



## ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the Report

The Open Society Institute has supported an [advocacy campaign to establish a civil society organization \(CSO\) window](#) in the International Development Association (IDA), with 1% of the proposed [IDA20 Replenishment](#) being initiated by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the [Civil Society Steering Committee of the Open Government Partnership](#) (OGP). The allocation would support CSOs' independent monitoring of IDA financial assistance in IDA [borrowing countries](#). The Partnership for Transparency Fund ([PTF](#)) and its affiliates [have endorsed](#) the campaign and written to IDA deputies from donor countries to support such an initiative for funding CSO engagement.

The principal arguments used in the campaign, endorsed by more than [180 CSOs around the world](#), include:

- a. The unprecedented amount of IDA20 resources (\$90 billion from July 2022 to June 2025) that “*will be wasted if they are not accompanied by robust accountability mechanisms matched to today’s challenges.*” Just 1% improves the integrity and returns on the other 99%.
- b. Civil society at the national and international levels has a central role in delivering such oversight in the public interest.
- c. The World Bank, IDA donors, and IDA borrowing countries already recognize the value of civic engagement for responsive and accountable delivery. [IDA18](#) (p. 48) and [IDA19](#) (p. 58–59) both include policy commitments associated with “citizen engagement,” open government, and “multistakeholder platforms” convened by the Bank. The [Over-view of IDA20](#) mentions partnering with CSOs and citizen engagement among its key principles (p. 19).
- d. The twin challenges of declining civic space and reduced funding, made worse by the pandemic, undermine civil society’s capacity to promote transparency, accountability, and control of corruption in public spending and to hold the state accountable.

Donors and World Bank managers involved in IDA discussions have welcomed CSO engagement and support for IDA20 discussions while pushing back on the idea of a CSO

---

<sup>1</sup> [“Statement of the OGP Civil Society Steering Committee in Support of a Civil Society Window in the World Bank’s IDA20 Replenishment”](#) (Open Government Partnership, 2023).

window and 1% allocation in IDA20. The current Bank policies<sup>2</sup> recognize the benefits of citizen and stakeholder (including CSO) engagement and allow such engagement in the life cycle of IDA operations. However, there is a dearth of information on the actual number, volume, and locations of CSO engagement in IDA operations. Available information suggests that the spaces for CSO engagement, enabled by the current policies, remain largely underutilized due to a multitude of constraints, including explicit funding processes. Thus, the key challenge is to persuade the Bank and IDA donors to adopt proactive actions to close the gap between the potential and actual CSO engagement during the implementation and monitoring of IDA operations.

The contractor will develop an options note to examine the above concerns about expanding CSO engagement and offer options to enhance actual CSO engagement in IDA operations. The overarching question to be addressed by the note will be—*How can the World Bank finance its commitment to citizen and stakeholder engagement in ways that ensure CSOs have the resources they need to facilitate such engagement, including for independent monitoring of IDA operations?*

## Responsibilities

The contractor shall analyze the following six issues and present an options note (15–20 pages) due no later than October 20, 2022 (the “final options note”), with a first draft (the “draft options note”) due on February 15, 2022. The client shall provide notes and feedback on the draft options note, which will be incorporated into the final options note. Ultimately, this final options note should help to address the question: *How can the World Bank finance its commitment to citizen and stakeholder engagement in ways that ensure CSOs have the resources they need to facilitate such engagement, including for independent monitoring of IDA operations?*

- 1. Citizen/CSO engagement policies at the Bank/IDA:** A quick review will determine whether there are any remaining policy impediments to engaging CSOs in IDA operations, including supporting independent CSO monitoring of implementation. While the World Bank policies apply equally to IDA operations, the IDA operations also have to comply with the provisions in IDA replenishments that take place every three years. The replenishment process affords opportunities for actions to promote actual CSO engagement that could be funded by IDA grant or quasi-grant funds. We will focus on these possibilities.
- 2. Level of actual CSO engagement in IDA operations:** The World Bank claims that there is already a significant degree of CSO engagement. This needs validation and/or challenge by data. The PTF will review the current IDA metrics for monitoring and reporting information on planned and actual CSO engagement and information currently disclosed at a corporate level. As needed, researchers will leverage the [Access to Information \(AOI\) policy](#) to ask the

<sup>2</sup> The IDA recognizes that civic engagement in its policies and lending operations enhances results and accountability. It has created a [framework for “citizen engagement,”](#) required “[stakeholder engagement](#)” in its lending operations, and enabled funding and participation of CSOs in the provision of services, [including third-party monitoring](#). The Bank/IDA has provided financial support to CSOs through the Bank’s [board-approved Global Partnership for Social Accountability](#) as well as other global funds for which it is the executing agency, such as the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Global Environment Fund ([GEF](#)), Global Agriculture and Food Security Program ([GAFSP](#)), etc.

Bank to provide specific numbers/data supporting their claims. Our premise is that the Bank is not collecting and/or disclosing this information at a corporate level. This will be verified, and recommendations for improving monitoring and reporting on actual CSO engagement in IDA operations will be presented. This could be a low-hanging fruit as the Bank publishes information on contracts awarded to commercial firms and consultants, and the presumption in the disclosure policy favors disclosure with few exceptions.

3. **Added value of independent monitoring by CSOs:** Currently, the Bank's CSO engagement policies encourage IDA borrowers to engage CSOs for a wide range of activities, including independent third-party monitoring (see footnote 1). However, in practice, such monitoring is extremely rare as governments and the Bank seldom see the need and do not want scarce IDA funds to flow to CSOs. They point to existing systems for ensuring accountability and impact assessments under the IDA. These include an Inspection Panel, an Independent Evaluation Group, an IDA Results Measurement System, a Grievance Redress Service, and the Integrity Vice Presidency. Persuading IDA borrowers to engage CSOs for independent monitoring will require a compelling case for the added value of such monitoring. The note will analyze the issues and compile the key arguments and evidence supporting the case for involving CSOs.
4. **Funding sources and mechanisms:** Currently, CSO engagement in IDA operations, including for independent monitoring, can be funded from several sources such as IDA lending proceeds, trust funds administered by the Bank, global funds outside the Bank (such as Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization), parallel financing by bilateral donors/foundations, and the [Global Partnership for Social Accountability](#) (GPSA). GPSA seems to be the only fund in the Bank dedicated to funding CSOs, but it is not limited to IDA countries only. The advocacy campaign has proposed a CSO window under IDA20, but other options within and outside the IDA may be feasible. The note will present several options for financing mechanisms and sources for funding them that involve the Bank, as its involvement brings the benefits of multilateralism and will help ensure close coordination with IDA-funded operations.
5. **Preserving the independence and quality of independent monitoring:** Concerns have been expressed about how to avoid conflicts of interest and preserve independence for CSOs if the Bank and/or borrowers have key roles in managing and funding independent monitoring. These concerns are legitimate, but the Bank has found ways to address them in other areas. Concerns have also been expressed about who will select CSO monitors, how local CSO monitors will be engaged, whether they would have the requisite capacity, and how quality would be assured. The note will present options for organizational arrangements that could address these concerns.
6. **Business processes for CSO engagement:** During CSO-Bank dialogues, CSOs have repeatedly pointed to the absence of (i) efficient and cost-effective Bank operational processes for the relatively small transactions that characterize civil society engagement; (ii) explicit cost and procurement planning in project documents for CSO engagement; (iii) the Bank's willingness to push back when governments resist the inclusion of CSO interventions; and

## ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference for the Report

(iv) the natural resistance of TTLs to subject themselves to task team budgets to support the development and implementation of such project components. These concerns were also highlighted in the Bank's [IEG evaluation of citizen engagement in Bank operations](#). These constraints will hamper any independent monitoring work by CSOs and would need to be addressed. What can be done? The note will present options.