGF resources |
| G-Watch | Government Watch (Philippines NGO and PTF partner) |
| GIC | Globe International Centre (Mongolian PTF partner) |
| GTF | Governance and Transparency Fund (of DFID) |
| IACC | International Anti-Corruption Conference (held every two years) |
| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
| IGI | International Governance Institute (Cameroon NGO and PTF grantee) |
| INFOC | Interfaith-Based Action for Ethics and Integrity (PTF partner in Uganda) |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MTR | Mid-Term Review |
| NCCK | National Council of Churches in Kenya (PTF partner) |
| NGO, INGO | Non-Governmental Organization, International NGO |
| NJMO | Nava Jeevana Mahila Okkoota (North Karnataka-based PTF partner) |
| NREGS | National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (Indian safety net) |
| PAC | Public Affairs Centre (PTF country partner for South Asia, based in Bangalore) |
| PATS | Partnership Approval and Tracking System – the official recording system used for DGF grants |
| PCA | Project Completion Assessment (independent evaluation) |
| PCR | Project Completion Report (submitted by grantees at close of project) |
| PDS | Public Distribution System (Indian system of fair price shops) |
| PTF | Partnership for Transparency Fund |
| PRIA | Society for Participatory Research in Asia (evaluator of Indian projects) |
| Rs. | Indian Rupees |
| RTI | Right to Information (Indian act on public access to information) |
| SA | Social Accountability |
| TI (-I, K, M, U) | Transparency International (and Indian, Kenyan, Mongolian and Ugandan chapters) |
| ULS, UENO | Uganda Law Society and Uganda Ethics Network Organization |

In addition, ASYUSED, CESD, DARC, NAMFREL, PSD and YAA are PTF partners in Cameroon, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Philippines, Croatia and Uganda respectively

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Executive Summary

Citizens Mobilizing to Combat Corruption (CMCC) is a program of the Partnership for Transparency Fund that provides grants and technical assistance to civil society groups in developing/transition countries that are fighting corruption and promoting good governance in public services and institutions. PTF has considerable experience in this field and is increasingly regarded as a leader in social accountability. The World Bank's Development Grants Facility (DGF) has given PTF a series of grants from 2004 to 2012, totaling \$2,560,000. This has enabled it to provide 42 grants from 2007-12 to 36 partners in 22 countries. The grants are designed to ensure these partners achieve demonstrable reductions in corruption and disseminate widely the lessons of their experience.

PTF operates as a "virtual organization" without permanent offices, and its personnel are very largely volunteers who are experienced development practitioners. One of its strengths is the much-valued advice to partners offered free by this team. Another is that it is "demand-driven" in that it responds to proposals from CSOs, rather than designing projects and then seeking CSOs to implement them.

The Final Evaluation (FE) covering the last 3 years of DGF support since the last independent evaluation was conducted over a 6-month period and included interviews with PTF principals; field visits to Argentina, Ecuador, India, Mongolia, Uganda and Kenya to interview grantees and other stakeholders and to see the CMCC work on the ground; a survey of grantees conducted by internet; a review of PTF and grantee documents (including a sample of project proposals, completion reports and evaluations); and meetings with PTF managers and advisors in Washington DC. The FE has been able to engage with over a third of CMCC grantees. The Evaluator simultaneously evaluated PTF's DFID-funded program (which uses exactly the same approach as the DGF-funded program) and also drew on his earlier Mid-Term Review of PTF's DFID-funded program.

CMCC has been on-track in identifying appropriate and effective grantees and working with them to design small scale, fast-moving projects that address specific malpractices in the public sector – usually instances of corruption that directly impact the lives of poor people. It has provided on-going advice and 74 grants to 52 CSOs in 21 countries, with the support of intermediary organizations in 3 countries.

The evidence from project documents, substantiated where possible by direct contact with grantees and other stakeholders, is that most projects performed well or very well. In other social accountability programs progress is often described in terms of identifying poor performance, capacity building or "raising awareness" of governance issues. CMCC is able to go further and point to *specific reforms* its partners have won. This is partly due to the very specific problems targeted and the careful guidance offered, but partly also due to PTF's emphasis on "constructive engagement" – hence structured and non-confrontational dialogue with officials is integral to the approach. Through this, "reform champions" have emerged who have helped secure the beneficial changes. However the FE regards the current geographic and partner spread to be too great for an organization of PTF's modest size, and finds that in general the most impressive results are to be found where multiple grants have enabled partners to build up more sustainable interventions, particularly in countries of greatest partner concentration.

The main FE conclusion is its confidence that the CMCC program represents high value for money, impressive innovation, and valuable support to civil society in fighting corruption. The program fits very well with the objectives of the DGF, in particular with regard to DGF's emphasis on innovation and building partnerships. The FE affirms that CMCC has had a strongly positive impact, exceeding what can reasonably be expected given the scale of its funding. Individually each successful PTF

project provides an anecdote of success but collectively they amount to a clear narrative. Combining citizens' investigation and vigilance, community mobilization, constructive engagement with public officials and seeking out "reform champions", in activities designed by the local CSOs, provides a formula that is effective in addressing the problems of corruption, particularly those that are experienced by poor people, in a wide range of country contexts.

Using this approach, PTF has a strong track record of supporting effective work at the local level which often results in a clear reduction in poverty and/or savings to the budgets of public services. These benefits are often difficult to quantify, but by just taking a few projects where direct benefits can be listed, it is evident that the immediate financial savings alone are worth many multiples of the DGF grant to PTF. On top of this there are other benefits such as community empowerment, new structures for citizen vigilance that give "voice" to poor communities (notably women and sometimes youth), reforms in bidding processes etc. – all of which ensure that improvements will be sustained. In some settings, partners are contributing to changing the culture from one of grudging acceptance of corruption as a way of life to a public rejection and demand for change.

Typical projects reduce corruption in service provision and public procurement and enhance official transparency. However PTF could do more to connect its grassroots partners with national movements that influence policy in these areas and with counterparts in other countries with whom experience exchange could be mutually beneficial. PTF does support national-level (as well as grassroots) activities; but PTF could do more to seek synergies between these two levels.

A distinctive feature of PTF's approach is to urge its partners to engage constructively with relevant officials or elected representatives. While this may not be an effective strategy in countries that disdain civil society, in the PTF priority countries it often achieves dramatic results. Examples from India, Uganda, Mongolia, Philippines, Argentina and elsewhere illustrate this. In some settings, however, formal agreements with authorities are unlikely and more confrontational approaches are called for; PTF could usefully recognize this more explicitly.

Even though PTF grants finance short-term activities the FE is confident that the impact of these projects is often reasonably sustainable due to the levels of community organization and empowerment achieved, the commitment of project activists, the buy-in of local officials (due to the constructive engagement approach used) and other factors. It is likely that the grassroots structures formed will also often be durable after funding ceases and that promoting stronger local demand for good governance triggers a "virtuous circle" of enhanced vigilance and community confidence.

Unfortunately PTF's own sustainability (at the level of activity achieved over the past 4 years) is currently in doubt due to the difficulty it is experiencing in raising funds. The FE makes some suggestions regarding this dilemma and also appeals to donors to continue funding PTF and other social accountability programs of demonstrable efficacy.

Being largely a volunteer-driven organization, PTF represents high value for money. It would be yet more efficient and effective if it had fewer partners to whom it provided multi-year support and if it concentrated on a smaller number of countries (as it intends to do). PTF keeps salaries and admin costs (including for monitoring and evaluation) to a very impressive 9.5% of its DGF budget. More importantly, the projects it finances often achieve very high returns in terms of reduced corruption. In South India, for example, the FE calculates that \$11 of benefits accrue in the shape of improved services accrue to poor people for every \$1 PTF grants to its partners, and in addition there are other less quantifiable benefits, such as empowerment of women and tribal groups, and greater awareness of entitlements.

The FE suggests, however, that PTF may make too great a virtue out of its volunteer base, and that some functions may be suffering as a result (network building and communications in particular and sometimes country program management). While progress so far demonstrates what small groups of committed citizens can do to clean up public bodies, the next stage is to use this experience more strategically in pressing for systemic change. It may be time, as resources permit, to pay for important functions that its volunteers are unable or unwilling to perform, as is already starting to happen. In particular, PTF has formed partnerships with major local NGOs to manage 3 of its country programs (with considerable success in India and Philippines, home to 36% of PTF grants since 2008). It may now be worth hiring a networking specialist, who could also help in communications and fundraising. PTF reviewers of the draft evaluation have commended this suggestion and recognized PTF's over-dependence on volunteers but point out that to date it simply has not had the level of core funding to permit it employing more staff.

PTF enjoys good relations with its partners, who welcome the advice and experience provided as well as the grants. Some of the more grassroots partners find the bureaucratic requirements difficult to meet, and the FE suggests ways in which these can be eased, and greater flexibility allowed. In particular the reporting burden could be eased by using a simple format that concentrates on whether anticipated activities have been completed, problems or delays experienced and notable highlights.

Although PTF accepts that projects seeking to change policies and attitudes are *complex* and require flexibility, its processes and relations with grantees sometimes give a different impression. It should more clearly indicate its readiness for flexibility and should emphasize to grantees the need to adapt to circumstances. Given that it is not realistic to expect significant change in corruption in a single year, the FE asserts that it is timely with tried and tested partners to move to multi-year grants, if and when resources permit.

The report makes a number of recommendations to PTF about how it could improve its impact and effectiveness (these tally considerably with PTF's own reflections, captured in its Strategic Plan for 2010-14). Principal recommendations are to reduce the number of countries PTF works in and evolve longer-term programs in those countries; improve its communications, including in defining more clearly its niche in the field of social accountability; and, above all, make steps towards becoming a "networking organization". This latter entails a "matchmaking" role, linking PTF partners with those doing similar activities elsewhere; this does not appear to be a PTF priority. For example PTF's website lacks the network-building style that some leading governance-focused NGOs achieve.

The report also makes some recommendations to donors about its support for effective anti-corruption work. One point deserves highlighting. Many of the improvements suggested for PTF's work will only be possible if funders are prepared to provide more resources for core operating costs, including travel, communications and networking so that PTF and similar NGOs can offer intensive technical support to grantees and more effective dissemination of experience and network-building.

In conclusion, though it is always possible to strive for improvement, the substantial benefits that have derived from many of PTF's small grants is a success story worthy of wider telling.

1. Introduction to “*Citizen Mobilizing to Combat Corruption*” Program

Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) was started in 2000 to explore, support and promote new modalities to meet civil society’s demand for good governance. Improved governance – greater accountability, responsiveness to citizens and transparency and honesty in the use of public resources – is seen as critical to achieving improved development outcomes. Convinced that the key to promoting more honest and accountable government lies in fostering a strong local demand for better governance coming from civil society, PTF seeks to promote the piloting by civil society organizations (CSOs) of initiatives to persuade public agencies and governments to improve their accountability and reduce corruption.

PTF is a not-for profit corporation registered in New York State consisting of 37 Members who elect a 12-person Board of Directors and appoint a Board Chair. The Board in turn appoints new Members as needed, a President, Secretary and Treasurer and various committees to help manage its business. All positions are subject to fixed terms.

PTF provides grants and technical assistance to CSOs that work to improve transparency and accountability of public agencies. PTF seeks partners that are in the front line in generating a demand for better governance and supports projects they design to give voice to civil society, demonstrate the value of constructive partnerships between government and civil society, and result in capacity building through action learning. PTF recognizes that for civil society to play a key role in holding governments accountable to their public, CSOs must be, and be seen to be, financially independent both from government and from other powerful vested interests. Its grants help make this possible because PTF is independent, represents no vested interests, and is a minor player posing no threat to public authorities. Also its core Members and Advisers are experienced development professionals and therefore largely respected by the public authorities in question.

“*Communities Mobilizing to Combat Corruption*” is a 9 year-long program of PTF financed by the World Bank’s Development Grants facility (DGF)¹. This has enabled PTF to provide 42 grants to 36 partner CSOs to finance their direct action anti-corruption projects in 22 poor and transition countries from 2007 to 2013. In addition to the small (usually 1-year) grants, PTF provides technical support to its partners, provided by 49 highly experienced Advisors (largely retirees from official aid agencies, many of whom are PTF members or directors). Projects largely focus on improving local public service delivery and local public institutions through specific time-bound actions that aim to curb corruption through specific governance reforms and monitoring of public services and transactions. PTF is in effect an internet-based international NGO that emphasizes governance reforms that have identifiable impact; it also disseminates lessons learnt, thereby helping build CSO capacity to fight corruption. Finally, it provides a conduit through which experienced senior volunteers provide help to strengthen CSO capacity.

2. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluator worked collaboratively with PTF to agree the methodology and develop a detailed evaluation plan. The key elements of the approach were:

- Reviewing PTF reports, a sample of grantee project proposals, project completion reports, project completion assessments, other documents; review of PTF’s book describing its first 12 years of experience, written by its founder, Pierre Landell-Mills.

¹ DGF grants to PTF have been: \$180,000 in FY05, \$250,000 in FY07, \$380,000 in FY08, \$550,000 in FY09, \$400,000 in FY10, \$400,000 in FY11 and a final \$400,000 grant made in FY12. These total \$2,560,000.

- Survey sent to all recent grantees not met in person during the evaluation; analysis of the 21 returns.
- Interviews with principals and many advisors of PTF (including one visit to Washington DC).
- Interviews with other key stakeholders, including the manager of the relevant DGF portfolio.
- Visits to Argentina, Ecuador, India, Mongolia, Uganda and Kenya to meet with grantees, counterparts in official bodies, donors supporting CSOs working on governance and others familiar with the work to the work of the grantees, in particular to assess the relevance of the PTF program to the most pressing governance needs and opportunities in the country.
- Preparing a report on each country visit, with recommendations for possible improvements, and discussing these with PTF.
- Collation of evidence and stories useful for both evaluation and communication work.
- Circulation of draft evaluation report to PTF and considering PTF's feedback in finalizing the evaluation report.

Annex 5 provides a fuller schedule of the FE and Annexes 3 and 4 detail the interviews held and main documents reviewed in the course of the evaluation. The Evaluator covered the last 3 years of DGF support since the last independent evaluation. He also conducted the Mid-Term Review of the DFID-financed PTF program in 2010-11 and hence was able to draw on the field work, interviews and analysis from this.

The other big source of PTF funding in recent years has been DFID's Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). Since DFID also requires an independent evaluation of its PTF support in the same time-frame as the Bank, the Evaluator agreed to take on this at the same time. Coordination of the two evaluations makes sense, since PTF uses precisely the same approach to its partner support, irrespective of the source of funding. Indeed some partners have received PTF grants out of both sources. While there is significant overlap (and very similar recommendations), the reports for the World Bank and DFID are different. Where PTF partners cited in this report are only supported by GTF funds they are highlighted **thus**.

In the following sections we take in turn a standard set of review criteria, as suggested by DFID in its requirement for the GTF evaluation. Each section includes various recommendations which are then summarized in Section 12. It should be pointed out that a number of recommendations tally with PTF's own intentions as set out in its internal documents.

3. Relevance

PTF uses DGF funds to support CSO involvement in seven areas (see PATS reporting on the DGF grant):

- transparency in public procurement;
- monitoring of government activities (e.g., privatization, public auction of licenses, delivery of agreed services, anticorruption programs);
- media campaigns;
- tracking of public expenditures;
- analyses of corruption in specific country situations;
- promotion of transparency in government activity (freedom of information, public hearings, web-based budget information), and
- knowledge sharing through participation in workshops and conferences

Grants are expected to display three project features: constructive engagement, community engagement and peer learning. In addition, PTF provides partners technical assistance, capacity building and networking relating to these activities.

This is an appropriate set of selection criteria, fitting well with the World Bank's governance approach, and the grants awarded reflect a reasonable distribution under these categories. All but the media and knowledge sharing elements contribute *directly* to improving governance and combatting corruption, and most grants support CSO efforts that tackle malpractices impacting on ordinary (especially poorer) citizens, particularly regarding the governance of public services. While larger scams usually attract more media interest, the cumulative impact of pervasive smaller-scale corruption is much more damaging to society and to development. One PTF-financed survey of an Indian city found that 82% of citizens pay bribes in order to access public services to which they are entitled. And before and after surveys in conducted for several of the Indian projects are able to document a marked reduction in such corruption.

It is important to recognize that the shape of the PTF program varies considerably by country. While its partners' priorities comprise one factor, this variation also reflects differences in opportunities and priorities: whether the governance problems are deep-seated in a stable political environment, whether new priority problems have arisen (such as with recent discovery of oil or mineral resources), or whether a major political change offers new opportunities. In particular, PTF has supported a number of partners who have contributed to striking reforms in transition countries (see Box 1).

Box 1. Governance Reform Opportunities in Transition Countries: Mongolia

A change in government in a country that has been mired in bad governance can provide a golden opportunity for CSOs if the new regime is committed to reform. This is what has happened in Mongolia. With PTF support (from both GTF and DGF sources), 3 excellent NGOs have: drafted laws that have been enacted; helped make the anti-corruption agencies of government bold and effective; helped to reform the judiciary, civil service, and police towards high norms of ethical standards; and helped model a disclosure policy at local level that is now being widely copied throughout the country.

Achievement of this scale could hardly be feasible in a country undergoing gradual and organic reforms. What has made the Mongolia achievements so impressive has been a "perfect storm" combination of factors: immense need for reform after decades of soviet-style government; further abuse of governance by a self-serving oligarchy that replaced the communist rulers; a popular determination to move towards real democracy and good governance backed by a strong network of widely respected civil society leaders; the election in 2009 of a president who stresses fighting corruption and promoting democracy; and weak capacity within government for forging the new laws and policies needed to make the reforms needed possible, and hence the willingness of the political leaders to seek the support of civil society.

As a result, and with funding and some guidance from PTF, the partners have:

- Drafted and seen through enactment a Conflict of Interest Law, backed by guidebooks and training
- Taken legal action against parliamentary efforts to block the passage of this new law
- Developed a model information strategy at Province level to give substance to the new FOI law
- Built the capacity/ independence of the Anti-Corruption agency, and connected it to civil society
- Helped strengthen professionalism/independence of the judiciary esp. by preparing a code of ethics,
- Helped the police leadership fight corruption in the force and introduce global best ethical practice
- Built capacities for professional and ethical procurement processes

Some might argue that much of PTF's anti-corruption work addresses smaller scale abuse of office rather than grand corruption, but on the other hand it is what many call "petty corruption" that is so devastating for poor people (having to pay a bribe to get their child accepted to a school, having to pay under-the-counter

for the essential drugs needed when there is sickness in the family etc.). Also, sadly, experience shows that all too often where corruption is the way of political life, exposés of grand corruption lead to vivid newspaper coverage and little more. PTF partner ULS, for example, has monitored corruption cases in Uganda's anti-corruption courts, and while there were several convictions, most of these were of the smaller fry. Big cases were acquitted or dropped, and when convictions did result these were overturned on appeal. Some PTF partners do, however, focus successfully on grand corruption (see, for example, discussion of integrity pacts and procurement, below).

That the PTF-CMCC support to CSOs is highly relevant to the development and social challenges of the countries where it operates is the most confident finding in this evaluation. The World Bank has prioritized governance as a development priority for 18 years, now (since President Wolfensohn's famous "cancer of corruption" speech in 1995) and has more recently come to see civil society's role in establishing an effective "demand for good governance" as a critical reform element. Hence in 2012 the Bank announced the new Global Program for Social Accountability (GPSA). The core purpose of the DGF is to supplement the Bank's normal operations with grants to external parties, in particular to support the innovations and partnerships that are needed to achieve the desired development outcomes. The CMCC program fits very well with these objectives and in particular should provide valuable pointers for the GPSA.

This is not to say PTF's work could not be made more effective in protecting vulnerable people from the impact of corruption. In some countries the program is more exciting and meets a more conspicuous gap than elsewhere. This is clearest where: a) there are multiple grants in the country, b) there is a common thread running through the projects (allowing some benefits of scale and cross-fertilization to be achieved); c) PTF support to partners is sustained, rather than one-off grants; d) PTF has a continuous presence in the country (such as an advisor who is resident there or a partner NGO who coordinates the program); e) where few donors support civic activism on governance in the area; and f) where there are opportunities to influence national policies and institutions, especially when based on experience of more grassroots activism.

***Recommendations:** Focus on a smaller range of countries, reflecting the above criteria; define the priorities in each country; and ensure there is a country "strategic anchor". This issue is expanded in Section 5.*

4. Impact

PTF declares its intention of funding partners to be to "assist CSOs to demand greater honesty, accountability and responsiveness from its public officials" and to achieve this through emphasizing:

- *Focus:* concentrating sharply on specific abuses;
- *Constructive engagement:* locating and seeking the cooperation of key influential officials and public agencies sympathetic to the CSO's cause;
- *Transparency:* CSO monitoring to make transactions as public as possible;
- *Persistence:* sustaining effort and building up pertinent local CSO capacity over time.

The above provide a good framework for assessing the impact of CMCC activities and whether these priorities are followed in practice.

a) *Focus:*

Most CMCC grants target concrete reforms that reduce or eliminate specific instances of corruption, rather than just "raising awareness", building capacity or creating CSOs (although these may all be needed as intermediary steps). The experience reviewed in this evaluation confirms that such activities lead to much

more tangible outcomes – in terms of identified and corrected malpractices, improved services and strengthened institutions – than would be the case with more general anti-corruption campaigns. PTF advisors usually urge the partners to restrict their scope in order to have deeper impact. (Sometimes the advice may lead to *over-focus*; for example ACCU was urged to monitor the supply only of anti-malaria drugs to clinics, not all essential medicines, which did not make good sense.) The following box illustrates such concrete outcomes.

Box 2. Examples of *Focus* leading to Concrete Reductions in Corruption

- **Latvia:** DELNA’s budget monitoring led to construction costs in just one contract for the National Library being reduced by €5.5M and to a deflation clause being activated (saving a further €3.5M)
- **Azerbaijan:** CESD monitoring revealed that \$17M of money from the Azerbaijan Oil Fund had gone “missing” in the construction of its new office. Some of this was returned and the Fund is now negotiating with the multilateral EITI monitoring group over a code of ethics and transparency. In 2012 CESD then exposed a \$10.4M discrepancy in expenditures in a railway construction project
- **Croatia:** PSD successfully lobbied for and helped draft new Public Procurement Act; and has established a computer-based database of all public procurements, which gets 6000 searches/month.
- **Philippines:** Ecolink started monitoring the misuse of government vehicles in using an SMS system to report vehicles that were clearly being used for private purposes. This has led to savings of \$215,000/year in three municipalities, and the project is now being taken to national scale.
- **India:** **Partners in Orissa** were able to halve the payment of bribes to service providers by using social audits, structured dialogue with authorities and campaigns. For example, most of the 11,000 families reached in one project now receive their entitlements to free medicines and health services (without bribes) – the value of which is estimated at \$30-55/family/year.
- **Cameroon:** **IGI** advocacy and then collaboration with the University of Buéa reduced the university’s losses due to corruption and financial mismanagement in its recurrent budget from about 30% to less than 10% through budget monitoring, greater transparency, and more disciplined procurement. This approach has been taken up elsewhere in Cameroon and also in Kenya and DRC.
- **Nigeria:** **DARC** worked with the authorities and trained procurement officers in Cross River State to clean up public procurement. The State’s oversight body estimated that this resulted in \$106,000 savings in one quarter and an international specialist estimated savings of \$2.7M in 9 months.
- **Mongolia:** Women for Social Progress drafted a Conflict of Interest law and lobbied for its passage through parliament – including taking the unprecedented step of taking a court action against parliament itself when it was clear that the speaker and some MPs were blocking the key debate. Now the law is passed and all public servants must make public all their assets and interests, and a hotline is in place for citizens who think officials are acting in a self-interested way. About 200 challenges per year are currently made, of which about half lead to formal charges. In addition, the Speaker of the National Assembly was exposed as corrupt and lost his job.

The public services targeted by PTF comprise national social safety net schemes in India, education services (Cameroon, Ghana, Uganda, Moldova, Honduras, Indonesia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Philippines), health services (India, Nepal and Uganda), the police and judiciary (Uganda, Mongolia, Bolivia and Serbia); energy (Romania); and land and forests (Nepal and Rwanda). CMCC projects usually have a strong geographic focus which helps make impacts more tangible and broadens citizen support for the activities, since people more readily see themselves as stakeholders in local programs of which they are supposed to be beneficiaries compared with national programs in which their interests are less tangible. However it is a key strength of PTF that it supports a blend of grassroots and national-level activities, although we suggest that more could be done to seek synergies between these two levels.

PTF could be more active in assisting local NGOs move up the administrative chain to tackle systemic governance issues that allow the abuses to take place at the village level, seeking the best partners for this. Without this, the result may be an undue emphasis on local-level corruption rather than upstream problems in the whole chain reaching to high officials.

There is also a considerable focus regarding operational approaches. PTF is emerging as a “market leader” in the tackling of corruption in the delivery of public services and in monitoring procurement. This deserves to be built on. Favored tools and strategies of CMCC partners are: procurement monitoring, integrity pacts, expenditure tracking, promoting freedom of information laws, social audits and other mechanisms to help local communities monitor programs from which they are supposed to benefit. These elements should form the basis of more proactive networking and experience-sharing to foster deeper use of these approaches internationally. While this happens to a certain extent (particularly in the national sharing of partners’ experience in India and Philippines), more could be done to use international workshops, e-conferences, the PTF website and “how-to” manuals to spread awareness of the effectiveness of these approaches more widely. Doing so would help PTF develop a stronger niche in the community of international NGOs.

b) Constructive Engagement:

A distinctive feature of PTF’s approach is to urge its partners to engage constructively with relevant officials, elected representatives and public bodies. Many projects illustrate the benefits of such this. For example groups in the Philippines have been able to use their good relations with officials to get access to procurement documents and bidding processes, thereby identifying where there is collusion or other malpractice. And **IGI in Cameroon** has been effective in reducing corruption in the University of Buéa by working with the university’s management committee, rather than positioning itself solely as an independent watchdog.

Perhaps nowhere is the effectiveness of constructive engagement clearer than in the India program. Though this has been largely (but not entirely) financed by DFID, DGF funds have financed the overall coordinating partner in Bangalore. The Karnataka partners have shifted from angry posturing towards the owners of the “fair price” shops who do not give full rations to embarking on a dialogue in which they learn the problems that the shopkeepers face. By holding joint meetings between the shopkeepers and community leaders a number of common interests and major obstacles have been identified, leading to cooperation in tackling them with the State officials. As a result, the quantity, quality and timeliness of supplies to the ration shops has greatly improved (with less loss due to corruption), relationships with the PDS shopkeepers and officials are better, and on-going cooperation is ensuring that all entitled get the rations they deserve. In addition, the cooperating shopkeepers now apply peer pressure on those who continue to indulge in corrupt or unjust practices. Similarly what used to be a strained relationship between District-level officials and communities in the allocation of emergency work and the selection of public work projects in the NREGS scheme has been turned into a positive relationship in some cases,

with the authorities trusting the communities themselves to select the projects and allocate the work. This is a win-win for all concerned, except for the crooked engineers and others who previously benefited by holding both the reins and the purse-strings in these public works schemes.

Some public servants interviewed in India, Philippines and elsewhere confessed that at first they were not favorable towards the planned CMCC activities (seeing them as making extra work), but they have come to see them as catalytic, achieving much more than they had thought possible and more beneficial in improving state programs than the reforms they could have achieved by themselves. In the Philippines this related to efforts to clean up procurement processes and in India to Food Inspectors' efforts to hold Fair Price Shops to account.

While CSO collaboration with a public body can lead to outcomes that are greater than each by itself could expect to achieve, the "constructive" principle should not be taken too far. Many officials have done everything possible to thwart social accountability activities and have resorted to threatening behavior towards some CMCC workers. In very polarized settings it may be difficult for a CMCC partner to find a public entity that will cooperate, especially overtly (although in such situations a special premium attaches to *any* official who is a reform champion). Many CMCC partners have found it necessary to "name and shame" corrupt officials or to organize various forms of public protests. While PTF hasn't blocked such strategies, they don't sit easily with the principle of constructive engagement. In some countries early grantees experienced considerable delays because PTF then required signed documents from the relevant public bodies committing to a partnership (this requirement is no longer applied). Some genuine reform champions may avoid any formalized engagement with civil society since this might court over-exposure and personal reprisals. This is not a significant problem providing the principle is adhered to pragmatically, as an aspirational goal rather than a bottom line.

Box 3. Working with government anti-corruption agencies

In Mongolia, **Globe International** has helped the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission develop strong links with civil society, and key officials joined in GI's training of CSOs on citizens' roles in combatting corruption. Transparency International has provided training to the special AC unit in the State Prosecutor's Office, which is now much more prepared to take up high-profile cases (56 cases from 2011-12). TI-M has also worked with the National Police Authority, including arranging an exchange visit and cooperation with police authorities in UK, to develop a structure for handling complaints of police corruption (this currently handles 100 cases/year).

In Argentina, CIPPEC has helped the Anti-Corruption Office of the Santa Fe province government (one of the largest) to prepare new legislation, particularly regarding asset declaration. It is also working with that province and 2 others to monitor the financing of political parties and to combat electoral malpractice.

In Uganda **ACCU** helps build links between civil society and the Inspectorate General of Government in particular to help CSOs monitoring public services and government schemes ensure investigation of bad practices they identify. IGG forwards cases to the Anti-Corruption Court if their investigations substantiate the CSOs' allegations. For example, ACCU detected fraud and over-pricing in the supply of malaria and AIDS drugs, resulting in State losses of \$17M that is under IGG investigation. Uganda Law Society has widely informed citizens about corruption laws and monitored the quality of the Anti-Corruption Court; it has established a State-civil society forum and a legal experts Committee, to strengthen government's AC initiatives, and has been invited to serve on the AC Court User's Committee.

The above illustrate a general point. CSOs can be very good at identifying corrupt practices that hurt ordinary citizens, but it is difficult for them to seek redress. Government AC agencies have clout but it is difficult for them to take up investigations proactively. Cooperation demonstrates that the "demand side" efforts of civil society can make the "supply side" bodies of the state much more effective.

c) *Enhancing Transparency*

CMCC partners have often been effective at enhancing the transparency of public services and bodies. In some countries (such as Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda, Philippines and Serbia) they have helped make local budget processes more transparent and responsive, and have often been creative in using national freedom of information laws – pushing the boundaries for the benefit of ordinary citizens. CMCC partners in India, for example, have filed over 600 requests for information under the Right to Information Act, and have persuaded some public bodies to routinely make information available, *suo moto*, rather than wait until it is requested. Many groups have also made transparency more effective by educating the public about the power of that information or use of mass media. And some have concentrated on what most citizens really care about – namely information about local plans and services that affect them directly. For example, National Council of Churches in Kenya and ASYOUSSED (PTF's partner in Buéa, Cameroon) have helped local communities appreciate the discretionary funds at the disposal of the local councils and are now involved in the allocation of these funds.

These are all examples of successful activities, but we suggest PTF could do more to help connect these grassroots partners with national Freedom of Information movements, both as vehicles for sharing more widely their experience and to encourage national advocacy to deal with matters that are grassroots priorities. This already happens in India, where some partners have become active in the People's Rights to Information movement, and in Philippines where partners work together in lobbying for greater transparency in public procurement.

d) *Persistence:*

Its small scale and uncertain funding makes it difficult for PTF to realize its ambition to “sustain effort” and “build up pertinent CSO capacity” over time. Its partners almost all speak in very positive terms about PTF, its advice and its support, but the most common lament or plea for a rethink is that most grants are just for one-year projects, and that even with tried and tested partners there are no multi-year or institutional support grants (although many do receive second and even further grants). With its current funding problems it is not possible to make changes now, but if and as the situation becomes easier it should be seen as a PTF priority to help put its partners on a more secure footing (especially those who depend considerably on its funding). This includes avoiding a funding hiatus between phases of projects as has been the case in India (where most partners who were offered follow-up funding experienced a 3 to 9 month delay between their first and second grants).

The clearest message, however, must go to donors who should be well-placed to support the social accountability work of PTF and other intermediary NGOs. Fighting corruption and reforming governance is as vital an ingredient of development as the most poverty-focused project and will not be achieved without the full involvement of civil society. But governance reforms are not as easy to quantify as vaccines delivered. And good governance will not be achieved simply by helping governments strengthen their governance institutions; citizens must be helped to demand reforms, to monitor government activities and to hold officials to account. However at present donors provide few funds for this, and when they do so they often prefer to define the interventions they want CSOs to adopt rather than trusting them to develop strategies appropriate to their contexts. As a consequence few organizations, like PTF, are able to respond to the priorities of indigenous civil society. We hope that this evaluation will help encourage donors to ratchet up their support to PTF and other NGOs who support social accountability activities prioritized by indigenous civil society.

Box 4. Monitoring and Safeguarding Devolved Funds and Services in Africa

Uganda Ethics Network Outreach (UENO) and a local CBO are monitoring funds allocated for building new schools and classrooms in Manafwa District, and strengthening the School Management Committees – parent-teacher bodies formally charged with oversight of the schools, but which in practice were non-functioning. This work (concentrating on schools that received construction grants under a World Bank program) has exposed many cases of malpractice, especially with head-teachers and officials colluding with construction companies. In one case a construction company was forced to rebuild a shoddy classroom block as a result.

Transparency International-Uganda: This project formed and trained Voluntary Accountability Committees (VACs) of citizens in Rakai District. The VACs detected and reported on corruption in local government services in agriculture, health, education and roads. It found serious cases of the theft of seeds, of funds for textbook production, and bribes demanded for moving children up one grade or for supplying essential drugs in health centers. TI-U built a district anti-corruption coalition to examine these cases before reporting them first to the authorities and then to the public. As a result, most of these problems have been eliminated, and roads are now better quality. This responsible approach was respected by (non-corrupt) officials and as a result the local government now informs community leaders in advance of development plans and budgets. The VACs continued to function after funding finished but most impressively TI-U has greatly built on this pioneering work by forming VACs and promoting Development Pacts in 6 other Districts (financed by various donors) and the World Bank local office has expressed an interest to adopting the approach.

NCCK in Kenya trained Social Auditors (SA) to monitor projects implemented with Constituency Development Funds (CDF) in Limuru. This found shoddy construction that had to be redone, faulty procurement and other problems, but also helped officials who were being criticized by communities when they weren't at fault. SAs were carefully selected to be highly committed, and now most are still active to varying degrees in scrutinizing the use of CDF and many have become regarded as community leaders/mobilizers. The SAs meet once/month to share experience and for team-building and the team reports regularly to NCCK. Most SAs are still active in this type of work (though PA had earlier said that only about 6-8 were). NCCK is now implementing a project in Machakos district that is based on and learns lessons from this Limuru project experience.

ASYOUSED in Cameroon has promoted citizen involvement in the municipal budgets of Buéa and Tiko. Enhancing transparency and probity was the starting point but this evolved to a participatory budgeting element. The mayors agreed to allow ASYOUSED to work with the local communities to draw up their priorities for the allocation of a portion of the budgets. For example, one village of Buéa had suffered a recent cholera epidemic and their top priority was a proper water supply with a protected connection to the local spring. ASYOUSED has good rapport with the mayors and councilors (who appreciate the guidance and training they have provided) as well as the communities and it appears that the councils have actually implemented the priorities selected by the communities.

The Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda, together with its Northern Uganda affiliate have monitored the supply of drugs and the functioning of 8 health centres in Lira District. This revealed malpractices in the State-Owned Enterprises that delivers drugs (especially anti-malarials) to public health facilities and in the company that supposedly manufactures low-price generic drugs. Small cases were addressed locally (such as in the Public Accountability Forums ACCU convenes), larger ones are referred to the Health Sector Anti-Corruption Working Group that ACCU helped to form with the Ministry of Health; it comprises officials as well as about 5 NGO representatives.

e) Summary and recommendations on impact:

This evaluation (in keeping with previous independent evaluations of PTF) is confident that CMCC projects on the whole have a strongly positive impact, exceeding what can reasonably be expected. The social, economic and political consequences highlighted in the grantees' documentation (and confirmed in Project Completion Assessments) reveals very clear and tangible benefits, going well beyond identifying governance problems and "raising awareness".

Where these projects have been subject to independent evaluation, these benefits have been largely confirmed. The substantial – often dramatic – benefit that can derive swiftly from such small grants is a success story worthy of wider telling.

Recommendations:

- *PTF could seek to develop more synergy between grassroots activities and national-level advocacy by encouraging and helping partners to connect with national or sub-national policy networks, to share their experience proactively and to use PTF's own web of contacts to connect partners with research centers, national advocacy groups, reform-minded officials etc. who could make good use of their grassroots experiences.*
- *PTF could give more emphasis to international sharing of experience and to encouraging the spread of the key SA tools used by PTF partners. This would enable PTF to use its inherent strengths more systematically and to demonstrate a more distinct "product line".*
- *Encourage constructive engagement as much as possible but do not make documentary evidence of this (e.g. MOUs with relevant officials) a requirement unless necessitated by the project design.*
- *If and when PTF's funding base becomes more secure, start supporting multi-year projects and consider providing institutional support to particularly tried and tested partners.*
- *Key finding: Donors should allocate sufficient funding to PTF (and to other NGOs who respond to civil societies' governance initiatives) to foster a more secure funding base for CSOs who demonstrate courage and innovation in tackling corruption.*

5. Economy and Efficiency

Being largely run by volunteers, drawing on the donated time of its advisors, and being highly cost-conscious when it comes to its travel and office costs and other expenditures, PTF is highly efficient in a budgetary sense. This section discusses the efficiency of the management approaches, PTF's use of advisors, grantee relations, networking, its financial systems and risk management. We conclude that PTF has a commendably efficient business approach, is always ready to test ways to improve efficiency and selects partners who share a similar efficiency ethos. The only obvious improvement could be to harvest economies of scale through stricter country focus. It should be stressed, however, that the DGF-financed programs cannot be looked at in isolation of other PTF activity funded out of other sources.

a) *Management Approaches*

PTF uses three management approaches for its CMCC program in different countries:

- *One-on-One Partnerships:* in which PTF works directly with grantees in particular countries via designated PTF voluntary advisors and regional coordinators. (This applies in most countries where there are 1 or 2 grants)

- *Regional/Country Partnership*: in which a carefully selected partner is delegated most management responsibility, though PTF retains sole authority over grant allocations and tranche releases. (This applies to a) South Asia where the Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, manages relations with 18 CMCC-financed partners; b) the FONTRA program in Southern Cone countries, funded by the Inter-American Bank; and c) the newer Kenya program, managed by ACT! – Act, Change, Transform.)
- *More modest Country Program approach*: in which a local partner is appointed to help PTF manage the country program but where PTF retains most responsibility. (This applies in Philippines and Uganda).

The appropriateness of these approaches depends on the size of the country program, the strength of the governance-focused CSO community and the depth of PTF presence. In general this evaluation is of the opinion that PTF has given too many one-off grants, and that it should move towards a more coordinated approach, concentrating on 8-12 countries (with the volume of funding PTF has enjoyed over the past 4-5 years). The 12 countries where PTF has given 4 or more grants since 2006 account for 76% of all its grants. One-off grants have been issued in 21 countries in this period (of which 8 were funded by GTF and 6 by DGF); this includes countries as large and complex as Russia, Nigeria and Indonesia. While undoubtedly some of these have achieved impressive results (such as PSD's work to clean up public procurement in Croatia) in general, richer results and learning experiences are found in countries where there are multiple partners and repeater grants. PTF should retain the flexibility to support excellent initiatives that come to its attention from elsewhere, where the CSO in question has difficulty mobilizing the funds it needs, but should narrow its reach. PTF has become aware of this issue (although in its DGF application it envisaged *expanding* the range of countries it provides grants) and only 3 of the 51 grants made in 2011 and 2012 were in new countries.

In general, our view is that both PTF and the partners benefit by having a country partnership approach and we suggest further devolution to the coordinating agency for processing grant proposals (with PTF just making the final funding decision), routine monitoring and for tranche releases. This would free PTF for giving specialist advice as needed, for evaluations and drawing lessons of experience in the PCAs, for organizing regional and international events to share experience, and for injecting project experience into the global civic activist community.

An in-country program coordinator might also be better placed to give timely advice and help to the more grassroots partners, since PTF's key strengths lie in national and international policy issues, rather than civic activism at the local level. For example, the India partners who focus on corruption within the safety-net schemes particularly welcomed the support they got from Public Affairs Centre, while the partner that targeted large, national public procurements spoke more appreciatively about the direct help from PTF. All, however, appreciated PTF's role in organizing workshops where they have the chance to meet partners from other countries.

We also suggest the national coordinator could even prepare *country* progress reports (rather than all partners preparing individual project reports), synthesizing the progress of all partners as well as activities of the coordinator. This would ease the burden on the grassroots partners. The coordinator would be expected to keep in close contact with all grantees to establish progress against the agreed project timetable, identify problems or key challenges surfacing and at the same time could identify notable success stories and interesting news. Since they are likely to be much more skilled in writing (especially writing in English), these reports are likely to be more useful to PTF and other audiences and would help PTF's communications effort. At present, partners put a great deal of effort into writing quarterly reports and it is doubtful if these are even read carefully, other than to establish whether activities have been completed that are triggers for the release of the next funding tranche.

b) Use of advisors

Perhaps the clearest feature that distinguishes PTF from other INGOs is its very strong reliance on volunteers who are extremely experienced and highly skilled in various development fields – most being retirees from the World Bank or other international agencies. Currently PTF has two full-time staff (the Program Manager and a manager of a specific World Bank-financed program called CARTA) and a part-time Grants & Finance Manager – plus consultants paid for specific purposes (such as website design). PTF currently lists 37 “Members”, most of whom are on the board or serve as advisors, plus a further 29 project advisors. All members and advisors serve as unpaid consultants to PTF and (particularly) to its grantees. If these services were budgeted at anything approaching a market rate, the technical assistance of PTF would greatly outweigh its financial assistance. Interviews of grantees during the FE affirm that they are in general very grateful for this advice and find it useful in the design and execution of their work. They find their advisors reliable, quick to respond and a friend, not just a “free consultant”.

Box 5. *Reforming Local Governance in Latin America*

Local Governance Reform, Argentina: two DGF-funded PTF grants helped CIPPEC in the preparation and distribution of a report on a major, 22-province survey on governance (planned by Global Integrity – a Washington-based NGO, and co-financed by National Endowment for Democracy). This is an impressive survey, assessing in a scholarly and objective way a range of governance indicators. It has proved a powerful tool to bring together CSOs, academics and local government officials. In some of the better governed provinces both officials and legislators have used the survey well, and have sought CIPPEC’s advice in specific reform initiatives. Salta government has asked CIPPEC to help in its strategic review of its civil service, with a view to redesigning its public employment and remuneration approach. And in Santa Fe, the new Anti-Corruption office used the analysis and CIPPEC help to prepare new regulations on asset declaration by public servants and to develop ideas for a few FOI law, which would in particular allow citizens much greater access to information about state-owned enterprises in the province.

Monitoring Campaign Financing of 2011 Election: The trust built up in the above project led the Santa Fe province governor in Argentina personally to ask CIPPEC to help develop a new, single-ballot electoral system designed to avoid electoral malpractice. This was visited during the evaluation and is a clear illustration of an NGO bringing major influence to bear on strengthening democracy. The official responsible for elections said that the reform would not have been possible without CIPPEC help. Ideas being considered include a reform of campaign finance, to ensure a level playing field, and adoption of electronic ballots. Other provinces (but not the federal government) are expressing an interest to adopt similar approaches.

Towards Evidence-Based Sub-National Governance Reforms in Ecuador: The Global Integrity survey was also run in Ecuador by Grupo Faro; again PTF co-financed this. The survey was done well and helped establish GF as a specialist in local governance and to open dialogue with some municipalities, resulting in 5 MOUs for future collaboration on transparency, budget, and service-accountability. Unfortunately the funding envisaged from Inter-American Bank for this did not come through, but PTF but a follow-up DGF-funded PTF grant has helped GF pick up some of this, particularly regarding enhancing public access to information. The survey was well-covered by the press and has been discussed twice by the Quito Municipality.

The evaluation suggests two areas of improvement, however. Firstly, since most advisors have held senior jobs in development they often have inflated expectations of the ability of grassroots partners in writing, research and documentation. PTF and the country coordinators should advise on the management of this expectation. Secondly, some partners could benefit from very specific expertise that may not be in the current directory of advisors in which case it would help if the advisors could act as “talent scouts”, using their contacts to identify specialists prepared to be advisors for specific requirements (some partners dealing with particularly technical issues such as large-scale procurement have suggested this).

In general the comparative advantage of PTF advisors is that they have deep understanding of the main governance issues, have good connections at high level in government, and have experience of large and complicated (rather than grassroots) projects. They mostly do not live in the grantees’ countries and rarely (sometimes never) get to meet their assigned partners. In reviewing PTF’s volunteer strategy, the challenge will be to maximize the use of their strengths to benefit partners and to seek to recruit new advisors with skill profiles that fill existing gaps.

We also suggest trying to increase advisors’ direct contact with their partners, rather than using email, where questions about project design etc. need to be discussed. This could be achieved by more telephone or Skype contact with grantees. The advisors may even help draft parts of project proposals, not just provide feedback, when the partner is clearly having difficulty.

c) Grantee Relations

PTF enjoys very good relations on the whole with its grantees and, as one would expect, a strong degree of gratitude for the support. There were some concerns expressed by grantees in the course of this review, however, which indicate areas of potential efficiency gains.

The most common concern of smaller grantees, especially those not so fluent in English, was the complex nature of the application, reporting and completion report processes, which many find daunting. PTF’s “Guidelines to CSOs” for grant applications runs to 31 pages and some informants commented that they have had to make several iterations of their proposals before grant approval to accommodate questions from PTF advisors. However those who find the process too time-consuming also point out: a) that PTF is by no means the trickiest funder, and b) that much of the complexity reflects the requirements of PTF’s donors which PTF must meet in order to be seen to be accountable for the funds it allocates. Donor requirements can easily be handled by large CSOs used to grants from large donors, but prove extremely difficult for grassroots CSOs, especially where their managers have limited English language skills. Simpler processes should be explored for them.

The second most frequent concern relates to funding discontinuity. PTF at present largely makes one-year grants, even when it is evident that the agreed goal will take longer to achieve. PTF may indicate its willingness to provide follow-up grants to known partners, but in practice these are treated as separate projects, rather than different phases of a single project. Subsequent funding applications are generally considered after the prior phase is finished, a completion report has been filed and reviewed by PTF, and perhaps an independent evaluation conducted. Most Indian grantees, for example, received a “2nd phase” grant, but experienced a gap of 6 months or more between phases. Although most partners were able to maintain some project activity, there was a loss of momentum and some loss of field staff.

It would be preferable to have longer-term funding commitments (of course, as PTF’s own financial situation permits). A multi-year funding agreement would still require evidence of good performance for subsequent tranches to be released but the NGO is able to plan on the basis of assured funding. (PTF has advised the FE that this funding discontinuity has only been a constraint in India). Some partners

have urged going further and issuing *program* grants for well-known grantees; such funding would be more flexible, allowing the partner to respond to situations as they arise, and then account for how the PTF funds have been used within broad agreed parameters, rather than define all the activities in advance.

PTF partners vary greatly in size, experience, “grassroots-ness” and dependence on PTF. The FE survey revealed that grantees receive anywhere from 1% to 98% of their funding from PTF. While one-off, short-term project grants may make good sense for the larger, less dependent NGOs, such funding can pose a challenge to the survival of smaller NGOs. Also, the nature of PTF’s advice (whose style can be influenced by the large official aid projects most PTF advisors have more experience with) and the mode of communication (email rather than voice) can be a little alienating to grassroots partners. PTF could usefully make more use of Skype in this.

While PTF maintains very close links with partners during project preparation and implementation, there may not be such close attention afterwards. PTF could do more to inform and link partners engaged in similar work in different countries (for example partners promoting integrity pacts or monitoring anti-corruption courts). And in a follow-up and impact assessment stage PTF could help its partners draw policy lessons from their projects for their advocacy.

d) *Networking*

International NGOs that work in many countries can contribute vital knowledge sharing and networking support in addition to the funds and technical assistance they offer, particularly when they work in a very specific field such as anti-corruption. In recent years, PTF has appropriately given more attention to this. It has organized a number of global or regional events that have brought partners together (sometimes piggy-backing on existing meetings such as the International Anti-Corruption Conferences in Thailand and Brazil).

Regional PTF workshops in Jaipur and Berlin in 2012 were particularly welcome to partners. These provided the chance for groups working on similar challenges but in different contexts to share experience and exchange tools. Similarly there have been more localized workshops for partners in East Africa and India, and exchange visits have been arranged in a few occasions (especially in India) to deepen the opportunity for exchange. PTF is more strenuously seeking other ways to disseminate valuable lessons. In particular in April 2013 PTF’s founder, P. Landell-Mills, published a book, “*Citizens Against Corruption*”, documenting many citizens’ victories that PTF grants have helped make possible. PTF also published a practical guide to promoting citizen demand for good governance at the request of the World Bank and funded by the 2009 DGF grant (“*Stimulating Demand for Good Governance*”, 2011).

PTF cannot reasonably be described as a networking organization. NGOs like International Budget Project, Global Witness and Article 19 have the edge when it comes to being seen as THE place to go for ideas and contacts on their topic. In particular their websites are clearly designed to be first and foremost useful resources for their partners. They are lively places to browse, get new ideas, find out about training guides, research papers, and all manner of resources from all and everyone in the field, as well as links to related websites, help to arrange horizontal links and exchanges etc. etc. And different sections of the website cater for CSOs, researchers, donors, and public officials. The PTF website (although somewhat improved by a recent revamp) is largely a database of documents on the projects it finances plus information about PTF and its publications. In other words it isn’t *fighting corruption* that comes across as its heart, but PTF as an organization. Conversations with partners also suggest that PTF advisors do little to connect them with other governance-specialist NGOs (such as the above).

While PTF has smaller capacity than the other NGOs mentioned, this is only part of it. PTF is a service and grant provider more than a campaigner or connector. Hence its website largely dwells on those services it provides to its clients and on its organizational expertise. Relationships are largely bilateral – with its partners – rather than network-building. As a result, partners working in very similar fields (promoting ethics and transparency in public procurement, judicial reform, or corruption in higher education for example) may well not be aware about each other’s projects and are not encouraged to collaborate or share experience. Much highly skilled expertise is generously donated by advisors to PTF, but it appears that its web design and network-building skills are still thin on the ground. It may seem churlish to flag these issues, since PTF directors and advisors provide a great deal of voluntary time and effort, but it may be time for PTF to employ staff to do those tasks that are unattractive (or foreign) to its volunteers, even if this means doing less elsewhere.

A revamped website would be welcome, but is only one step towards becoming a networking organization. For that, its staff and advisors would play other roles alongside being free consultants for PTF partners. They would also: be talent scouts – looking around for CSOs, researchers and other resources that could help the cause of fighting corruption; knowledge managers – searching out reports, training materials, how-to guides etc. and disseminating these to PTF partners and other anti-corruption activists; and match-makers – helping to arrange horizontal links, exchange visits, and new collaborations between partners and others.

e) Finance System

PTF’s finance system is rigorous and dependable. It emphasizes probity and cross-checking. The grant-making and financial management processes are handled professionally, and there is now a clearer delineation of who has sign-off authority for what, meaning that PTF is now very swift in making payments when due, unless there are some issues being questioned.

f) Risk Management

The risks PTF itself describes comprise two main and three lesser risks. The main risks related to government obstruction and weak partner implementation. The mitigation strategies envisaged: (a) ensuring as fully as possible that relevant public authorities agree to the intervention or commit to support it and (b) that there is careful partner selection, and strong PTF technical input and oversight. While (b) makes clear sense, in some countries (a) may have been over-done, and the risk is actually impossible to avoid.

PTF encourages “constructive engagement” as a principle to be followed wherever feasible, but it isn’t always possible to get a “reform champion” to commit on paper, as discussed in Section 4.b. Some projects had delayed starts because partners were told they ought to get signed MOUs with their government counterparts. Elsewhere governments may agree to cooperate with PTF partners in identifying corruption but when it comes to prosecuting those shown to be guilty, they are far too lax, calling into question the worth of the government’s signed agreement.² Reaching an easy agreement may even be a sign that a regime feels unthreatened by civil society, and conversely obstruction by civil servants of CSOs’ activities can be a measure of their effectiveness, not just a risk to be avoided. Hence this is certainly a risk to be managed, but *how* to manage it will depend on the country context. Also, while collaboration with public bodies is undoubtedly an effective strategy it is not the *only* strategy, and at times public demonstrations or confrontational approaches may be more appropriate.

² In this case different departments are involved, with different levels of commitment. The Ministry of Health is regarded as very serious about curbing leakage in Uganda’s medical supplies, but the State prosecutors have a light touch when it comes to those who are politically well-connected.

The lower order risks PTF identifies are: not being able to sustain PTF's volunteer effort; not being able to mobilize sufficient funds from other sources and not being able to identify enough good projects. Undoubtedly PTF finds it easier to find volunteers with the right profile for some tasks than others (the discussion above about it not having become a networking organization is an example of this); also it is now more prepared to pay staff and consultants for some functions previously played by volunteers. Identifying new projects is certainly not a problem.

What is clearly becoming a higher-order risk (potentially even an existential one) is the difficulty in mobilizing new and renewed funding. Some, such as DFID, have closed down its relevant funding window; others will not consider funding a US-based NGO or will only fund NGOs based in developing countries. PTF is considering opening a European office to become eligible for some additional funding sources, it could also consider applying to country offices of donors jointly with its partners.

The factors partners most commonly cite (in the FE survey) as the risks to their projects are: strong resistance from local officials, threats of reprisals or violence, the economic crisis, the thoroughly engrained nature of corruption, the reluctance of officials to receive grievances or provide information, political instability, conflict in the country, and lack of political will for reform. We conclude that PTF does as much as can reasonably be expected to take such factors into account.

Recommendations:

- *Adopt a stricter country focus, appointing where possible an excellent partner as country-manager or resident advisor; devolve more responsibilities and powers to that partner.*
- *Take steps towards being a networking organization; give more attention to networking, strategic linking and experience sharing functions and to expanding direct contact with partners.*
- *Ease the writing and reporting burden on partners, especially for those whose forte is not writing reports in English; more "voice" rather than email contact with partners (e.g. Skype)*
- *Give more regular feedback to partners on their performance (especially using the PCAs).*
- *Consider fundraising innovations e.g. opening a European office and applying to country offices of donors, perhaps in conjunction with PTF partners.*
- *When (hopefully) PTF's funding base becomes securer, provide multi-year grants to established partners and avoid gaps between funding different phases of the project.*

6. Effectiveness

PTF is thorough about requiring self-evaluations (Project Completion Reports) and often following these up with Project Completion Assessments conducted by PTF advisors or external consultants (usually based on a desk review of documents by a specialist who knows the project well). These documents have been reviewed for this evaluation for about 20 projects and are found to be fully consistent, pointing to grantee performance ranging from satisfactory to extremely effective³. PTF estimates that on average over 80% of the projects it funds realize their objectives (which the FE finds a realistic estimate). There have also been a number of independent assessments of PTF as a whole which similarly point to a high level of effectiveness.⁴

³ In PCAs PTF advisors rate each project against 4 criteria: design, implementation, outcomes and replicability and then aggregate these to a total score. This is a solid approach and generally the FE review indicates that these assessments are realistic.

⁴ In particular "*Fighting Corruption and Promoting Transparency in the Public Sector: An Independent Evaluation of the Partnership for Transparency Fund*", Catherine Gwin and Sylvia Saborio, May 2008, which concluded that 19 of the 25 projects assessed achieved all or most objectives (86%). Also an earlier evaluation [Shakow Report, March 28, 2005] which concluded that "PTF is an extremely valuable and effective instrument for support of small but important anti-corruption

In its application to the Bank for funding (as recorded in the DGF's Partnership Approval Tracking System – PATS) 4 objectives were declared:

- Promoting broad CSO involvement in good governance activities
- Supporting specific projects to enhance transparency and integrity in public service
- Generating/sharing lessons of experience of CSO engagement in anti-corruption activities
- Building the capacity of CSOs to engage in the fight against corruption.

Since the first two of these account for the bulk of DGF resources, we concentrate on assessing the impact of these – in particular PTF's grant-making.

While assessments of individual projects can lead to quantification, because they are so different it is difficult to aggregate data on the reduction of corruption overall. India is a partial exception and the FE estimates that every \$1 spent in promoting equity and justice in national security net schemes brings benefits worth \$11 per year to poor families (see Section 7), as well as other benefits (such as women's empowerment, improved nutrition, and savings for the government schemes). Many specific projects have realized savings many-fold the size of grants awarded (several of these are summarized in the text boxes). To quote just one example – DELNA instigated "integrity pacts" governing all contracts in the building of the new National Library of Latvia (NLL); as a result the cost of one contract was reduced by 37% – a saving of €5.5M. It also pressed the government to adopt an ignored cost-indexation provision, resulting in a further saving of €3.5M. These two savings alone (€9M) came to 170 times the sum of the 2 PTF grants to DELNA for its NLL project (\$72,000); in addition at least one corrupt bidder was expelled from the construction process, the State Audit Office substantiated DELNA's concerns and agreed with many of its recommendations and now national construction projects are more carefully overseen.

Individually each successful PTF-financed project provides an anecdote of success but collectively they amount to a clear narrative. Combining citizens' investigation and vigilance, community mobilization, constructive engagement with public officials and seeking out "reform champions", in activities designed by the local CSOs, provides a formula that is effective in addressing the problems of corruption that are experienced by poor people in a wide range of country contexts. This is well documented in "*Citizens Against Corruption*", the recent book published by PTF's founder, Pierre Landell-Mills.

Hence the FE confidently concludes that PTF has had a good track record of achieving the outputs and results it sought to achieve in its funding request to DGF. The rest of this section probes the effectiveness of PTF-CMCC's approach, its partnerships and country programs and asks how the program could be made more effective in the future.

a) How effectively have CMCC's ambitions been realized?

The chief program goal, namely "to enhance transparency and integrity in the public service, including procurement, privatization, public auctions, licensing, public financial management etc.", has been well achieved. In particular 42 CMCC grants have been and the large majority of these have performed well.

The one outcome that we think is only partially achieved is that of sharing and disseminating lessons of experience. This is discussed above (5. d). Projects are generally well documented but not in a format that is attractive to CSOs outside PTF, and neither has a solid effort been made to disseminate this

projects...." The current evaluator also conducted a Mid-Term Review of the DFID-financed program of PTF, which was similarly positive about PTF's effectiveness.

experience in sites more frequently used by CSOs working on governance issues.⁵ PTF has, however, organized some important workshops and these have been much appreciated, although tend to be restricted to existing PTF partners, and so have not contributed to the sharing of PTF experience to a new audience. PTF side-events at big conferences of relevance (such as IACC and CIVICUS World Assemblies) have, however, helped achieve this, and now public events relating to PTF's new book, as well as the book itself, will also be useful in terms of spreading news of PTF-funded successes.

Obviously travel cost is the major factor limiting networking and knowledge management events, and PTF might explore raising dedicated funds for gatherings on "hot topics" for PTF's constituencies (such as integrity pacts, citizen monitoring of procurement, and strengthening ethics of the judiciary or police). If open to all relevant stakeholders (not just PTF grantees), it might prove easier to fundraise for this rather than grant-making. Perhaps a bursary scheme could be included to finance international exchange visits for activists working on similar issues.

b) How partnerships and country programs could become more effective

There has also been good progress in terms of developing national partnerships. The partnership with PAC in India has become very strong, and this has helped in capacity building, project management, exchanging experience and cooperation/mutual support for the grassroots partners. Country partnerships are also developing well in Philippines and Kenya. We even suggest that more responsibility could be delegated in these arrangements for network-building (including reaching beyond PTF-grantees), documentation of project experience, and perhaps screening grant proposals. In the Indian case this may be inevitable in that DFID is likely to finance a follow-up and scaled-up CAC program directly with PAC (without an explicit PTF involvement).

As suggested above, it is timely for PTF to concentrate on fewer countries and explore a national coordinating partner in each. PTF may well wish to retain its original thirst for innovation (able to support good ad hoc ideas wherever in the world they come from) but to focus on perhaps 8-12 countries where there is a carefully planned program of multiple grants. The coordinating partner would not just be for quality control, capacity building and communications, but would help make the whole greater than the sum of the parts. PTF maintains (including in its response to the MTR and in its Strategic Plan) that it is now committed to a stricter country focus; this is indeed evidenced in its grant list over the last 2 years.

In addition to sharpening country focus, PTF might also strive for more thematic focus – aiming to become a global leader in a few tools and approaches, such as reducing corruption in safety-net schemes and service delivery, integrity pacts, and citizen monitoring of procurement.

We suggest that PTF allows for greater flexibility in project implementation. While some development activities (such as building roads) lend themselves well to detailed planning at the outset, fighting corruption is much less predictable. While it helps to encourage grantees to think through what they seek to achieve and how different activities might contribute to that goal, a logical framework approach must be used as a guide, not a straightjacket, especially when it comes to small and inexperienced grantees. Permitting an adaptive approach might be more appropriate. PTF is certainly prepared to be flexible, but the FE finds that partners often are of the view that they *must* carry out the activities in their project agreement, irrespective of whether more pressing priorities have surfaced.

⁵ A search of the websites of 6 leading organisations in the field (Transparency International, International Budget Project, Article 19, Global Witness, Publish what You Pay, and Publish What You Fund) showed that only two contained any accounts of PTF-funded projects that mentioned PTF's name – which they presumably would if placed by PTF. Two projects were referenced in TI's website (both were national TI chapters), and one in IBP's.

Recommendations:

- Give more attention to sharing and disseminating lessons of experience both within PTF's international group of partners and also beyond; consider fundraising specifically for a knowledge management, networking and peer support strand of work (which might be easier to achieve than fundraising for multi-country grant programs).
- Strengthen the role of coordinating organizations within country programs and allow for greater flexibility during project implementation, permitting an adaptive project approach.
- Develop a stronger thematic (as well as country) focus, aiming to become recognized as a global leader in certain areas, such as addressing corruption in service delivery and safety-net schemes, fostering integrity or development pacts, and civic procurement monitoring.

Box 6. Helping to Strengthen State Institutions of Governance – example of Mongolia

Women for Social Progress has had an astonishing impact on advancing ethical standards in public service with very modest PTF funding. It first drafted a Conflict of Interest (COI) law that was eventually approved by the parliament (Grand Khural). There was considerable resistance since it requires MPs as well as civil servants to publicly declare their interests on MPs. The deadlock was only broken when WSP's legal counsel took the unprecedented step of filing a private case against the parliament itself – firstly in the District Court of Ulaanbaatar, and then in the national Appellate Court. This forced the Speaker to schedule a debate (on January 2012) which passed the law. Now every senior official must submit an annual asset/interests declaration to the country's anti-corruption agency, IAAC. The MP who championed the legislation was later appointed by the President as Minister of Justice and he in turn appointed WSP's chief legal expert as his Secretary of State – a testament to the quality and clout of this group.

Once the law was passed, WSP started working with IAAC and CSO leaders to ensure its proper implementation, including by providing training to a range of officials on COI and through the "Let's Fight Corruption Together" campaign. A special "hotline" was opened so that citizens can register complaints against any official or elected representative. This is quite well used and has resulted in a significant number of cases of bribery and corruption being investigated (about half of which lead to formal charges). In 2012 only 15 of the 47,000 officials required to file a COI and Asset Declaration forms failed to do so; those of senior officials are publicly available on-line.

Transparency International – Strengthening Capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies: TI-M has helped increase the capacity of the National Police Authority, the Judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office to tackle corruption. This has entailed arranging support from UK police specialists (including a 2-way exchange visit) to create a system to elicit and objectively handle public complaints about the police, agreement on a Code of Ethics (COE) for judges enforced by a Disciplinary Council (DC), the publication of the 45 best-handled cases of the capital city court, enhancing the independence/professionalism of the Mongolia Association of Judges and training for the State Prosecutor's Office (SPO) in tackling corruption cases.

The internal body to look into complaints against police officers already handles about 100 cases a year. The DC upholding the COE processed hundreds of complaints of judicial corruption in its first 2 years, leading to 10 prosecutions and the rate of bribing judges has reduced steeply. As one of Mongolia's leading judges explained to the FE, this has helped change the culture of the judiciary so that "we now conform to best international practice". Publishing best practice law cases has added to judicial transparency and many of the principles identified are being incorporated into a set of new laws due to be approved by parliament shortly – including ending the practice whereby the Chief Judge appoints judges for each case and instituting random selection instead, to avoid insider influence. Top officials in the SPO told the FE that there is now greater confidence in taking up and supervising sensitive cases, and citizens are better informed about how complaints are addressed. During 2011 and 2012 there were 56 cases of corruption taken up by the SPO.

7. Value for Money

Programs that largely comprise small grant-making are inevitably intensive of administration, especially with multi-country programs. Skimping on these items is false economy as it leads to uncertainty as to how well the grants are being used. Similarly, M&E must be budgeted for reasonably. In the case of PTF, costs have been kept impressively low to maximize the share for programs, without risking poor grantee performance, for these reasons:

- Most senior PTF personnel (advisors, evaluators etc.) are volunteers, largely retirees from the World Bank and other development agencies; M&E likewise is largely done pro-bono;
- Travel costs are kept to a minimum by piggy-backing on other trips wherever possible;
- PTF is very cost-conscious in its expenditures, e.g. regarding its travel policy;
- PTF is close to being a virtual organization, little in the way of office costs;
- Each item of spending has to be approved by 2 out of 3 in its finance committee;
- Its partners also have a high degree of volunteer spirit, are staffed purely by locals and have low overheads, so reducing their admin costs.

As a consequence, the CMCC program undoubtedly represents very good value for money. This following table breaks down how the \$1.2M of DGF grants to PTF over the 3 years FY10-12 have been apportioned (using the financial tables in PTF’s annual Progress Reports to DGF).

| Fiscal Year | Grants | Workshops/reports | Supervision | Evaluation |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|
| FY10 | 315,030 | 8,050 | 42,000 | 0 |
| FY11 | 385,796 | 11,157 | 6,763 | 0 |
| FY12 | 315,253 | 27,061 | 32,756 | 30,171 |
| Total FY10-12 | 1,016,079 | 46,268 | 81,519 | 30,171 |
| % total budget | 86.5% | 3.9% | 6.9% | 2.7% |

If the CMCC program is regarded as grants + knowledge management for social accountability + drawing lessons of experience (including independent monitoring and evaluation) progress, then the overall program consumed 93.1% of the DGF grant – a very commendable ratio for a small grants program. (NB the grant balance of some \$26,000 was allocated after the end of FY12.) The partners also maximize the share of grant funds going to communities and other direct costs of project activities as opposed to CSO personnel (for example in India personnel costs were kept to 37% of the grants). In summary, we don’t believe it would have been feasible to have achieved greater financial efficiencies.

Box 7. “Values for Money” – examples of major reforms obtained cheaply in Philippines

Ecolink sought to curb corruption in the national youth fund in 4 cities. With a \$29,228 grant (for FY09) it successfully identified and stemmed \$167,000 of corrupt or wasteful practices – \$6 saved for every \$1 invested. Scaled up over the country this could save \$13M. It has also empowered the youth groups involved and spawned a cadre of young anti-corruption advocates. In its next project these activists used SMS technology to report to Ecolink any misuse of government vehicles (that all have distinctive red license plates). This probing yielded \$270,000 in savings.

NAMFREL, another PTF partner, has closely monitored the procurement of drugs and other items by hospitals (using a \$33,500 PTF grant). This contributed to a more genuinely competitive process and savings estimated at \$740,000.

Perhaps the most impressive illustration of value for money derives from the grassroots projects (the *Citizens Against Corruption* program, CAC) that reduce corruption and secure poor people's entitlements in India's safety net schemes, for which an estimated 40% of the budgets is currently lost due to corrupt practices. CAC is largely financed by DFID's Governance and Transparency Fund, but DGF funding has been used for the important coordination role of Public Affairs Centre, the Bangalore-based NGO.

India's poor families are entitled to rations of highly subsidized basic foods in the Public Distribution Scheme (PDS) but to access this they need ration cards, the issuance of which is subject to corruption and inefficiency. A study in Karnataka in 2011 showed that 9 million such cards had been issued, but there are only 4 M families in the state classified as poor. Moreover very many poor people are denied cards, unless they pay a bribe. And once they have received a card they often find that the PDS shops give short rations and charge more than the stipulated prices. Corruption and losses occur at all levels from the food corporation of India down to the local warehouses, such that an estimated \$200M/year of the PDS funds disappears and 57% of the food provided doesn't reach the poor. In the next largest safety net scheme (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) poor families are guaranteed up to 100 days/year of work on public work schemes at the official minimum wage. Local leaders often demand a bribe for giving a job-card, select public works schemes that benefit local elites rather than poor communities, and often appoint "ghost workers" (on fictitious public works schemes); there is clear collusion between the local elected leaders, vested interest groups and district officials.

An assessment of the Karnataka partners for this evaluation estimates that through grants of just \$219,000 over a 3 year period these four PTF partners have secured benefits worth \$2.4 million per year to poor people and have greatly reduced losses (estimated at 30-50% overall) in the PDS and NREGS schemes. This has resulted in a very substantial improvement in the living condition of some 48,000 families (270,000 people) as summarized in the following table. To summarize, every \$1 spent by PTF partners have brought \$11/year benefits to poor families.

| Partner + PTF grant | Benefits of CAC and number of households | Worth (\$,000) |
|-----------------------------|---|----------------|
| SVYM \$54.4K | 593 tribal HHs newly get PDS rations (AAY) in Phase II alone | 114 |
| | c.a. 6000 families see rations increase from 60% to full entitlement | 252 |
| | Corruption, other losses and non-delivery of PDS reduced from 47% to 2% | |
| CFAR \$49K | 983 poor HHs newly get PDS rations (371 + 612 in Phases I and II, all BPL) | 106 |
| | 3513 HHs see increase in rations from 38% to 99% of entitlements | 244 |
| | 1700 new HHs included in the extension of project area, perhaps ½ benefits | 97 |
| Parasp. Tr \$53K | 590 new HHs get PDS rations (BPL) | 67 |
| | c.a. 15,000 HHs served by 50 improved PDS shops see rations increase from 75% to 95% entitlements | 340 |
| | 500 bogus ration cards (out of 1500 identified by PT) are cancelled, saving the government | (57) |
| NJMO \$63K | c.a. 10,500 HHs see PDS rations increase double (to 75% of entitlements) | 440 |
| | in 150 villages over-pricing of PDS rations is largely eliminated | 95 |
| | 9-10,000 families benefit from an average of 50 extra days of NREGS employment | 680 |
| | Poor communities in about 50 villages are now allowed to select their public work projects | |
| TOTALS \$219,000 | 48,000 families (about 270,000 people) benefit from CAC, Average benefit is about \$52 per year per family | 2,435 |

Recommendation: As its global program has expanded, PTF's reliance on volunteers for all tasks becomes increasingly untenable. Already staff have been hired for administration and program management; we think that more investment should be made in the dissemination and network-building functions. This area is clearly neither a forte of, or of much interest to, retirees from the World Bank and other official development agencies that have done such a good job for PTF in other areas.

8. Equity

The projects PTF have supported largely focus on issues of everyday concern to poor people. In India, most projects seek justice and probity within the country's safety-net schemes – meant to help the poor, but all too often failing as described above. PTF partners have succeeded in getting the necessary documentation to ensure some of the very poorest (who are often left out because they escape the notice of the authorities) to get access to the ration shops and other schemes.

For this evaluation we met many such people, for example a group of extremely poor tribal people in Dadadahali Haadi village, Mysore District, Karnataka. They had been left out of the state's allocations and had been living in the nearby forest until it was designated a national park and they were resettled to their current location. Having been provided a village to move to they effectively disappeared from the State government's attention and they couldn't afford the bribes needed to get admitted to the PDS scheme. Now, thanks to CAC they have got ration-cards, for which they are extremely grateful since these provide enough certainty of survival that they no longer have to migrate far and wide seeking casual work; they can instead tend the small pieces of land they have, making do with work available in the locality and staying together as a community. This is just one illustration; altogether SVYM (the local PTF partner) was able to secure 593 tribal people with ration-cards within one year.



Caption: Two tribal people of Dadadahali Haadi who now receive PDS rations, thanks to SVYM support. Gita Kumara (on left) said “Having a ration card is such an important asset to us

Most of the CBOs that PTF's Indian partners work with are women's groups or are dominated by women. This is partly out of equity considerations and partly because the women are usually in and around the villages, while the men often travel far for work. Determined advocacy by the women has changed their relationship with duty-bearers. One woman interviewed said “before, the PDS shopkeepers were like dictators; we couldn't even question them. Now they are submissive; they know we can force them to

close if they abuse our rights.” Having seen what these women’s groups have achieved has earned considerable respect from the men, so further increasing the confidence of the women activists. This has given them the courage to tackle other issues that affect women deeply. For example in Raichur District women’s groups have succeeded in ostracizing men who beat their wives and have forced liquor shops to move out of the village, so reducing problems of drunkenness. And in Mysore the groups have taken up widows and pensioners’ rights, caste and birth certificates, violence against women and children, child trafficking and other issues.



Caption: NJMO women’s groups in Raichur, have secured about 500,000 days of extra NREGS work for poor families, and have largely persuaded the authorities to allow them to choose the public works schemes such as the tank being dug here (right) to bring assured water to their village.

Many of the PTF partners visited during this evaluation are led by women (including all the Mongolia projects and most of the Ugandan ones). This tends to mean that strong attention is given to gender considerations. Hence although PTF hasn’t explicitly incorporated equity issues into its mandate, in practice its projects have a strong orientation towards women’s interests.

Similarly, a number of PTF’s projects work with youth, including at least four grants that went to youth groups and many projects that focused on tackling corruption in the education sector (9 GTF projects and 8 DGF). Further grants addressed concerns of ethnic minorities and other forest dwellers (in Nepal, India) or supported groups in areas where there were high percentages of ethnic minorities. To conclude, this report makes no specific recommendations regarding improvements in the issue of equity.

9. Sustainability

PTF advisors have conducted Project Completion Assessments including quality ratings for about half of the completed projects. A high proportion of these are awarded scores of 3 or above (i.e. “satisfactory” or better, on a 5-point scale). The average PTF rating up till early 2012 was 3.3. During this evaluation (plus an earlier mid-term review of the DFID-GTF funding) we have engaged directly with about 36 PTF partners (mostly by visiting their offices, but for some via country- or international-level workshops); we conclude that PTF’s internal assessment of sustainability is realistic. Though the benefits of many projects might persist, the institutional structures created are unlikely to, since one-year projects rarely have the chance to build enough momentum for this. From discussions with partners and from 11 field trips to see work “on the ground” we think there are, however, grounds to consider that results will continue after PTF funding stops, to a varying extent, due to the following factors:

- *Community empowerment:* When poor communities are informed of their rights and have proper channels to pursue those rights they really can improve their situation; this results in a permanent change in their sense of “agency”, hence they will continue to assert those rights even when the support organization is no longer present.
- *CBO structures:* Many projects have selected strong community leaders, provided training in community mobilization, advocacy and governance, and have worked with them to form community groups; these groups usually do not require any funding and so, as above, success in their initial campaigns is the fuel that sustains them; hence TI-Uganda has created voluntary action cells, led by accountability monitors, that are still active up to 4 years after the project funding ceases.
- *Domestic resources mobilization:* some partners have been able to mobilize resources from the communities they work with, even though poor; e.g. **NJMO** in Raichur is able to mobilize sufficient funds in this way to retain most of the project’s field workers.
- *Donors’ replication:* many partners have sought funding from other donors to continue proven approaches, often taking these pilots to significantly greater scale; in particular the whole grassroots program in India is likely to continue through PAC entering an agreement directly with DFID-India; similarly, **ACCU** is receiving funding from the Democracy and Governance Facility (a DANIDA-coordinated multi-donor coalition, including the World Bank) to scale up the monitoring of health facilities and essential drug supplies that it started with its PTF grant.
- *Government adoption:* in some occasions local or national officials are sufficiently impressed by the community groups’ achievements that they incorporate those same approaches to strengthen accountability within government programs; for example community monitoring of procurement within national education and roads programs in Philippines has been taken up as a norm,
- *Strengthening government social accountability measures:* some schemes nominally include citizen oversight (such as social audits) but in practice these don’t function effectively; with PTF funding some groups seek to reform these either by pressing from the outside or by joining them and reforming them from the inside.

What is considerably less sure is the sustainability of PTF itself. Starting in the year 2000, it achieved modest growth for its first few years (averaging 5.75 grants made per year from 2000 to 2003 and 9.75 grants/year from 2004-2007) and then had a very steep growth thanks to two big funding commitments from the World Bank and DFID, enabling PTF to award an average of 31.25 grants per year from 2008-11. Both these sizeable programs have now closed, with the residual 4 grants (all DGF) being awarded in 2012. Although PTF has been seeking further funding, at the time of writing little in the way of new funding appears promising.

Box 8. Factors that enhance sustainability of partners’ efforts

When asked about sustainability (in the FE Survey) PTF partners emphasize these factors:

- CBOs that hold authorities to account have been created, strengthened or become more confident
- Umbrellas and networks of these CBOs have been formed for mutual support and quality assurance
- Dissemination of experience to other CSOs in country; especially helping the spread of innovation
- The emphasis on constructive engagement has provided better links with key officials
- Many partners have been able to continue their AC work by gaining funding from other sources
- Empowered communities maintain momentum even without on-going specialist support
- Some partners have been able to keep supporting their CBOs on the back of other project.
- Links with official governance bodies have provided continuity (e.g. EITI Monitoring Group)
- Supportive journalists maintain coverage (esp. radio) and themselves do CSO-style monitoring

One reason for the funding difficulty is that many donors have recognized the importance of supporting social accountability practices, but instead of doing so through global programs have charged their country offices to take this up (or, in the case of the World Bank's new Global Program for Social Accountability, have opened grant programs designed to support developing country partners only). Those offices are looking to support national NGOs or national programs of international NGOs. Since PTF doesn't have country offices it is effectively cut out of these sources. While this may not be a disadvantage to the larger PTF partners, who are well able to handle donor funds directly (building on the experience of their PTF-funded projects) a number of the smaller partners (such as the Mongolian NGOs and UENO in Uganda) have stressed to the FE that they would much prefer to retain PTF as the funding intermediary because they trust it and greatly value the careful advice PTF gives them in the design and implementation of their projects. Rightly or wrongly, they have more confidence in the objectivity of a grant scheme run by a known and trusted international NGO than they do of one run by a national NGO, in a country where the NGO sector is characterized by "tribal groupings".

It is still to be hoped that PTF will secure sufficient grant-funding to enable it to keep up and even expand its program, since PTF's reputation has become solid in certain niche fields.

Recommendations:

- *Document more systematically the long-term impact of PTF-financed projects to show not just the immediate returns from well-planned social accountability exercises but also the virtuous circle of success breeding renewed civic determination; this analysis, if widely and effectively disseminated, could help build a stronger case for donor funding of PTF.*
- *As well as continuing to seek funding from new donors, consider establishing a European office to facilitate fundraising from European funding sources.*
- *Discuss with partners in some countries the possibility of mounting a joint funding proposal to country offices of donors (including donor consortia) who prioritize governance reform.*

Box 9. Illustration of Sustainability – Textbook Watch in Philippines

Government Watch has been scrutinizing the printing and supply of textbooks to schools for several years, with \$100,000 of PTF funding and in partnership with the Boy and Girl Scouts. Helped by Coca Cola, this citizens' vigilance has stopped many examples of malpractice (including the loss of 40% of textbooks during the distribution process). As a result, the cost per textbook has been reduced by an impressive 55% (resulting in savings of about \$3.6M/year) and the average time taken from agreeing a textbook to actual delivery to schools has been reduced from 24 months to 9 months.

After many years of this program, the gains have been consolidated. Government has agreed new processes including unbundling of the textbook cycle into three separate contracts (for preparation, printing and delivery) and this is working much better. Even the printers prefer the simpler bidding process. G-Watch now feels it can leave this issue with relatively light CSO monitoring, at least for now, and shift to monitoring the much large school building and school furniture supply.

10. Replicability

a) How replicable is PTF's approach?

PTF-financed projects are very diverse, although there are a number of common strands that occur in a diverse array of settings, such as community tracking of service delivery, orderly marshaling of citizens'

complaints, procurement monitoring, promoting integrity pacts that guarantee transparency in large contracts, focusing on very specific governance abuses rather than broad (“end corruption”) or nebulous (“raise awareness”) targets and, above all, engaging with authorities in assertive yet constructive dialogue. The experience over a wide range of projects suggests that these are highly replicable in many settings. Indeed the FE has found a number of occasions where either CSOs have sought to replicate approaches demonstrated by PTF-financed projects to be effective (as in procurement monitoring in Philippines) or the authorities have been inspired to make policy changes (for example with the WSP and TI-M projects in Mongolia). PTF could do more to promote replication by more assiduously disseminating lessons of project experience and seeking to build international networks of civic activists working in similar activities (a point made above).

It is also fair to point out that a number of other donors and intermediary NGOs promote similar approaches. PTF perhaps has a clearer strategy of combining them more deliberately⁶ and is unique in its network of retired development professional advisors who, as volunteers, help PTF partners to operationalize these traits. These factors mean that it is quite common for the rather small but well-prepared projects supported by PTF to become in effect pilots for larger-scale projects that follow (funded by other donors). For example TI-Uganda’s project pioneered (elected) Voluntary Accountability Committees (for tracking local government budgets) and Development Pacts in Rakai District. This has now been greatly scaled up and expanded to 6 other Districts, with funding from various official donors and is generally regarded as fair by local governments.

It will be interesting to observe the progress of the likely DFID-funded extension of PTF’s India program under DFID’s Poorest Areas Civil Society program; if successful this will show how replicable the approach is under scaling up, but equally if difficulties arise or project performance varies it might show the importance of PTF’s “hand-holding” and advice. Similarly, some of the Uganda partners are now getting larger volumes of funds under a multi-donor governance fund, which will enable the scaling up of those NGOs’ projects.

Hence the FE considers PTF to have used methods and styles of working in combating corruption that are readily replicable and effective in a wide array of settings. Our only advice is that replicability could be deepened if PTF were able to invest more in South-South peer learning, linking experienced practitioners with those seeking to implement a similar project elsewhere.

b) Context Matters

PTF’s approach can be replicated in a wide range of countries where three contexts apply:

- *Freedom of association*: there are few barriers to the formation or operation of CSOs and freedom for CSOs to speak out when they believe officials are abusing their offices. A growing number of countries, however, restrict these rights – in particular CSOs’ freedom to receive foreign funding.⁷ While the ostensible reason usually given is to enable tighter control of terrorists, in practice these controls are increasingly used to stem the activities and the funding of groups that fight corruption or are seen as critical of the regime.
- *Official openness*: the PTF approach only works if key officials or elected representatives are prepared to engage with the CSOs and if it is relatively easy to access the official information needed

⁶ See recent report: “*Strategies for Empowering Communities to Demand Good Governance and Seek Increased Effectiveness of Public Service Delivery*”, PTF Working Paper 4, 2013, V. Bhargava

⁷ See: *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association*, A/HRC/23/39, Maina Kiai, UN General Assembly, 24/04/2013

to probe accountability. Of course in hypothetical countries where all officials have highest integrity, social accountability will also be a fruitless enterprise.

- *Freedom of the press:* An important weapon of social accountability is for CSOs to be able to place prominent stories in the media and cooperate with journalists, especially where the government resists constructive engagement or facing up to well-substantiated allegations. Where journalism is repressed, and also where there is a weak tradition of investigative journalism, social accountability is greatly weakened.

11. Innovations

PTF claims that its grants reflect innovation in both design and implementation. This section assesses these claims.

a) Innovations in design

- *Support for many local CSOs tackling corruption within public services:* This report affirms the validity of this claim. Of course many other NGOs also support social accountability practices, but PTF keeps its focus narrow, and as result may achieve greater returns. PTF is also more prepared than most to support small NGOs that need more support than well-established practitioners. PTF can be justifiably proud of the ingenuity demonstrated by many of its partners. Its grants have helped realize some very exciting innovations in this field, as illustrated throughout this report.
- *PTF is a very nimble NGO using light but effective procedures:* Yes, it can be a very nimble and responsive NGO; many partners have commented on the swiftness with which they get a reply to an emailed question. However some NGOs have been frustrated by the number of iterations and delays in concluding project proposals and reaching grant agreements. Some, but by no means all, find PTF business approaches (in reaching grant approval and in its reporting requirements) to be heavier than they experience with other donors providing larger sums of money. It should be stressed that only a few NGOs in the survey made this comment and that many (in the face-to-face meetings) considered PTF's attention to detail to be a good discipline that it shouldn't drop. As described in Section 5.c some of PTF's business requirements could perhaps be eased for their smaller partners. It should also be underlined that much of the complexity stems from requirements of PTF's own donors. Hence its earlier guidance to grant applicants was just a few pages, but this now runs to 31 pages ("*Partnering with the PTF: Guidelines for CSOs*").
- *PTF largely uses experienced volunteers:* This is very true and it is an important attribute of PTF, as well as a major source of cost efficiency. The volunteers are mostly senior retirees of major international development agencies and they contribute a great deal of time and expertise to PTF for no payment. It is increasingly evident, however, that there are some tasks that its volunteers are less interested in and which are currently languishing – most notably networking, website management and fundraising (PTF now employs 3 part-time staff for many of the less popular tasks, especially in administration). As we have argued above, if PTF is to be seen as a leading NGO in its important discipline it should aim to become a networking organization and innovation broker, sharing globally experiences of what works locally. PTF perhaps also needs to become a little more modest about its advisors' contributions. Many partners are grassroots NGOs working in very difficult and very varied settings; there is a limit to how much they will benefit from the advice of those with 30 years of World Bank experience dealing with senior government officials when the key challenges they face are threats of violence or stonewalling from recalcitrant officials. Much of the PTF advice comes through

email correspondence based on draft partner documents; without immersion in the local context it may be difficult for the advisors to appreciate the challenges faced, and there may be more important heights to scale than excellence in report-writing. At the other end of the scale, some partners work on such specialized activities that it is unlikely they will benefit much from their advisor – probably a generalist. As stressed above, in interviews and in questionnaire responses the majority of partners have strong praise for the support they get from “their” advisors. But it may be timely to consider whether there may be better ways to draw value from these experienced volunteers. Rather than just advising specific grantees, it might be more effective to have some as topic specialists (perhaps by region) covering themes such as integrity pacts, procurement monitoring and community monitoring of services. These would then be key people in sharing experience, helping partners access the specialist experience they need from outside of PTF and in network building.

- *Operating as a “virtual organization”*: This is a success story for PTF. It manages a \$2M/year operation dispersed across the world and services a board whose 12 members come from 8 different countries all without an office, and largely using email and Skype. On the whole, decisions are reached very swiftly. Some partners point out that when donors have country offices it is easier to establish personal relationships that ease reaching understandings, but others prefer their links with their PTF advisors.

Box 10. Some Innovative Tools and Approaches

- *Integrity Pacts*: used by Transparency International, India and Uganda and Delna in Latvia
- *Public expenditure tracking*: by ASYOUSSED in Cameroon and Pro-Democracy in Romania
- *Use of ICT*: Ecolink in the Philippines use mobile phones to report abuse of government vehicles; YAA in Kenya invite youth to report on corruption in education using SMS messages
- *Codes of Ethics*: TI Mongolia have introduced a Code of Ethics for judges and is now monitoring its use
- *Strengthening public procurement systems*: e.g. CESD in Azerbaijan and NCKK in Kenya.
- *Enhancing access to information*: e.g. Group Faro in Ecuador and IAPA in Azerbaijan; most Indian partners use Right to Information (RTI) legislation to expose official corruption
- *Scrutinizing the scrutinizers*: Many groups monitor, advise, feed complaints into and expose failings of bodies set up by governments to monitor use of public funds and service providers
- *Strengthening integrity institutions*: WSP supports Mongolia’s anti-corruption commission through training and by connecting it to NGOs; in Uganda various partners, especially ULS, work with the Inspector General of Government and the Anti-Corruption Court.

Integrity Pacts in India:

TI-India has persuaded many of India’s largest State-Owned Enterprises to sign up to *Integrity Pacts*, committing their procurements to greater standards of transparency and to independent scrutiny. This has revealed many examples of corruption, including 6 successful prosecutions, including jail sentences. Currently a \$15M corruption case is being investigated which centers on a major international construction company. Lesser crimes revealed include collusion to prepare bidding documents that favor particular companies. The Government of India has now required all public procurements to have such pacts, which is good progress and has encouraged many more whistle-blowers to come forward, but there is a serious shortage of the trained and certified Independent External Monitors to scrutinize the procurements. As a result of this work, TI-I has also been working with parliamentarians to craft a whistle-blowers’ protection act.

b) *Innovations in implementation*

PTF describes the following as its innovations in implementation:

- *Spreading successful experiences to other countries:* While there are good illustrations of this (such as regional workshops in Delhi, Nairobi and Berlin and using international events such as the IACC and CIVICUS World Assemblies to hold workshops for PTF partners attending) this report argues that PTF could do much more in this regard. This is a message that PTF is taking up, in particular through the recent publication of a book on its experience. However a refrain of this report is encouragement for PTF to aim to become a networking organization and innovation-broker along the lines of NGOs such as International Budget Project and Publish What You Pay. At present few grantees (let alone other CSOs) say they find PTF to be a useful source of information about experience in other countries – yet that experience is precious.
- *Testing new delivery mechanisms:* The traditional PTF approach has been the one-on-one grants, with technical assistance provided by one or more designated advisors to support the unique program of the grantee. Now, PTF is experimenting with a cluster approach, deliberately seeking to have a number of grantees working on similar issues (such as decentralized service delivery in Kenya). PTF has also been appropriately testing different modalities of managing country programs, as discussed earlier.
- *Encouraging mutual learning and peer review:* PTF has fostered opportunity for grantees to exchange experience and to help each other in India and to a lesser extent Philippines and East Africa (the three areas where PTF has made more than 15 grants per country over the last 5 years). An interesting newer innovation is peer review exchange visits, where grantees assess and provide feedback on each other's projects. Indian partners have found this very useful not just because of the valuable ideas on improving their project that have been gained but also because of the affinity networks and social capital formed.
- *Emphasizing constructive engagement in the project design:* a hallmark that distinguishes PTF from other social accountability NGOs is its emphasis on constructive engagement. While this has usually proved effective (even in settings where advocacy groups are generally frustrated in their efforts to influence reforms), it is possible to overdo the insistence in this regard, as was discussed in 4.b. The principle should certainly be kept, but insisting on MOUs or other documentation to prove governments' willingness to engage may result in unnecessary delays. Some grantees have also pointed out that the insistence on using the term "anti-corruption" as opposed to "pro-good governance" or similar can create the impression of confrontation.
- *Experimenting with a common results framework:* PTF is deliberating a more common and rigorous approach to measuring results so that it can better aggregate its global impact. This is methodologically difficult given the widely differing nature of country contexts and corruption problems tackled. However Vinay Barghava (PTF's chief technical advisor) is developing indicators to assess key attributes of social accountability: spaces for civic engagement, citizen empowerment, reducing corruption, better budget utilization or service delivery, and increased responsiveness of officials. This is all work in progress, but there is more to report in India where most projects focus on the national safety net schemes. This is a good start but probably overly complicated for the grassroots partners.
- *Innovative use of new technology:* PTF is a keen user of ICT in its own communications and is starting to encourage grantees to be more innovative in this area. For example the new Citizens

Action Platform in Uganda and Kenya (funded by the DGF grant) uses SMS messaging and geo-mapping to track the supply of drugs needed for malaria and HIV/AIDS and to report and address citizens' grievances regarding health facilities.

12. Summary of Recommendations

The following is a digest of the recommendations made in this report. While most relate to PTF, we conclude with some suggestions to donors. Some of the proposals are not new, but echo those made by earlier evaluations, in particular the Mid-Term Review of the DFID grant, and the Gwin/Saborio evaluation of May 2008 (which also advised PTF to have a stronger country focus, make more effort to share grantee experience and to move beyond short-term, one-off grants).

Country Focus: Focus on a smaller range of countries, albeit retaining the capacity for supporting particularly innovative proposals elsewhere. For each country a PTF (public) strategy note should describe the program and the country context. The focal countries would reflect these criteria:

- a) PTF has made multiple grants in the country;
- b) There is a common thread running through all or most of the projects;
- c) Few donors or INGOs support civic activism on governance in the area; and
- d) There are opportunities to influence national policies and institutions, especially when PTF-supported grassroots actions can provide policy-relevant lessons.

Program coordination: Ideally in the focal countries there should be a “strategic anchor” – either an intermediary organization that manages the program, a partner NGO who serves as a partner coordinator, or an advisor who lives in the country (or visits frequently). PTF should devolve more responsibilities and powers to that anchor.

Stronger niche: PTF would be wise to articulate more clearly a compelling mission, aiming to become seen as a global leader in this field, such as “fighting corruption in public spending”. This could be broken down into themes such as tacking corruption in public service delivery and safety-nets, CSO monitoring of public procurement, fostering integrity or development pacts, and citizen oversight of sub-national governments. Document more systematically the long-term impact of PTF-financed projects in these themes to show not just the immediate returns from well-planned social accountability exercises but also the virtuous circle of success breeding renewed civic determination.

Communications: The recent book by Pierre Landell-Mills provides an excellent account of the success of many PTF-financed activities, but its readership is likely to be limited. Today, activists rely much more on websites, not books, to learn about the experiences of others and to scout for potential new partners. PTF is well advised to invest more effort in communications, in particular regarding its website, with the aim of becoming the destination of choice for all activists working in PTF's niche field. The model to draw on might be International Budget Project, Publish What you Pay, or Article 19 whose websites are constantly referred to by anyone interested in analysing public budgets, the extractive industries and freedom of informational law respectively, whether they are partners or not. Currently, PTF's website is largely an incomplete repository of rather dull project documents and related papers prepared for PTF grant-making purposes rather than to spread relevant lessons of experience. The “case studies” section is more interesting but centers on individual project successes rather than an accumulation of lessons on

particular themes. The “quarterly” newsletter is also livelier, but the latest on offer (at the time of writing) was for Spring, 2012.

A website designed to be of service to activists would focus on operational themes, rather than projects, would provide links to relevant experience from outside the PTF universe, would seek to connect users with other relevant organizations, and would convey the views and experience of activists at the front-line, not just PTF advisors. Besides making a stronger contribution to civic action on governance, this would help PTF with its fundraising. It would also make it much easier to get other organizations working on governance to provide links to relevant PTF web-pages in their own web-sites.

Networking: Related to the above, PTF should move towards being a networking organization – finding creative ways to foster: links and exchange visits between grantees; mutual support mechanisms; experience exchange with other social accountability practitioners; and sharing of experience in ways that encourage replication of what works. For this, PTF advisors should see themselves not just as experts advising PTF partners but also “relationship brokers”, helping to connect partners with others working in similar fields or with potential donors and others who might offer the partners the help they need. The specific objectives of networking could be to help PTF partners and other CSOs:

- At the country level, by helping to foster anti-corruption movements, not just successful projects. This would entail bringing together like-minded CSOs for experience exchange and mutual support, encouraging more strategic use of partners’ experience in particular by connecting them with national or sub-national policy networks, and similarly helping to connect partners with research centers, NGOs, reform-minded officials and others who could make good use of their experience.
- Internationally, by giving more attention to disseminating lessons of experience both among PTF’s global set of partners and beyond. Promoting the spread of the key SA tools used by its partners, would help identify PTF with a more evident “product line”, so strengthening its identity. PTF might consider fundraising specifically for a knowledge management, networking and peer support strand of work (which might be easier to achieve than fundraising for multi-country grant programs).

Relations with grantees: PTF has on the whole very good relations with its grantees, who much appreciate the advice and interest of PTF, as well as its funding. However improvements could be made – in particular:

- a) If and when PTF’s funding base becomes more secure, start supporting multi-year projects and consider providing institutional support to particularly tried and tested partners. Significant, tangible reduction in corruption takes time to realize. Alternatively, or in addition, make the process of follow-on grants as smooth and prompt as possible (including starting to process the next phase before the previous one is completed) to avoid losing momentum or causing hiatus in funding.
- b) Allow for greater flexibility during project implementation, permitting an adaptive project approach (in particular guided by a country-level program coordinator). Fighting corruption is more complex than a “linear project”, such as the construction of a new facility; unknowns will inevitably be encountered as well as unplanned for opportunities. There must be flexibility to adapt projects to such changing circumstances.
- c) Ease bureaucratic requirements of partners, especially in the case of grassroots CSOs and those not fluent in English; instead of asking for narrative quarterly reports (which seem not to be widely read), a simpler reporting matrix could be used to list actions planned during the period, progress achieved, reasons for any deviation, and any notable highlights or problems experienced. This would be easier

for all concerned, especially for tranche-release decisions and for communications purposes. The requirement for log-frames, impact matrices and budget projections could also be eased.

- d) When PTF thinks partners are facing difficulties, more intensive contact is needed using phone (or ideally face-to-face) communication for a candid discussion of the issues to ensure that the partner is aware of PTF concerns and that their side of the story is fully heard; just using emails is often not culturally appropriate for this.
- e) Encourage constructive engagement as much as possible but do not make documentary evidence of this (such as a MOU with relevant officials) a grant requirement unless necessitated by the project design. Public bodies may resist such formalities, and in some settings more angry CSO strategies (including protests) are warranted.
- f) Advise partners on other potential sources of funding and technical support. This would require more regular dialogue with other INGOs/donors interested in governance.

Diversify fundraising: PTF is at a difficult stage financially since its two major funders over recent years are not able to provide further funding from the same sources. PTF is exploring many new angles; the following innovations might be fruitful, if not already explored:

- a) Open a European office to facilitate fundraising from European funding sources;
- b) Developing operational partnerships with US NGOs to make it more likely that PTF will be able to secure funds from US government sources and US foundations.
- c) Discuss with partners in some countries the possibility of mounting a joint funding proposal to country offices of donors or INGOs in those countries.
- d) Explore joint funding approaches, in particular in conjunction with Transparency International (since a fairly high percentage of PTF grants are to national TI chapters).

Recommendations to Donors

1. It is important that donors allocate sufficient and sustained funding to NGOs who support effective CSOs' governance initiatives. Major reforms of governance cannot usually be achieved swiftly because of the ingrained nature of the problems. It is short-sighted of donors not to invest much more heavily in supporting such civic engagement.
2. Donors understandably want to ensure their funds achieve real results but their bureaucratic requirements can present problems for small groups who lack the skills to express their work well in detailed log-frames and results matrices. Such requirements, relayed via intermediary NGOs, may veer grassroots CSOs to a fixed view of their project rather than encouraging the adaptive thinking that is particularly important in this field. Donors should ease their requirements if they wish to support innovation at the grassroots level.
3. Donors should do more to encourage and assist in the dissemination of lessons of experience, not just provide funds. They should consider bursary schemes for exchange visits between practitioners and should be prepared to provide more funds for knowledge management and networking.

Annex 1. Schedule of PTF Grants made using DGF Funding

NB. This schedule includes all DGF-funded grants, not just those financed in the 2010-12 period covered by this evaluation.

| Year | Region | Country | Partner | Project Title | Amount | Category |
|------|---------|-------------|--------------------------|---|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 2012 | CEE/FSU | Azerbaijan | CESD | | \$25,000 | Procurement |
| 2012 | EAP | Mongolia | TI-M | Supporting integrity and accountability in the judiciary and police | \$33,165 | Legal |
| 2012 | SAS | India | TI-India | Promoting Integrity Pacts | \$25,000 | Procurement |
| 2012 | SAS | India | CUTS | Contributing towards Corruption Free & Transparent Service Delivery through MGNREGS through Civic Engagement in Jaipur & Tonk Districts of Rajasthan, India | \$25,000 | Social Services, Soc. Safety Net |
| 2011 | Africa | Cameroon | AGDGG | School Resource Management Project | \$21,300 | Education |
| 2011 | Africa | Cameroon | ASYOUSED | Improving Transparency in Project Identification...Tiko & Buea | \$35,000 | Governance |
| 2011 | Africa | Ghana | Save Ghana | Promoting Accountability & Responsibility for Improved Basic Education in Ghana | \$26,500 | Social Services - Education |
| 2011 | Africa | Kenya | NCKK | Enhancing Community Participation in Management, Monitoring and Evaluation of Constituency Development Funds | \$26,000 | Social Services - Development Funds |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Albania | CPII | Monitoring State Publications | \$35,000 | Governance |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Azerbaijan | IAPA | Media Empowerment: Struggle Ag. Corruption | \$29,788 | Media/Info |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Kazakhstan | PFDCS | Fight Corruption as Kazakh Higher Education Institutions | \$26,400 | Social Services - Education |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Romania | EFOR/SARS | The Second Energy Agency Monitoring Project | \$29,295 | Power |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Serbia | Toplica | Transparent Public Procurement for Less Corruption in Serbia | \$32,400 | Procurement |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Serbia | YUCOM | Supporting Adequate Response of the Serbian Judiciary through Corruption Trial Monitoring | \$38,419 | Legal |
| 2011 | CEE/FSU | Serbia | Juzne Vesti & Simplicity | Reduce Corrupt Practices in Budgeting & Spending in Local Govt. in South Serbia | \$30,900 | Governance - Budgeting |
| 2011 | EAP | Philippines | NLCGG | Participatory Local Governance in N. Luzon | \$39,500 | Governance |
| 2011 | EAP | Philippines | PCDSI (ex ECOLINK) | Bantay Red Plate | \$39,500 | Procurement |
| 2011 | LAC | Bolivia | Construir | Citizen Oversight of Bolivia's Justice System Reforms | \$25,000 | Legal |
| 2011 | LAC | Ecuador | Grupo Faro | Transparent Municipalities: Management of Info. Systems and Alternative Technologies | \$35,000 | Right to Information |
| 2011 | LAC | Honduras | ASJ | Capacity-building, Social Auditing and Advocacy for a Stronger Educational System | \$35,000 | Social Services - Education |
| 2011 | SAS | Nepal | Samuhik Abhiyan | Combatting Corruption through Citizen Participation | \$29,108 | Governance |
| 2010 | Africa | Cameroon | ALDED | Monitoring the quality of classroom construction in Departements of Mefou and Afamba | \$30,163 | Social Services - Education |
| 2010 | Africa | Uganda | ULS | Promoting Accountability and Transparency in Uganda - PACT | \$35,000 | Legal |
| 2010 | Africa | Uganda | UENO | Enhancing Capacity of School Management Committees in Monitoring Education Sector | \$25,000 | Social Services - Education |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Armenia | P&T NGO | Transparent and Accountable School | \$32,000 | Social Services - Education |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Croatia | PSD | Active Policy Advocacy Project | \$29,935 | Procurement |

| | | | | | | |
|------|---------|-------------|------------|--|----------|-----------------------------|
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Estonia | TI-Estonia | Enhancing Internal Supervision Capacity of Local Governments | \$27,930 | Governance |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Latvia | Delna | Managing competency to fight corruption in the construction of the Latvian National Library and Large Government Building Projects | \$34,991 | Infrastructure |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Latvia | Providus | Fair Election Campaign in Latvia | \$30,000 | Governance - Elections |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Lithuania | TIL | Enhancing Whistleblowers' Protection 2 | \$30,000 | Legal |
| 2010 | CEE/FSU | Romania | SAR | Enhancing the transparency and accountability of energy policy and regulation (Romanian Academy) | \$27,900 | Infrastructure - Power |
| 2010 | EAP | Mongolia | WSP | Resolution of Conflict of Interest | \$24,580 | Legal |
| 2010 | EAP | Philippines | BBC | Replication of BBC Govt procurement monitoring mechanism | \$33,405 | Procurement |
| 2009 | CEE/FSU | Lithuania | TIL | Enhancing the Whistleblowers' Protection Law | \$35,000 | Legal |
| 2009 | LAC | Argentina | CIPPEC | Regional Advocacy Campaign: Towards Evidence-Based Sub-National governance Reforms in LAC | \$25,000 | Governance |
| 2009 | LAC | Argentina | CIPPEC | Towards Evidence-Based Sub-National Governance Reforms:Argentina Advocacy Campaign | \$17,800 | Governance |
| 2009 | LAC | Ecuador | Grupo Faro | Towards Evidence-Based Sub-National Governance Reforms in Ecuador | \$24,800 | Governance |
| 2008 | Africa | Uganda | NAFODU | Radio Campaign to fight corruption | \$30,000 | Media/Info. |
| 2008 | Africa | Uganda | ULS | Enhancing the Capacity of Lawyers to Promote Accountability-- Monitoring Court Corruption Cases (ULS) | \$25,000 | Rule of Law |
| 2008 | Africa | Uganda | UENO | Enhancing Community Involvement in Monitoring School Building (UNEO) | \$24,000 | Social Services - Education |
| 2008 | Africa | Uganda | TI Uganda | Empowering Local Councils to Fight Corruption in Rakai District (TI- Uganda) | \$25,336 | Governance |
| 2007 | Africa | Uganda | NAFODU | Corruption awareness and prevention program in Uganda | \$25,000 | Governance |

Annex 2. - Terms of reference for the evaluation



December 31, 2012

Mr. John Clark
Pencarreg Farm, Elms Road
Raglan, Wales NP15 2DX
United Kingdom

Dear John:

Evaluation of the DGF Grants for
Good Governance: Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption
DGF Files 501612/11/10

Thank you for your willingness to carry out the final evaluation of the good governance and anti-corruption program funded by the Development Grant Facility of the World Bank, entitled Good Governance: Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption. DGF Files 501610/11/12 refer.

In the interest of efficiency and because of their similar objectives and approaches, we have agreed that the evaluation will be carried out in conjunction with your final evaluation of the Governance and Transparency Fund program entitled Citizens Against Corruption [GTF 044] funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID). The terms of reference for the GTF evaluation are attached and will serve as the basis for the DFG evaluation as well.

The basic objective of the DGF evaluation will be to assess the extent to which the World Bank-financed program achieved its objectives in an efficient and effective manner, had the expected results and impact and may be expected to be sustainable and replicable. You may follow the outline and methodology of the GTF evaluation terms of reference to the extent they are relevant to the DGF grant program and the evaluation goals.

In addition to the assessment of the results of the DGF-funded program, you should draw lessons of experience that can be applied to the future work of the PTF. To the extent relevant, you should draw comparisons between the DGF and GTF-funded activities to assess any qualitative differences between them and the implications for future support to citizen-led, grass roots programs to promote good governance and fight corruption.

1100 15th Street NW - Suite 400, Washington DC 20005



You should carry out the evaluation between December 1, 2012 and March 31, 2013. The draft report, not exceeding [15] pages, should be delivered no later than June 30, 2013.

Please indicate your agreement to carry out the evaluation as described by signing and returning one copy of this letter.

We look forward to the results of your evaluation.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Daniel G. Ritchie'.

Daniel G. Ritchie
President

Agreed:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'John Clark'.

John Clark

Date:

4 March '13

cc: Colum Garrity, World Bank
Lorena Curry, Grants Manager, PTF
Colby Pacheco, Program Officer, PTF

1100 15th Street NW - Suite 400, Washington DC 20005

(Annex 2 cont'd) Final Evaluation of GTF 044 Citizens Against Corruption (CAC)

1. Introduction

The purpose of the Final Evaluation (FE) is to provide an independent assessment on the implementation of the GTF grant 044 *Citizens Against Corruption (CAC)* to assess whether the purpose of the program has been achieved (as stated in the logical framework), measure and report on achievements and impact, and to derive and help disseminate the principle lessons learnt regarding supporting civil society organizations fighting corruption. The FE should assess the strengths and weaknesses in the CAC and to make clear and realistic recommendations to tackle the weaknesses. The FE should also assess how the CAC has contributed to overall GTF objectives of strengthening capability, accountability and responsiveness to make governance work for the poor.

Brief description of CAC Program

PTF is an international CSO supporting direct action anti-corruption projects implemented by partner CSOs in poor countries. PTF's Citizens Against Corruption (CAC) is a £2 million DFID funded program to carry forward PTF's support for civil society organisations fighting corruption by directly engaging with public agencies through a series of specific time-bound projects.

Convinced that the key to promoting more honest and accountable government lies in fostering a strong local demand for better governance coming from civil society, PTF has pioneered the "demand-side" approach to good governance by encouraging CSOs to seek greater openness in government and to track the delivery of public services. PTF seeks to promote CSOs piloting innovative ways to improve transparency, accountability and fight corruption. PTF makes small grants to support eligible CSO projects and uses highly experienced volunteer governance specialists to provide technical advice on project design and management.

The PTF helps gives voice to civil society and, through the projects it supports, demonstrates the value of constructive partnerships with government agencies, building capacity and developing mechanisms for holding governments accountable. It aims through these activities to reduce corruption in the countries where its partner CSOs are located.

2. Scope and Scale

The FE will cover the CAC program described in PTF's funding application to GTF dated 18 September 2007 and the related log frame as amended in 2011 with the agreement of GTF Manager. CAC is a global program that is being implemented in 19 countries around the world covering four continents and involving some 49 CSO grantees. PTF works with local partners

where feasible; these provide local knowledge, assist in locating CSOs qualified to be receive PTF support and help monitor project implementation and disseminate knowledge.

PTF seeks to support projects that are expected to have clear outcomes and sustainable impacts in terms of reduced corruption and/or greater transparency and public accountability, identified as far as possible in a results framework.

It is hoped that the final evaluation will be able to give us a clear sense of the program's achievements, and failures, as a whole and the reasons behind these. However, it will not be possible to cover every area of the program in detail. The goal is to review sufficient sample of projects and country programs to gain a valid and accurate assessment of achievements, what the impact has been and how sustainable, and the lessons learnt.

The specific purposes of the FE is to:

- Identify the impact of the program and ways that this may be sustained
- Record and share lessons
- Account to local stakeholders for the program's achievements
- Improve future program design and management
- Verify funds were used effectively and efficiently to deliver results
- Enable DFID to evaluate the performance of the GTF as a whole, making sure the overall portfolio has increased accountability and responsiveness.

3. Principal questions to be considered in the evaluation process

The FE should assess to what extent PTF achieved the objectives of the CAC program as set out in the original project proposal as subsequently refined in agreement with DFID/GTF Manager. This assessment should have information on PTF's program in every country where support has been given and seek to respond to the following specific questions:

a) Relevance: The program's significance with respect to assisting CSOs to fight corruption and, in that context:

- How well did the program relate to governance priorities at local, national or international levels?
- How well did the program relate to DFID's plans to assist less developed countries?

b) Impact: What was the impact on civil society efforts to fight corruption and, within that specific context, assess the broader economic, social, and political consequences of the program and how it contributed to the overall objectives of the Governance and Transparency Fund (increased capability, accountability and responsiveness) and to poverty reduction. Specifically:..

- What was the program's overall impact and how does this compare with what was expected?
- Who were the direct and indirect/wider beneficiaries of the program?
- What difference has been made to the lives of those involved in the

program?

- c) Economy:** Has economy been achieved in the implementation of program activities
- Could the same inputs have been purchased for less money?
 - Were expenditures appropriate in achieving program activities?
- d) Efficiency:** How far did funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time, other resources and procedures contribute to or hinder the achievement of outputs.
- Are there obvious links between significant expenditures and key program outputs? How well did the partnership and management arrangements work and how did they develop over time?
 - How well did the financial systems work?
 - How were local partners involved in program management and how effective was this and what have been the benefits of or difficulties with this involvement?
 - Were the risks properly identified and well managed?
- e) Effectiveness:** Assessment of how far the intended outcomes were achieved in relation to targets set in the original logical framework.
- Have interventions achieved or are they likely to achieve objectives?
 - How effective and appropriate was the program approach?
 - With hindsight, how could it have been improved?
- f) Equity:** Discuss extent to which the program had a positive impact on the disadvantaged groups recognizing that these groups are those most damaged by corruption.
- g) Value for money:** Did PTF achieve the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcome.
- Was there an optimum balance between economy, efficiency and effectiveness?
 - What were the costs and benefits of this program?
 - Overall, did the program represent good value for money?
- h) Sustainability:** Potential for the continuation of the impact achieved and of the delivery mechanisms following the withdrawal of DFID support.
- What are the prospects for the benefits of the program being sustained after the funding stops? Did this match the intentions?
 - How has/could collaboration, networking and influencing of opinion support sustainability?
- i) Replicability:** How replicable is the process that introduced the changes/impact? Refer especially to innovative aspects which are replicable.
- What aspects of the program are replicable elsewhere?
 - Under what circumstances and/or in what contexts would the program be replicable?

4. Innovation and learning

Has the program identified a new way of working that could be shared with others? If so, please describe how the program is innovative and/or what are the main lessons learned. (See section 4.5 and 4.6 and Appendix II of the GTF Project Completion Review guidelines for further detail on how innovation and learning may be considered).

5. Has PTF been doing things right?

- (a) **Country coverage and partners.** The PTF historically was a demand-driven organization that responded to requests from individual CSOs for support. Most projects were single operations in individual countries. The GTF-funded program supported three different approaches: (i) the original direct one-on-one partnership with grantees (primarily in Africa); (ii) a country-state model in India, where most projects are focused on monitoring corruption in two national programs (for guaranteed employment and food distribution) in two states—Orissa and Karnataka. The India program is supported by a local partner agency, the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore; and (iii) more modest country program as in the Philippines and Kenya. More recently, PTF has decided to limit its assistance to a smaller number of countries and seek to work in collaboration with a competent local partner. Is this approach well-conceived?
- (b) **Approach.** PTF has worked both a national, state and district/village levels (macro, meso and micro). Is PTF more suited to one of these?
- (c) **Diversification.** Lack of new funding has seen PTF turn to managing social accountability programs and consultancy. Based on the experience of recent years, what should be PTF's strategy for the next decade.

6. Learning and adapting: monitoring, measuring and evaluating

PTF has made considerable efforts to put in place a monitoring and evaluation process for both individual projects and for the PTF program as a whole. Were these efforts system adequate and effective? Have the learnings been adequately disseminated?

7. Summary of Recommendations

Please provide a brief summary of the key recommendations that have emerged from the final evaluation. Recommendations should be subdivided into those related to program design and those related to program management and indicate clearly for whom the recommendation is intended.

8. Evaluation Methodology

It is envisaged that the evaluation will be based on:

- A review of PTF reports, a sample of grantee CSOs' project proposals and log frames, project completion reports and where available project completion assessments.
- Interviews with key stakeholders
- Interviews with selected grantees
- Visits to 4/5 countries (countries to be agreed) and prepare three Project Completion Assessments
- Collation of evidence and stories useful for both evaluation and communication work

The evaluator will work collaboratively with PTF to refine the methodology and develop a detailed evaluation plan.

9. Evaluation Process and Timeline

The evaluation is expected to begin in October 2010 and be completed by the end of March 2011. The following table indicates the detailed timing.

| Action | By When | Who |
|--|-------------------|----------------|
| Final TORs agreed | 15 Oct 2012 | PTF |
| Evaluator's selection confirmed | 31 September 2012 | PTF/GTF |
| Refine methodology, develop overall evaluation plan and agree contractual details | 31 October 2012 | Consultant/PTF |
| Evaluation undertaken | Nov 12–March 13 | Consultant |
| Presentation and discussion of initial findings/first draft with wider PTF team and partners | Early April 2013 | Consultant/PTF |
| Review nearly final draft in detail | Early May 2013 | Consultant/PTF |
| Final evaluation submitted | 31 May 2013 | Consultant |
| Write and issue PTF response | 20 June 2013 | PTF |
| Evaluation published online + disseminated | 30 June 2013 | PTF |

6. Outputs

Outputs will include:

- An evaluation plan.
- A presentation of initial evaluation findings/first draft for discussions with the PTF.
- Full FE, approx 40 pages, of publishable quality.
- Executive Summary, stand alone, 'communicable', 4 pages, and
- Three Project Completion Assessments.

7. Skills and Competencies

The consultant/evaluator must have an in-depth understanding of the role of civil society in fighting corruption, social accountability and in promoting the demand for good governance in developing countries. He/she should have a strong record in conducting evaluations, including of advocacy work. The consultant will have respect and credibility within the field and a good knowledge of monitoring and evaluation methodologies and policy work and experience of working with and evaluating CSOs. She/he should be familiar with policy advocacy work and have demonstrated political sensitivity. He/she must have an ability to write concise, readable and analytical reports.

Attachments

1. DFID GTF FE Guidelines
2. PTF CAC Application dated September 2007

Annex 3. *List of Interviews*

- **PTF Chair:** Ana Cruz and other directors, including the founder (Pierre Landell-Mills), President (Dan Ritchie), Vice Chair (Frank Vogl), and Chief Technical Officer (Vinay Bhargava – by Skype),
- **Other PTF Principals and Advisors** in Washington, including Roger Sullivan and Jeff Kass (Programme Managers), Pietronella Van Den Oever (Volunteer Coordinator), Steve Ettinger (Latin America Regional Coordinator), Judy Edstrom (Kenya and Uganda coordinator), Richard Stern (Fundraising) and Lorena Curry (staff-member and Grants & Finance Manager)
- **Other meetings in DC:** David de Ferranti (founder, Results for Development Institute), Colum Garrity (World Bank Task Team Leader, PTF DGF Grant); Nathaniel Heller (President, Global Integrity)
- **Argentina, CIPPEC:** Staff responsible for PTF-financed project plus senior staff of the organization (Fernando Straface, President; Julia Pomares, Director of Politics & Public Management; Mercedes Ribas, Director of International Development; Sandra Elena, Director of Justice Program);
- **Buenos Aires:** Fernando Sanchez, Provincial Deputy and former National Deputy; Rafael Gentli, Provincial Deputy; Nicolas Massot, DG of Political and Institutional Reform, City of BA government; Sergio Balardini, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- **Santa Fe field visit:** Claudia Catalin, Electorate Secretary of the Province; Paulo Friguglietti, Director of Anti-Corruption and Transparency, Province Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
- **Rosario field visit:** Pablo Javkin, ex-Provincial Deputy and President of the political party: CC-ARI; Rodolfo Succar, Provincial Director of Regional Development and Social Economy; Alejandro Villalba, Ministry of Government; Estela Moncunill, President of Ajercicio Ciudadano (NGO); and Gaston Mutti, Academic who worked on the PTF-funded project
- **Ecuador, Grupo Faro:** Mabel Andrade and other staff responsible for the PTF-funded project; President and Directors of GF;
- **Other Quito meetings:** Ruben Flores Agreda, General Administrator, Municipality of Quito; David Langsdale, Professors at San Francisco University; Monica Orozco, Journalist specializing in corruption issues; Mariana Velasco, Radio Colon;
- **Ibarra field visit:** Irving Reascos, advisor to the mayor on governance; Joconda Benevides, Director of Planning for municipality; Jackelin Valencia, Director of Finance.
- **India, Delhi:** Ashutosh Mishra, Transparency International- India; Rajesh Tandon, Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA)
- **Bangalore: Public Affairs Centre** (South Asia Regional Partner), meetings with Public Affairs Centre: Sam Paul (founder), Suresh (PAC Director), Harish (coordinator of CAC programme for PTF), Srikanth, Khanti and others
- **Mysore District field visit:** Staff of SVYM, including Balasubramanya (Director), Poshni (programme coordinator), Chethan (responsible for PTF-funded project), and Praveen (Education). Meetings with various village groups, Information Volunteers (who help citizens with Right to Information requests), PDS shop owners and monitors, poor people who newly have access to PDS rations. The program included visits to Dadadahali haadi, Gothakalada haadi, Tiger Bloc, and Vendila
- **North Bangalore visit:** Meetings with CFAR staff: Sharmina (office director), Sudha (coordinator of PTF-funded project), Lahna and Radha; visit to Cauvery Nagar slum for meetings with local women activists for the project and to meet community members.

- **Paraspara Trust:** PTF partner working in other slum areas of Bangalore; meeting with Venketash (founder) , the new director, the field staff and volunteer activists with the project.
- **Raichur District, North Karnataka:** Meetings with Abhay, NJMO Founder, staff and voluntary activists with NJMO and Grakoos (the trade union of NREGS workers inspired by NJMO's work); visits to Sikhal Village, Dayanand, Khuldia and Umli Panur to meet community leaders and others affected by the NJMO work.
- **Mongolia, meeting with PTF partners:** Naraa (founder of GIC) by Skype; Enkbayr and Gundegma of GIC; Ms. Oyuntya (Director), Mr. Ariunbold (legal advisor), staff and board members of Women for Social Progress; Tur Od (Chair) and Narunzel (new Director), Sukhee (former Director), TI-Mongolia; Mr. Khashchuluun, Reporter, *Daily News*;
- **Meetings with key stakeholders:** Ms. Bayartsetseg, State Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Mr. Batzorig and Mr. Sukhochir, Independent Authority Against Corruption; Mr. Sukhbaatar, Chair, and members of the Public Council to IAAC; Ms. Burmaa, MP and formerly with WSP, with whom she is still active; Ms. Batchimeg, MP; Mr. Ganbaatar, Deputy Chief, National Police Authority; Mr. Zandraa, Chair of Judicial Disciplinary Committee and Presiding Justice, Administrative Chamber; Mr. Tsogt, Chief Judge of Administrative Cases Appellate Court; Mr. Ganzorig, Deputy Prosecutor General.
- **Other meetings:** Tserenjav, Director, Transparency Foundation (NGO); Mr. Bayanmunkh, Manager of Governance Program, The Asia Foundation; Ms. Saruul, Director, Direct Democracy (NGO-cum-advisor to government)
- **Field visit to Bayankhutag District, Kentii Province:** to see GIC's Transparency in Local Government project; meetings with District Mayor (Mr. Undurkhaan), Deputy Mayor (Mr. Munkhnaran) and former Dep. Mayor (Ms. Bayartuyan)
- **Uganda PTF partners:** Cissy Kagaba and Abbas Kigozi, ACCU; Grace Babihuga and Irene, ULS; Alice Wabule & Gerald Sseguya, UENO, Peter Wandera and Henry Sekamanya, TI-U; Charlotte, Carole and Joyce, INFOC
- **Uganda – other stakeholders:** Godber Tumashabe, ACODE (NGO); Fred Wanida, Registrar, Anti-Corruption Court; Senior Directors, Inspectorate General of Government (IGG); Fergal Ryan, Democratic Governance Facility (multi-donor); Harriet Namisi, USAID; IGG; Chris Obore (journalist), Monitor Publications; various Ugandan NGOs at the IGG consultation meeting
- **Lira field visit:** local activists with ACCU's local partner, North Uganda Anti-Corruption Coalition (Sam Atul, Felix Opwonia, Emanuel Obiga, Robert Odic, Alfred Jageno); Beatrice Apong, acting District Health Officer and her staff; lead staff at 3 clinics in Lira District (Ogur, Barr and Ayago)
- **Kenya Partners:** Anthony Kariuki, Henry Kuria and Faith Kisinga, ACT; Peter Achar & James Giroge (Limuru activist), NCKK; Morris Odhiambo & Regina Kibwana, CLARION; Dalmas Okendo & Francis Kairu, TI-K; Judy Nguru –Walla & Susam Mwongere, YAA
- **Kenya – other stakeholders:** Chris Finch, World Bank; Bruve Lawson-McDowall, DFID; John Batten, Poverty Eradication Network; Francis Maina, priest in Limuru and member of the district Constituency Development Fund committee

Annex 4. *List of Documents Reviewed*

- PTF section in the partnership Approval and Tracking System of the World Bank's Global Programs and Partnerships facility
- All PTF Letters of Agreement/Objectives, including its DGF Grant Application and budget
- All PTF Progress and Grant Completion Reports submitted to World Bank-DGF since 2009
- PTF Annual Reports (from 2008 to date)
- PTF President's reports
- List of all grants made
- Independent evaluations of PTF (prepared in 2005 and 2008)
- PTF Strategic Plan, 2010-14
- Partnering with the PTF: Guidelines for Civil Society Organizations
- Grant applications, PCAs and (most) PCRs for all projects in the 6 countries visited during the evaluation, as well as relevant country and regional reports
- Workshop reports from regional and international meetings
- Independent project assessments of Indian program by PRIA in Delhi
- All responses to the emailed and on-line survey of PTF grantees
- "*Citizens Against Corruption*", the recent book published by PTF's founder, Pierre Landell-Mills and reviews of the book
- PTF Newsletters
- Various other documents available on PTF's website

Annex 5. Schedule of Final Evaluation Process

The FE process was designed to capture the experience and suggestions of the majority of grantees and key stakeholders of both the CMCC and DFID-funded “Citizens against Corruption” programs while at the same time being as cost-effective as possible. The elements were:

- **October 2012:** UK: Discussions with PTF principals on the FE; Agreement of TORs; Preparation of work-plan and schedule of travel; Review of basic PTF documents; Preparation of trip to Argentina and Ecuador.
- **December 2012:** Argentina and Ecuador: Met PTF grantees and other stakeholders in the capitals to assess the progress of these PTF-funded projects and to elicit feedback on PTF as a partner. Undertook field visits to Rosario and Santa Fe (in Argentina) and Ibarra (in Ecuador) to see work on the ground and meet with local government counterparts.
- **Late December 2012:** Washington DC: 3 days of meetings with PTF management, PTF advisors, World Bank governance specialists and other NGOs in the governance field who know PTF’s work.
- **February 2013:** UK: Reporting on Latin America visits; Preparing and disseminating a questionnaire to PTF grantees not met in person in the course of the evaluation; Preparation of trip to India and Mongolia; further documentation review.
- **15-24 March, 2013:** India: Met with TI-India and PRIA in Delhi; then to Bangalore to meet Public Affairs Centre and PTF grantees in Karnataka; field visits to Khote Block (Mysore District), Raichur District and two large Bangalore slums to meet project operands, beneficiaries of the projects, relevant officials and others. Wrap-up meetings with PAC staff.
- **25 March – 2 April, 2013:** Mongolia: Met with the PTF grantees and a wide range of officials (in various government departments), Members of Parliament, senior judges, journalists, NGO leaders and others; Field Trip to Khentii Province to see the local transparency and civic activism project first hand.
- **April 2013:** UK: Further review of documentation; Preparation of trip to Uganda and Kenya; Analysis of Survey responses; preparation of rough draft of final evaluation report.
- **28 April – 8 May, 2013:** Uganda: Met with the PTF grantees and various officials and other civil society leaders; Field Trip to Lira to see local work of the project to combat corruption in the distribution of malaria drugs.
- **8-14 May, 2013:** Kenya: Meeting ACT, who coordinates the Kenya program for PTF; Evaluation workshop including PTF grantees; individual meetings with grantees and with other stakeholders.
- **June 2013:** UK: Finishing draft evaluation report for sharing with PTF; Reviewing PTF’s comments and revising the report as considered appropriate; Submission of final report to PTF for PTF to forward, with its response, to the World Bank.