

Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability Approaches in Enhancing Integrity of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs



IMAGE BY PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)

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Executive Summary

This paper has been prepared as a knowledge resource for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and government agencies involved in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) in the Philippines. It has been prepared as part of “Guarding the Integrity of the Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the Philippines” (or *i-Pantawid*) being implemented by Filipino CSO), the *Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG)*. The Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) is providing the funding for the project. The project’s objective is to develop a model for constructive engagement between government and civil society at the community level using social accountability initiatives for transparent and accountable implementation of the CCTP in the Philippines. The project started in mid-2014 and completion is expected in 2017. A draft of the paper was made publicly available for comments during the March–July 2015 period through the CCAGG, PTF, and GPSA websites. Comments were received from the CCTP implementing agency in the Philippines (Department of Social Welfare and Development) and many other contributors. Their comments were integrated into this final paper.

CCTPs’ IMPACTS AND INTEGRITY RISKS

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTPs) are widely used in the world and are proving effective in delivering results. CCTPs are government programs that typically provide cash to participants upon their fulfillment of a set of conditions or responsibilities (e.g., school attendance by children, visits to health facilities). According to the World Bank, the number of CCTPs increased from 27 in 2008 to 53 in 2013. There is a preponderance of evidence from impact evaluation studies that CCTPs are delivering their intended results. In its 2014 *The State of Social Safety Nets* report, the World Bank surveyed impact evaluations of CCTPs and found that they have been successful in generating the following poverty alleviation impacts:

- Increased human capital formation
- Better job prospects
- Stimulated local economies
- Enhanced self-esteem
- Improved social cohesion

However, CCTP achievements can be undermined by fraud, errors, and corruption. The risk of such occurrences, collectively referred to here as integrity¹ risks, are inherent in all stages of CCTPs and emanate from several sources including: lack of transparency in key systems (e.g. targeting, compliance verification); weakness in internal control and accountability systems; beneficiary falsification or concealment of information required for eligibility; bribes demanded from compliance verification officers to overlook non-compliance or validate compliance; unavailable or ineffective grievance redress processes; and interference with program design and implementation to derive political advantage (e.g. inappropriate inclusion or exclusion of eligible households).

¹ In this paper we use the following definition of *Integrity*, adapted from the Transparency International: capacity to prevent any deviations from its intended use and any change in the designated beneficiaries resulting from exclusion errors, clientelism, or abuse of power for personal gain.

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF INTEGRITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN CCTPs

Several international studies of control and accountability mechanisms in CCTPs found that fraud, errors, and corruption remain problematic despite state-led measures (see bibliography). There is a need, therefore, to complement state-led efforts to manage integrity risks within CCTPs with other mechanisms that directly engage beneficiaries of CCTPs and citizens more widely, including the use of social accountability approaches. These are the twin findings of the studies reviewed for this paper covering several countries in Latin America, five countries in Africa and the Middle East, and the Philippines as well as our field review of CCTP integrity systems in the Philippines in 2013. Initiatives to engage civil society, including social accountability initiatives, used in CCTPs include:

- CSOs assess awareness, access, and quality of information and provide feedback to authorities to further improve transparency, which in turn sets the basis for engaging citizens to hold the implementing authorities accountable.
- Communities assist authorities to minimize obvious errors of inclusion, exclusion, and exit by vetting lists of beneficiaries.
- CSOs and community leaders help to improve compliance with conditions by working with beneficiaries to help them understand benefits of compliance.
- CSOs help with the process of beneficiary feedback collection and use it to constructively engage with service providers to improve access, quality, and responsiveness of the supply-side services (e.g. education, health) thereby enhancing impact.
- CSOs can independently assess vulnerability of CCTPs to integrity risks, performance of state run integrity risk management systems, and follow up with evidence-based constructive dialogue and advocacy to improve matters in vulnerable areas.
- CSOs can help gather information at the grassroots level on CCTP outcomes (e.g. changed motivations, attitudes, and aspirations).

Based on a review of the current literature the following good practices and lessons for greater engagement of citizens, CSOs and the use of social accountability initiatives in CCTPs were identified.

- *CSOs and civil society volunteers can be important facilitators in implementation of the CCTP by better linking authorities and beneficiaries.* Community facilitators (formal and informal) play an important intermediary role at the local level as well as in linking the grassroots to the national level (see cases from the Middle East and Africa, as well as Indonesia, and Peru in this report). However, their effectiveness can vary depending on the facilitators' caseload, skills, and knowledge. The effectiveness of such intermediation can be undermined when authorities within the CCTPs have weak relations with CSOs, since both sides may be wary of collaborating with each other due to the time and skills required. This is especially true at the local level. To counter such a possibility, the authorities need to take measures for CSOs to genuinely participate in program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
- *Collaboration with citizen beneficiaries and civil society in CCTP decision-making processes is good practice but has risks that need to be managed.* Several countries

have set up collaborative decision-making bodies involving civil society, community, and beneficiary representatives (e.g., Brazil, Peru, Philippines). They represent a good practice in helping beneficiaries access relevant program information, comply with their responsibilities, monitor program performance, provide feedback, and seek remedial actions against unjust practices. However, experience suggests that they can be effective only when the oversight of local government is limited, political interference is limited, and performance-monitoring indicators are used.

- *Quality and accessibility of information disclosed on CCTPs is a key determinant of social accountability initiatives and CSOs should assess the availability of information and advocate for greater transparency.* The range of “good practices” in information disclosure (Brazil, Peru) includes: institutional structure; regulations; board composition; reports; budget information; database of local government units (LGUs) selected and beneficiaries by LGUs; and principles and mechanisms for the targeting and selection of beneficiaries, allocation of resources, internal rules and norms, and complaint mechanisms.
- *Civil society participation improves the responsiveness of grievance reporting and other beneficiary feedback mechanisms by raising awareness and facilitating grievance filing and follow-up* (Philippines, Mexico). Grievance redress mechanisms are key components of all CCTPs. However, their performance varies over time and location. CSOs can play an important role in checking performance and advocating for improvements. Mexico’s use of biannual surveys to collect stakeholders’ opinions and knowledge about the CCTPs constitutes a good practice example. In 2014, the Mexican CCTP organized an “Exercise of Citizen Participation” with the intention to drive improvements in governance and in fighting corruption. Representatives of local-level collaborative committees, civil society, and academics attended it and tabled various proposals for improving the program.
- *Independent third-party monitoring by CSOs on the effectiveness of state-led integrity assurance systems is essential to enhance the integrity of CCTPs.* The major mechanisms for the ensuring integrity of a cash transfer program are those established by government to oversee, monitor, and audit. Since these typically are not sufficient and/or function poorly, they need to be complemented by CSO monitoring, both of the delivery of the CCTPs and the performance of governments’ own oversight mechanisms for CCTPs (World Bank, Peru).
- *Social accountability initiatives can be an effective complement to state-led control, but such accountability mechanisms engaging citizens/CSOs should not substitute existing internal management information systems of the CCTP already in use.* Several studies (World Bank, TI International, U-4) found that using a combination of top-down (e.g. supreme audit institutions, evaluation, spot checks) and bottom-up (e.g. beneficiary and civil society participation in key processes) approaches is most effective in mitigating risks. They caution that social accountability tools should be used as complements to internal and external audits and not as substitutes.
- *Social accountability initiatives should be operationally and financially independent of CCTP implementing agencies for greater effectiveness.* As noted above, collaboration by citizens and CSOs in decision making and delivery of CCTP services can add value by enhancing responsiveness and integrity of CCTPs. However, once CSOs are part of implementation (and sometimes paid by a government CCTP implementing agency) they are not in a position to hold the implementing agency accountable. The GPSA

provides a good practice model whereby constructive engagement between government implementing authorities is required but the funding for GPSA grantees does not flow through the implementing agencies. This arrangement assures independence and objectivity. The *i-Pantawid project*, for which this paper has been produced, is a good example of such an arrangement. A Memorandum of Understanding between CCAGG and DSWD assures constructive engagement and cooperation, but in all other respects CCAGG has operational and financial independence. One way for countries to adopt this good practice is to consider collaboration between state oversight agencies and CSOs to carry out social accountability work that complements the work of oversight agencies. A good practice example is the growing practice of participatory audits sponsored by Supreme Audit Institutions.

We found a relative dearth of studies independently assessing performance of CCTP integrity risk management in general and the use and impact of social accountability approaches in CCTPs in particular. This is in contrast with there is a rich body of CCTP impact evaluation studies that have been surveyed as part of the World Bank study on State of Safety Nets. We believe there is much more information than reviewed for this paper that could be collected and analyzed for lessons and good practices in the use of social accountability initiatives for enhancing the integrity of CCTPs.

We recommend that the worldwide financiers of CCTPs(e.g. the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral development agencies) sponsor an international knowledge sharing and peer-learning program on the use of social accountability approaches in CCTPs. As far as we could determine the last international conference on CCTPs, organized by the World Bank, took place in 2006. The recent pioneering study by Transparency International (Gamba 2015) is a useful beginning but is limited to Latin America and addresses overall integrity with no specific mention of independent third party social accountability initiatives.

Investing in social accountability initiatives and wider efforts to engage citizens and community organizations in CCTPs can potentially generate a significant return on investment. The financial returns of eliminating inclusion errors and other leakages due to waste and corruption can be significant. For example, as a result of a \$35,500 PTF grant to CCAGG for a CCT monitoring project was the discovery and rectification of inclusion errors estimated to have cost \$95,500 in erroneous payments to ineligible beneficiaries (CCAGG 2012). While it can be argued that the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) eligibility update system would have discovered these errors eventually, the fact remains that they lasted several years until discovered by the CCAGG, which may have occurred sooner had CSOs such as CCAGG been involved in social accountability work by design from the start of the CCTP.

As exclusion errors are discovered and rectified, improvements in poverty alleviation significant economic impacts. The CCAGG project mentioned above also discovered and helped rectify exclusion errors. Without CCAGG intervention, about 10 percent of poor households in the project area would have been left behind. It is clear that this social accountability initiative generated returns that were several times higher than the investment. Other significant results/impacts of social accountability initiatives include improvements in compliance with co-responsibilities and grievance resolution and enhanced public trust and support due to independent third-party monitoring. The CCAGG project also contributed in each of these areas and the scaled-up *i-Pantawid* project funded by GPSA is projected to produce similar results. Unfortunately, similar cost-benefit analyses were not found in any other studies reviewed. This is clearly another knowledge gap for further analysis and evidence.

ENHANCING INTEGRITY RISKS MANAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES CCTP: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT

The CCTP in the Philippines (the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino program) has evolved into a successful flagship poverty alleviation program. It was introduced in 2007 and benefited over 4 million households in 2014 (nearly 80 percent of poor households) with an annual budget of about US\$1.2 billion. The program is operational in 80 of the 81 provinces in the country. Independent evaluations of Pantawid Pamilya’s impact on health and education outcomes indicate that the program is succeeding in achieving its objectives.

The Pantawid Pamilya program uses several control and accountability mechanisms. The accountability mechanisms being used by the implementing agency—the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)—include:

- A Targeting System
- A Compliance Verification System
- A Grievance Redress System
- An Update System
- A Family Development Sessions Program
- Regular spot checks by an independent institution
- Random supervision and financial audits
- National, provincial, regional, and municipal advisory committees comprised of multiple stakeholders
- An independent Monitoring and Advisory Committee
- Annual inquiry on the status of CCTP implementation by Congress of the Philippines during the deliberation of the budget
- An external audit by the Commission of Audit (the supreme audit institution)
- Favorable policies for social accountability initiatives

Independent studies of the performance of control and accountability mechanisms in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, as well as fieldwork by CCAGG and the PTF, indicate that integrity risk management is generally satisfactory for a program of this size and maturity but can be improved. This finding in the Philippines is similar to the findings of the international survey. The World Bank assessed the governance risks in the 4Ps program in 2012 when approving additional financing for the 4Ps program and noted: “Accountability and oversight, and approval and authorization of processes are in place and are functional. DSWD has also been conducting regular field visits, systematic Spot Checks, and has a functioning Grievance Redress System in place. Despite these functioning systems, there are still risks of local level manipulation of beneficiary selection, verification of eligibility, and management of grants.” The CCAGG’s “Conditional Cash Transfer Program Watch Project” was carried out during 2011–2012 and discovered several dysfunctions which it helped remedy: inclusion and exclusion errors; lack of compliance with co-responsibility; and payment delays. Fieldwork by the PTF in 2013 found that integrity risks were present in all key functional areas: targeting, compliance verification, benefit payments, grievance redress, exit, delivery of services, and interagency coordination mechanisms, particularly at the municipal level. In its 2013 audit of the DSWD, the Commission for Audit in the Philippines observed some deficiencies in beneficiary database, beneficiary payroll, and benefit payments and urged the department to take action to improve integrity of the Pantawid Pamilyang program.

The DSWD is taking measures to address the integrity issues raised by the independent assessments and has supported an expansion of the social accountability program by CCAGG through the i-Pantawid project. We commend the DSWD for this and for its efforts to seek collaboration with civil society to improve integrity of the Pantawid Pamilya program. We submitted the following recommendations in March 2015 for consideration by the Department of Social Welfare and Development to strengthen state-led integrity mechanisms in the i-Pantawid program.

- *Information disclosed on the [Pantawid Pamilya website](#) could be substantially expanded.* In line with the good practice, it should consider posting on its website the following additional information: the operations manual; names of beneficiaries by municipalities and cities; detailed budget information by provinces and municipalities; detailed annual reports on grievance redress systems, including distribution of grievances by location and type; reports of spot checks done by the independent agency; schedule and minutes of Independent Monitoring and Advisory committee meetings; COA audit reports; composition frequency and minutes of multi-stakeholder advisory committee meetings; and independent evaluation results. Such disclosure is an essential foundation for social accountability of the CCTPs.
- *A system of periodic beneficiary satisfaction and feedback surveys could be introduced.* Mexico offers a good practice example for beneficiary feedback collection that uses biannual surveys to collect beneficiary feedback.
- *Actions are needed to monitor and improve the functioning of the Municipal Advisory Committees (MACs).* Our fieldwork in one region found that MACs are not performing the roles expected of them. This finding is consistent with experiences of Social Control Councils in Brazil. The Pantawid Pamilya program covers more than 1,600 municipalities and cities, which makes monitoring their performance challenging. Two ways to help improve their performance are to: (a) establish a performance monitoring system for MACs using key performance indicators; and (b) encourage grassroots CSOs to monitor, report, and advocate performance of MACs. Some measures of MAC performance that CSOs could report on include:
 - Percentage of member CSOs and of beneficiaries in the MAC
 - Extent to which the MACs are functioning as indicated by the number of meetings held
 - Extent to which MAC members have received standardized information of their role and taken part in the specified amount of training
 - Extent to which beneficiary lists are available to MACs on a regular and timely basis
 - Extent of dissemination of information and public and beneficiary awareness of the MAC
 - Extent to which MACs interact with the DSWD National Program Office
 - Extent to which MACs know who to contact and how to proceed in case of problems

On April 13, 2015 DSWD Secretary Corazon J. Soliman approved the creation of Risk Management and Quality Assurance Division (RMQAD) under the Pantawid Pamilya National Program Management Office (NPMO) to strengthen the state-led integrity mechanism. This Division would take the lead in addressing the risks in CCTP implementation

and ensure that its integrity is guarded. NPMO has advised us that: (a) the integrity risks identified in the paper, including the Opportunities Framework for Social Accountability interventions, can serve as a reference and takeoff point of the RMQAD; and (b) the above recommendations shall be studied and NPMO will consider mechanisms to implement them.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CSOS AND THE DSWD FOR ENHANCING CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES CCTP

There is very little evidence of citizen engagement and social accountability initiatives in the P4 Program of the Philippines despite an impressive number of CSOs signing a pledge to do so. In 2011, more than 90 CSOs and volunteer organizations in the Philippines committed to help with program implementation in any one of the following ways:²

- Volunteer to assist in the implementation or monitoring of the program
- Participate in Community Assemblies as part of beneficiary identification
- Audit the Compliance Verification System
- Assist in the Beneficiary Update and Grievance Redress Systems
- Enhancement and implementation of the Family Development Sessions
- Initiate the formation of an oversight structure for the program
- Undertake measures to sustain the gains of the program

However, our survey did not reveal any reports of what CSOs have done to follow through, except that CSOs were contracted by the DSWD to perform the [Family Development Sessions](#) (FDS).³ Even here there is no available information on coverage or results.

As identified in the CSOs' Statement of Commitment to the Pantawid Pamilya program, **significant opportunities exist for CSOs to enhance the integrity and results of the Pantawid Pamilya program.** CSOs can validate beneficiary lists, report on targeting errors, and assist with recertification. CSOs can collect beneficiary feedback on access and quality of supply-side services in health or education programs, along with advocating and assuming co-responsibility for overcoming supply bottlenecks. CSOs may also improve their involvement in the Pantawid Pamilya program by broadening awareness and sustaining public and political support for it. A significant misconception about the Pantawid Pamilya program among citizens is that it is a dole-out, rather than a development, program. CSOs can help dispel this misconception. This will reinforce the credibility of the program.

It is recommended that CSOs and the DSWD analyze the social accountability initiatives in the Pantawid Pamilya program and develop a follow-up action plan. Three building blocks for such an initiative exist in the Philippines. *First*, the government has policies and action plans for engaging with civil society as part of its founding membership with the Open Government Partnership. *Second*, the DSWD recognizes CSOs and volunteer partners as the "third eye" of the DSWD. *Third*, the CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the Pantawid Pamilya program can be a foundation for such initiatives. The government can help CSO involvement by increasing the information available on the Pantawid Pamilya and setting up incentives and funding for CSOs to get involved.

² CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the P4 Program accessed at <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/csostatement.pdf>.

³ For more information on how the CSOs work to promote FDS please see <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/pantawid-pamilya-cso-faq> PLASN.

A practical challenge faced in funding CSOs for social accountability initiatives is ensuring the credibility of their participation, including safeguarding their independence while potentially criticizing the government and the DSWD. One possibility of addressing such a conflict of interest is to keep the funding source for third-party monitoring entirely separate from the DSWD. Likewise, to mitigate a conflict of interest for CSOs, there should be rules to ensure that those engaged as facilitators in the implementation process (i.e. part of program implementation) cannot also be selected for independent third party monitoring of the program. Healthy competition among CSOs to perform different discrete functions within the CCTP structure, including a check on other CSOs, ensures for both greater integrity and accountability.

It is also recommended that the DSWD consider taking the initiative, in collaboration with its development partners (the World Bank, the ADB and Australia), to host the international knowledge sharing and peer-learning event recommended above. Such an event could help DSWD to put a more solid footing the social accountability initiatives by CSOs in the Philippines that in turn would help the Pantawid Pamilya program to sustain its achievements during times of political transitions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CCAGG

The i-Pantawid project implemented by CCAGG features many good practices in social accountability for enhancing integrity of CCTPs but there is room for improvement. The project plans to implement the following interventions to engage citizens and CSOs, including for social accountability:

- Conduct social audits to monitor targeting, compliance verification, payment, and grievance redress in 30 municipalities in the Northern Luzon region
- Administer community score cards on the delivery of social services including health and education
- Assist with grievance resolution
- Conduct Family Development Sessions and train Parent Leaders as facilitators
- Build the capacity of grassroots CSOs and communities for engagement with authorities and to practice social accountability
- Generate and share project results and lessons learned with CSOs and other stakeholders through the knowledge portal of the GPSA

A good practice innovation in the i-Pantawid program is that CCAGG has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DSWD that provides a framework for constructive engagement including sharing of information and findings.

There are three additional areas where CCAGG could play a useful role. These may be considered as the project develops. *First*, CCAGG could verify which information about the Pantawid Pamilya program is publicly available and how it compares to international good practices. Such a report could be a basis for advocating improved transparency in the Pantawid Pamilya. *Second*, CCAGG could partner with the Transparency International chapter in the Philippines to carry out and publish an independent integrity risk assessment using the GAMBA 2015 methodology. *Third*, the CCAGG could, and should, carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the i-Pantawid project.

The following table summarizes the current and recommended citizen engagement and social accountability interventions in the i-Pantawid project.

International good practices of citizen engagement and social accountability interventions in the CCTPs	Citizen engagement and Social accountability interventions in <i>i-PANTAWID</i> project	
	Already Planned	Recommended
Improve transparency by verifying and advocating quality and user-friendliness of access to information		X
Vet lists of beneficiaries to help minimize targeting errors	X	
Work with beneficiaries and service providers to improve compliance with conditions	X	
Facilitate beneficiary feedback collection	X	
Act as a social intermediary between CCTP implementers and beneficiaries at the local level	X	
Help strengthen links between local and national level consultation and implementation processes	X	
Assess integrity risk vulnerabilities and performance of integrity mechanisms and engage with authorities to improve integrity	X	
Partner with Transparency International Philippines to assess integrity risk vulnerability at the CCT program level using TI methodology		X
Carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the <i>i-Pantawid</i> project in partnership with an independent research partner		X

CCAGG agrees with these recommendations and will make best efforts to implement them as resources permit.

1. Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE PAPER

This paper has been commissioned as part of a project entitled “Guarding the Integrity of the Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the Philippines” (*i-PANTAWID*). The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG, <http://www.ccagg.com>), a Filipino CSO, is implementing this four-year project (2013–2017) with its partners, including the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF, www.ptfund.org). The project is funded by the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA, www.gpsa.org). The *i-Pantawid* aims to develop a model for constructive engagement between civil society and government at the community level for transparent and accountable implementation of the conditional cash transfer program in the Philippines (called *Pantawid Pamilya*) using social accountability initiatives.

The chief purpose of the paper, first produced in March 2015, is to enhance the knowledge of CSOs involved with the *i-Pantawid* project in the Philippines on international good practices in improving CCT integrity. Given the broader interest in the subject, the paper was made available worldwide for comments and contributions through the GPSA Knowledge Portal (<http://www.thegpsa.org/sa/gpsa-knowledge-platform>) from March – July 2015. A number of comments and suggestions were received. The original paper has been revised to integrate these comments and edited for use in and outside the Philippines. The intended audiences for this revised paper are civil society and government practitioners involved in implementing conditional cash transfer programs (CCTPs) in the Philippines.

1.2 DEFINITIONS

Definitions of the key terms used in this report are as follows:

Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTPs) are government programs that “provide cash to participants upon their fulfillment of a set of conditions or co-responsibilities.” Examples include one or more conditions such as: ensuring a minimum level of school attendance by children, undertaking regular visits to health facilities, or attending skills training programs. Some CCTPs also include school stipend programs, graduation programs, and food distribution.

Citizen engagement is defined by the World Bank as two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector within the scope of World Bank Group interventions – policy dialogue, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics – which give citizens a stake in decision-making with the objective to improve intermediate and final development outcomes. The spectrum of citizen engagement includes consultation, collaboration/ participation, and empowerment (World Bank 2014).

Social accountability initiatives are defined as programs that feature citizen’ and civil society organization (CSO) engagement “with policymakers and service providers to bring about

greater accountability for and responsiveness to citizens' needs" (GPSA).⁴ In this paper we use the following classifications of *social accountability mechanisms/processes* (an overview of *social accountability tools* is attached as *Annex 1*).

- Enhancing transparency through public access to information
- Beneficiary and civil society consultations and feedback mechanisms
- Grievance redress mechanisms
- Inclusion of beneficiaries/users in decision-making bodies
- Independent third-party performance monitoring
- Beneficiary and civil society capacity building in one or more of the areas above

Beneficiaries are defined as those clearly identifiable households or individuals that receive CCT benefits during program implementation.

Integrity is defined as the CCTP's "capacity to prevent any deviations from its intended use and any change in the designated beneficiaries resulting from inclusion and exclusion errors, clientelism, or abuse of power for personal gain" (Transparency International 2015).

STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

1. Introduction

2. Overview of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

3. Integrity Risk Management in CCTPs

4. Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability in CCTPs:
An International Survey

5. Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability in the
Philippines' CCTP

⁴ Source: <http://www.thegpsa.org/sa/about/social-accountability>


2. Overview of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

In this chapter we present the main characteristics of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTPs). In Section 2.1 we look at growth and distribution of the CCTPs around the world. Section 2.2 presents the theory of change underlying the CCTPs. Key functional (operational) components of CCTPs are presented in Section 2.3. This is followed by a summary of evidence on impact of CCTPs on poverty alleviation in Section 2.4. The final Section 2.5 gives an overview of administrative challenges involved in CCTPs given their large size and geographic spread.

2.1 CCTPs AROUND THE WORLD

Conditional cash transfer programs are being increasingly used to fight poverty around the world. According to a study of social safety nets by the World Bank, the number of countries with CCTPs has steadily increased from 27 in 2008 to 53 in 2013. They were pioneered in and are most prevalent in Latin America and the Caribbean region, as shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CCTPs BY REGION




Source: World Bank (2014). The State of Social Safety Nets, p. 9.

2.2 CCTPs: THEORY OF CHANGE

CCTPs aim to reduce poverty by supporting human capital development among the poorest households. They do this by: (a) encouraging more and better human capital investments among the poor to provide the opportunity to exit poverty; and (b) reducing chronic poverty by helping the poor escape from intergenerational poverty traps. The results chain for CCTPs is shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: RESULTS CHAIN OF A CCTP




Source: Adapted from Rubio 2012.

2.3 OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF CCTPs

CCTPs focus on human capital development by making cash transfers to targeted (usually very poor) households conditional on complying with household members participating in specified productivity and welfare enhancing programs. Usually the conditions relate to health, nutrition, and education programs. Participation is intended to produce both short-term benefits (e.g. increased household consumption) and long-term benefits (e.g. disrupting the intergenerational cycle of poverty through human capital formation). Typically CCTPs have the operational components presented in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3: KEY OPERATIONAL COMPONENTS OF CCTPs



Source: Prepared by the author drawing on World Bank (2011) and Gamba (2015, 2014).

2.4 IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF CCTPs

Evidence shows that CCTPs have positive outcomes in the intended areas. Poverty alleviation and other development impacts of CCTPs have been evaluated in multiple countries.⁵ The World Bank has surveyed impact evaluations of social safety nets⁶ and noted that CCTPs are one of the most widely evaluated development programs. The survey found that CCTPs have been successful in generating the following poverty alleviation impacts:

- *Increased human capital formation.* Positive and significant impact on grade promotion and cumulative years of schooling (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia) and significant increase in the number of children completing primary schooling and moving to higher education (Tanzania).
- *Stimulating local economies.* In Ghana it is estimated that the LEAP program generated up to \$2.50 of benefits to local economy for every dollar provided to beneficiaries. Similarly the multiplicative effects of social safety nets were found in Ethiopia (\$2.50), Zambia (\$1.79), and Kenya (\$1.34).
- *Enhanced self-esteem.* Beneficiaries have greater self-esteem and higher self-efficacy in the labor market as well as greater optimism for the future (Chile).
- *Improved social cohesion.* Coverage of schools by the Bolsa Familia program leads to strong and significant reduction in crime in the respective neighborhoods (Brazil). There are positive effects on social cohesion and civil participation (Tanzania).

2.5 KEY IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FACING CCTPs

CCTPs involve many administrative challenges. CCTPs involve a large number of beneficiaries distributed over wide geographical areas. There are large budget outlays, with staff and management information systems to identify and register beneficiaries, verify compliance, make payments, and keep information and records up-to-date. In addition, they require significant amounts of interagency coordination given that while the benefit administration is usually done by a social assistance agency of the government, the services associated with the conditions are provided by other departments/agencies. Coordination between national and local government bodies is usually needed. The communication and consultation needs are large given the visibility of the programs.

⁵See the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3iE) 2014 and Abdul Latif Jamil Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) 2014 for dozens of impact evaluation studies.

⁶*The State of Social Safety Nets: Evidence from Impact Evaluations*, World Bank 2014, pp. 33–36.

3. Integrity Risk Management in CCTPs

This chapter focuses on key aspects of integrity risk management of CCTPs. As noted in Chapter 1, the term *integrity in CCTPs* is defined as a CCTP’s “capacity to prevent any deviations from its intended use and any change in the designated beneficiaries resulting from exclusion errors, clientelism, or abuse of power for personal gain” (ELLA 2014). In Section 3.1 we discuss key integrity risks that are typically present in all CCTPs. Section 3.2 presents the main integrity risk management mechanisms that are used by CCTP policymakers and implementers in the executive branch of the government. The final Section 3.3 presents a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of integrity risk management that is being developed by the Transparency International.

3.1 KEY INTEGRITY RISKS IN CCTPS

CCTPs, in common with all cash transfer programs, whether in developed or developing countries, can involve risks of fraud, errors, and corruption. CCTPs are vulnerable to such risks as they involve large numbers of beneficiaries, large budget outlays, payments of cash, and opportunities for clientelism. These risks, collectively referred to as integrity risks, when unmitigated undermine the results of the programs. They are inherent at all key stages of CCTPs (see Table 1) and emanate from several sources: lack of transparency in key systems (e.g. targeting, compliance verification); weakness in internal control and accountability systems; beneficiaries falsification or concealment of information required to become eligible; bribes demanded by compliance verification officers to overlook noncompliance or validate compliance; unavailable or ineffective grievance redress processes; and interference with program design and implementation to derive political advantage (e.g. include ineligible or exclude eligible households).

TABLE 1: KEY INTEGRITY RISKS IN CCTPs

<p>Access to information is insufficient</p>	<p>Key to CCTP accountability efforts is the timely flow of information from provider to consumer. This enables the critical feedback loop from the community to the program administrators. Program managers, government institutions (information and service providers), financial institutions, beneficiaries, and civil society all provide and consume information vital to the successful functioning of the program. It is therefore the timely information flows that also allow for citizens, government institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to hold the program accountable and reduce opportunities for corruption and/or questionable program management.</p>
<p>High inclusion and/or exclusion errors</p>	<p>Such errors are caused by one or more of the following: deficiencies in targeting and registration systems (e.g. geographic targeting criteria) that results in exclusion of the poor outside of target areas; a large element of discretion for officials in making eligibility decisions creating opportunities for bribes/political clientelism; infrequent eligibility recertification; excessive staff caseloads; breakdown of internal controls; concealment/misrepresentation of information by beneficiaries inadvertently or in collusion with officials, etc.; and management information system (MIS) errors.</p>

Noncompliance with CCT conditions	Possible reasons include: households not complying; services not being available; inaccurate reporting; excessive staff caseloads; cultural, linguistic, and gender factors; inadequate monitoring and reporting procedures; and delays/errors in linking local information with payment processes. Risks include: unwarranted penalization; bribery to overlook noncompliance or validate compliance; political interference with compliance verification; bureaucratic errors.
Inadequate access or quality of health and education services	Typically CCTPs have conditions related to households complying with attending school and participating in specified nutrition and health services. The impact of such services depends on their accessibility and quality. Supply-side shortages, quality inadequacies, and poor coordination among responsible agencies undermine both the integrity and impact of CCTPs.
Payment delays	Irregular, inaccurate and interrupted payments, usually caused by the failure of IT systems and organizational issues such as funds availability, timely authorizations.
Ineffective grievance resolution processes	Typical areas of weaknesses include: no clear pathways about who to contact and how; no protocols for receiving, assessing, and responding to citizen complaints; lack of norms/service standards for tracking and responding to grievances; language and complexity barriers; existence of “informal” grievance systems; and poor communications/relationships between beneficiaries and local level program managers.
Exit	There often remains a lack of clarity and/or transparency regarding when and how beneficiaries “graduate.” This is commonly a result of weaknesses in monitoring systems to update eligibility on an ongoing basis and ensure graduating beneficiaries do not receive support for which they are not entitled. Pathways to exit include: achievement of health and/or education levels; elapsed time; change in poverty status (i.e. no longer below the poverty line). The consequence of weaknesses in this functional area is the inefficient use of public resources. Good practice is to deliver graduating beneficiaries into other productive avenues (e.g. jobs, higher education, healthy family education programs, etc.) so that the goal of intergenerational transmission of poverty is sustained.

Incidence and severity of integrity risks vary from program to program as well as by geographic areas within programs. Risk incidence is also dynamic and rises and subsides from time to time. It is thus very important to periodically assess these risks in any given local area. An assessment of integrity risks is common practice during the design stage of development projects/programs including CCTPs. Periodic updating of risk assessments is also a good practice.

3.2 STATE-LED INTEGRITY RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

CCT policymakers and managers are aware of the integrity risks and internal control and accountability mechanisms that are a standard feature in the design of all CCTPs. Typical mechanisms include:

- Disclosure of information
- Eligibility and targeting processes

- Compliance verification systems, including exit
- Financial management systems, including payment systems
- Internal and external auditing
- Grievance redress systems
- Regular monitoring and reporting on key performance indicators
- Periodic impact evaluations

The World Bank has supported integrity risks and risk management measures in CCTPs in many countries (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru, Indonesia, Tanzania, Paraguay, Yemen, Macedonia). Its lending guidelines require that a governance risk assessment and mitigation plan be included in all loan appraisals. A review of some of these plans provides a good illustration of risks identified and mitigation measures used (Table 2).

TABLE 2: EXAMPLES OF INTEGRITY RISKS AND RISK MITIGATION MEASURES IN THREE WORLD BANK FUNDED POROJECTs FOR CCTPs

Potential Integrity Risks	Risk Mitigation Measures
Lack of consistent and accurate poverty targeting systems (Philippines)	A targeting system aligned with national poverty measuring/mapping systems
Political manipulations to registration process, i.e. clientelism (Brazil)	Centralized determination of eligibility. Periodic re-certification. Social audit. Community involvement in targeting and validation processes.
High inclusion and exclusion errors (Philippines)	Public validation and certification of beneficiaries. Spot checks. Grievance redress system to resolve exclusion and inclusion complaints. Public validation of beneficiary lists through social audit.
Weak linkages between national and local levels (Philippines)	Memorandum of understandings. Interagency coordination bodies.
Inefficiencies in verification of compliance (e.g. false reporting, low access and quality of health and education services due to supply-side shortages, MIS inaccuracies/inefficiencies in capturing and updating information) (Philippines)	Strengthen systems, resources, and incentives of service providers. Integration of data systems. Internal quality control systems to ensure integrity and accuracy of compliance monitoring.
Cash releases do not reach the beneficiaries in the stipulated time and in proper amounts; high transaction costs in collecting benefits (Philippines)	Direct payment to beneficiaries. Third-party spot checks. Internal audits. Payments through banking systems. Innovations such as mobile payment units, phone-based payment systems. Civil society oversight and feedback collection. Social audit.
Indigenous people (IP) unable or unwilling to access the benefits (Mexico)	Indigenous people consultation and participation plan. Adjust program to IP needs.
Elite capture of social accountability processes (Mexico)	Training and financial incentives for community-based social activists/agents.

Source: Project Appraisal Document for CCTPs funded in Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines.

3.3 ASSESSING PERFORMANCE OF INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

A comprehensive methodology for assessing soundness and performance of integrity systems in CCTPs is being developed by Transparency International (Gamba 2015).

Economic Equality in Latin America (EELA) started as a pilot project in 2008 followed by EELA II from 2012–2014. The projects focused on transparency and accountability in conditional cash transfers in seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru). They developed a methodology for use by civil society organizations to assess vulnerability of CCTPs to integrity risks and then used the evidence to engage with implementing authorities to improve integrity. It is hoped that the methodology can be adapted for application in any cash transfer program at the national level. The projects results are reported in the report titled “Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: Promoting Transparency and Accountability” (Gamba 2015).

Key elements of the Transparency International methodology are as follows:

- It divides the CCTP into the following six components: (1) targeting; (2) inclusion; (3) transfer; (4) monitoring of conditions; (5) grievances and complaints; and (6) exit.
- Identification of the most vulnerable components of the CCTP where threats to integrity are more likely. The vulnerability assessment is done using a questionnaire with guiding questions covering eight indicators (shown in Table 3). Analysts, usually TI country chapter staff, complete the questionnaire by assigning a score from 1 to 5 for each question and noting observations and justifications. The result is a ranking of components by vulnerability to integrity risks under five categories: high; medium-high; medium; medium-low; and low.
- Stakeholder and mapping stage. At this stage the focus is on stakeholders in the most vulnerable components identified in the previous stage and examining the relationships among the stakeholders. This allows identification of where the risks are and which institution is responsible or most affected by those risks. Discussion can then focus on remedial measures.

**TABLE 3: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
ASSESSING VULNERABILITY OF CCTP_s TO INTEGRITY RISKS**

Dimension Assessed	Type of Indicator
<p><i>Integrity Mechanisms</i></p> <p>Degree of formalization and compliance with the substantive control functions in the process among participants themselves and by third parties interested in monitoring the activities</p>	<p>1. <i>Transparency (T)</i>. Refers to possibilities (law and/or policy driven) that are available to stakeholders for accessing information concerning the CCTP.</p>
	<p>2. <i>Accountability (A)</i>. Refers to direct control mechanisms among the participants in the process (particularly the beneficiaries) as well as the information exchange mechanisms they use.</p>
	<p>3. <i>Horizontal Control (HC)</i>. Refers to the degree of direct oversight exercised by state institutions and agencies that are independent from the CCTP.</p>
	<p>4. <i>Vertical Control (VC)</i>. Refers to the degree of oversight exercised by citizens, media, and CSOs on the practices and procedures of the component.</p>
<p><i>Integrity Mechanisms Performance</i></p> <p>Degree of effective performance of the substantive control functions of each component</p>	<p>5. <i>Regulation</i>. Existence of formal rules for the component as well as the enforcement of such rules in practice.</p>
	<p>6. <i>Capacity</i>. Degree to which authorities have adequate resources (technical, financial, and human) for achieving objectives.</p>
	<p>7. <i>Effectiveness</i>. The ability to comply with the objectives and achieve the desired results.</p>
	<p>8. <i>Efficiency</i>. The efficient use and administration of available resources to meet their intended purpose.</p>

Source: Author's compilation using the information in (Gamba 2015)

4. Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability in CCTPs

In this chapter, we discuss roles and opportunities for citizen engagement and social accountability initiatives in CCTPs (Section 4.1). *Social accountability initiatives* are defined as programs that feature citizen and civil society organization (CSO) engagement “with policymakers and service providers to bring about greater accountability for and responsiveness to citizens’ needs” (GPSA).⁷

Section 4.2 presents findings of a literature survey conducted in preparation for this paper. Our survey found only a few studies. These included cross-country studies in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa and information on control and accountability mechanisms in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Indonesia. We were disappointed that in contrast to the rich body of CCTP impact evaluation studies we found a dearth of documentation of social accountability initiatives in CCTPs. This lack of CCTP-focused social accountability work is also notable as there is a relatively large amount of literature available on social accountability in public services delivery in health and education services (Joshi 2013; World Bank 2014, Gaventa 2010). This suggests to us a significant knowledge gap that needs greater attention in knowledge gathering and sharing. Since the CCTPs have been around for more than a decade there is enough field experience for analysis.

The final Section 4.3 presents the emerging good practices in use of social accountability based on the international literature survey. Details of use of social accountability initiatives in the Philippines are covered in Chapter 5.

4.1 CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES: ROLE AND OPPORTUNITIES IN CCTPS

As noted above, in this paper, we are using the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) definition of *social accountability initiatives*. **Citizen engagement** is defined by the World Bank as the two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector within the scope of World Bank Group interventions – policy dialogue, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics- which give citizens a stake in decision-making with the objective to improve intermediate and final development outcomes. The spectrum of citizen engagement includes consultation; collaboration/participation; and empowerment. GPSA defines social accountability as programs that feature citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) engagement “with policymakers and service providers to bring about greater accountability for and responsiveness to citizens’ needs.”

In CCTPs the citizens we are primarily concerned about are *the beneficiaries* of the cash transfers. Civil society is broadly defined as including not only CSOs but also business associations, community-based organizations, academia, think tanks, and media.

The conceptual framework for involving two-way interactions between civil society and government authorities can be found in many think pieces and policy documents. For example: (a) the client power concept first promoted by the 2004 World Development Report;

⁷Source: <http://www.thegpsa.org/sa/about/social-accountability>

(b) Asian Development Bank’s (ADB’s) 2013 publication entitled “Empowerment and Public Service Delivery in Developing Asia and Pacific”⁸; (c) the Open Government movement; (d) The Busan Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; and (e) the International Association of Public Participation’s Spectrum of Public Participation.⁹

Conceivably opportunities for social accountability initiatives exist in all components of CCTPs (Table 4).

TABLE 4: AN OPPORTUNITIES FRAMEWORK FOR CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT&SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES IN CCTPs

CCTP Component → Citizen Engagement & Social Accountability Mechanism ↓	Targeting	Compliance	Payment System	Grievance Redress	Information Disclosure	Exit
Enhancing transparency through public access to information	x	x	x	x	X	X
Beneficiary and civil society consultations and feedback mechanisms	x	x	x	x	X	x
Grievance redress mechanisms	x	x	x	x	x	x
Inclusion of beneficiaries/users in decision-making bodies	x		x			x
Independent third-party performance monitoring	x	x	x	x	x	x
Beneficiary and civil society capacity building engagement in one or more of the above	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: Author

x denotes potential opportunity

⁸<http://www.adb.org/publications/empowerment-and-public-service-delivery-developing-asia-and-pacific>.

⁹http://c.yimcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/imported/IAP2%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES IN CCTPs

In this section we survey available literature on integrity risk management systems and social accountability initiatives employed in CCTPs internationally. We begin by noting that there is a dearth of documentation of integrity risk management and social accountability initiatives in CCTPs in contrast to the rich body of CCTP impact evaluation studies and social accountability in public services. We were able to find a few studies covering selected countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Summaries of these are presented below. The studies reviewed and cited are listed in the Bibliography at the end of this report.

In addition, the CCTP in the Philippines was reviewed during a field visit to the Philippines (Annex 2) in 2013 by one of the authors of this paper (Shomikho Raha) as well as by the CCAGG as part of the PTF-funded “The Conditional Cash Transfer Program Watch Project”.

4.2.1 LATIN AMERICA (Transparency International 2015)

This Transparency International study covered integrity risk assessments in CCTPs in seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru). The focus was on assessing integrity risks. The main findings were as follows:

- Vulnerability levels in CCTPs in most countries ranged from medium to medium-high. This was explained by the fact that transparency, accountability, and control rules and standards were not being correctly applied.
- Grievances and complaint components (followed by an exit component) are the ones most often associated with medium-high to high vulnerability in most countries.
- Targeting components were rated medium in the vulnerability level as many programs failed to facilitate citizen monitoring.
- Low or insufficient levels of access to information were observed in all components.
- The most vulnerable relationships are those between beneficiaries and authorities managing the program at the local level and beneficiaries and entities responsible for making payments.

Several findings and recommendations of the study highlight the role social accountability initiatives can and do play in enhancing the integrity of CCTPs. These include:

- CSOs can provide an independent assessment of CCTP vulnerability to integrity risks and effectiveness of state-led integrity risk management systems or other methodologies. The methodology should be robust and credible.
- CSOs can develop deeper insights in issues and solutions by mapping stakeholders in the most vulnerable processes through dialogue.
- CSOs can use the independent risk assessment findings and community views on issues and solutions in the most vulnerable processes (gathered through dialogue with

stakeholders) to constructively engage with CCTP authorities to advocate system design and performance improvements.

4.2.2 LATIN AMERICA (The World Bank 2011)

The World Bank reviewed control and accountability in CCTPs in Latin America. It noted that CCTPs involve distinctive implementation challenges that require effective control and accountability mechanisms (e.g. a large number of beneficiaries, a large quantity of cash payments, high visibility, and shared implementation responsibility across levels and departments in the government). It found that basic control and accountability mechanisms were in place and generally effective in the countries surveyed.

Although social accountability is not explicitly mentioned, the study does point out the role of bottom-up approaches involving beneficiaries, communities, and CSOs. The review concluded by noting the pros and cons of a variety of accountability mechanisms being used by CCTPs in Latin America (see Table 5). It found that using a combination of top-down (e.g. supreme audit institutions, evaluation, and spot checks) and bottom-up (e.g. beneficiary and civil society participation in key processes) approaches is more effective in mitigating risks. It cautioned that citizen engagement and social accountability mechanisms should be used as complements to internal and external audits and not as substitutes for them.

TABLE 5: PROS AND CONS OF CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS IN CCTPs

Top-Down Approaches			
Mechanism	Advantages	Disadvantages	Where Used
Supreme audit institutions	Use country systems, resources, and international standards	Influence/effectiveness depends on their standing in country	Nearly all Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries
Call centers	Focus on client service, which is important in decentralized environments; promote accountability and monitoring	Need to operate very well or can backfire	Argentina, Brazil
Spot checks	Promote accountability, have consequences for corruption	Impact can be limited, cover small sample, expensive	Argentina, Colombia
Crosschecking databases	Inexpensive, quick	Need to have technical prerequisites in place (unique ID, capacity, expertise)	Argentina
Concurrent audits	Provide timely information that can be acted upon in the short-	Can be costly	Argentina, Honduras

	run		
Evaluation	Most basic accountability tool, independent	Provides results after actions have taken place, expensive to do everywhere	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
Bottom-Up Approaches			
Mechanism	Advantages	Disadvantages	Where Used
Commissions with municipal, civil society, and beneficiary participation	Take advantage of skills/ commitments in some places, may be closer to beneficiaries	Depend on volunteers, role needs to be defined carefully, can't make up for general program weaknesses	Argentina, Brazil
Mothers' committees	Contribute to empowerment of beneficiaries, close to clients, strong self-interest	Depend on volunteers, members may become "intermediaries"	Colombia
Civil society organizations	Thirdparty, close to client	Potential conflict of interest	Argentina, El Salvador

Source: World Bank 2011.

4.2.3 THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA (ODI 2013)

The **“Holding Cash Transfers to Account”** study presents participatory research findings on beneficiary and community perceptions of five CCTPs in Africa and the Middle East. The countries covered are: Kenya; Mozambique; Uganda; Yemen; and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Gaza and the West Bank). The study summarizes key features of the CCTP in each country and the extent to which program objectives address empowerment, social justice, social cohesion, and citizenship alongside economic vulnerability. The key primary field research objectives included: (a) beneficiary views, experiences, and perceptions of beneficiaries on CCTP impact and governance; (b) examples of good practices on how to involve beneficiaries and communities in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E); and (c) gathering perceptions and experiences from CCTP implementers.

The main findings and conclusions are as follows:

- In general, awareness was low and frequency and reliability of payment were sources of concern.
- Community facilitators (formal and informal) played an important role in strengthening links from the national down to the grassroots level.
- There was a dearth of participatory M&E despite the potential gains to be had from involving communities in social audits, feedback loops, and other ways of improving CCTP effectiveness.

The study recommended that:

- Targeting needs to be improved
- Payment modalities should be reformed to reduce time
- Investment in awareness raising and capacity building of CCTP implementers should be greater

- Participatory feedback/grievance and M&E mechanisms should be introduced or strengthened

4.2.4 BRAZIL

The *Bolsa Familia* program in Brazil is the largest CTP in the world with over 12 million families. In Brazil's *Bolsa Família* program (BFP), participatory social accountability mechanisms called Social Control Councils help with beneficiary selection and conditionality monitoring (Box 1).

BOX 1: ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR THE SOCIAL CONTROL UNITS OR COUNCILS (SCCs) & CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN THE *BOLSA FAMILIA* OF BRAZIL

- Law 10.836 of 09/01/04—Establishes that social control shall be implemented locally through a council or committee
- Decree 5.209 of 17/09/04—Establishes rules for supervision, social control, and oversight of BFP
- Public Act 246/MDS of 20/05/05—Creates the necessary tools to allow the municipalities to join the BFP. It is linked to the creation or appointment of the social control institution
- Instruction No.1 of 20/05/05—Publicizes the guidelines for composing, formalizing, and operating Social Control Units.

*Source: Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania (National Secretary for Citizen Income). Social Oversight of the *Bolsa Familia* Programme.*¹⁰

Nearly 6,000 SCCs have been created since 2005 to monitor the functioning of the BFP. SCCs are expected to have representatives of local authorities and civil society in equal numbers, following the participatory management model that governs Brazil's social protection policy (MDF). Functions assigned to them are shown in Box 2.

SCCs and beneficiaries, in practice, have only weak powers to represent themselves and their interests. In theory SCCs are very important mechanisms for ensuring social accountability, as pointed out by Linder (2012). However, this potential remains unrealized in Brazil due to a variety of reasons. Reports suggest 60 percent of the SCCs did not regularly visit schools or health facilities to oversee the monitoring of conditionality. In addition, where functional, there was the fear that the local municipal authorities captured SCCs. Indeed, surveys showed that over 70 percent of members were supporters of the local mayor. Many observers agree that processes for selecting SCC members were not transparent and claim social control of the BFP is largely ineffective. The World Bank also recognized the weaknesses in SCCs as an area for improvement in its risk assessment as part of its appraisal of the BFP.

¹⁰See more at: <http://ella.practicalaction.org/node/1041#sthash.nj2PGMhB.dpuf>.

BOX 2: FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC IN THE BFP IN BRAZIL

The most important specific functions are:

- Verify municipal *cadastro* targeting
- Evaluate the list of BFP beneficiaries
- Monitor local provision of health and education services
- Verify local benefits management and monitoring of conditionalities

On single registry:

- Check whether families which are poor or extremely poor in the municipality are registered
- Verify whether the poorest regions in the municipality were prioritized in the central registration
- Check whether the registered data reflect the reality of the lives of the families included
- Check which are the means adopted by the local public authorities to register and control the authenticity of information
- Verify whether there are procedures for updating registered data

On management of benefits:

- Check whether poor or extremely poor families included in the single registry benefited from the BFP
- Periodically evaluate the list of beneficiaries of the BFP
- Monitor through the system of management of benefits (consultation module) the management actions of the benefits (suspension, re-activation, cancelling, re-admission) of the BFP

To improve the functioning of SCCs, BFP managers have taken actions to strengthen them by improving SCC access to information, capacity building of SCC members, and opening up information flows from SCCs to the central office on SCCs monitoring activities and findings (MDF). Linder has proposed the following indicators to monitor the performance of SCCs that can also serve as good practices for monitoring the functioning of similar participatory targeting, grievance redress, and M&E mechanisms at local levels:

- Percent representation of members of civil society and of beneficiaries on each SCC. Goal should be to make the SCC independent of the local officials (e.g. municipality) including elected representatives (e.g. mayor).
- An indicator to measure the extent to which the SCC is functioning and meeting on a regular basis as required.
- An indicator to measure the extent to which members have received standardized information of their role and taken part in the specified amount of training.
- An indicator to assess the extent to which access to beneficiary lists is given to the SCC regularly and in a timely manner.
- An indicator to measure the extent of dissemination of information about the SCC and the extent of public and beneficiary awareness of the SCC.

- An indicator to measure the extent to which the SCC interacts with the central office and to ensure the SCC president knows who to contact and how to proceed in case of irregularities or problems.

The absence of effective SCCs (social organizations) has left beneficiaries without a means of representation. The lack of organization and communication at the lowest level has made it more difficult for beneficiaries to receive information about the BFP and to oversee and monitor it (Hevia de la Jara 2010). This has exacerbated symmetries of power between managers/providers and beneficiaries and has made it more difficult for them to take action against unjust practices in case of need. Hevia de la Jara recommends that “for the positive effects of CCTs to reach the poorest population in Latin American countries, there is a need to strengthen and promote channels for civic involvement and social accountability, wherein the poor are no longer considered part of the problem but rather become engaged actors who are part of the solution.”

In a study of citizen-driven efforts to promote accountability in three Northeastern cities in Brazil it was found that beneficiary direct participation in such efforts was low (Sugiyama 2013). This reinforces the conclusion that despite good intentions social accountability mechanisms in Brazil are not yet effective, integrity assurance is dependent on program managers, and state-led oversight institutions and beneficiary voice in program performance is low.

Other noteworthy features of the BFP include: publication of beneficiary lists on the government transparency portal website; telephone hotlines—one for inquiries from local BFP managers on all aspects of BFP regulations and procedures and one for queries from beneficiaries and program managers; and an Ombudsman who helps resolve general complaints from the public. These features, especially publication of beneficiary lists, can be considered good practices.

4.2.5 MEXICO

Oportunidades (Opportunities) program in Mexico is the oldest (17 years+) CCTP in the world. In 2014 its scope was expanded and the program was rebranded as *Prospera*.

The CCTP in Mexico uses Community Promotion Committees (*Comunitaria*, CPCs) to establish a link between the beneficiary families and staff of health services, education institutions, and the National Coordination. The CPCs can be used by beneficiaries to channel their requests and suggestions, foster community development, and promote social accountability and transparency of the program. CPCs are established in each community to engage beneficiaries in the management and monitoring of the CCTP. The members are volunteers selected among the beneficiaries. According to one assessment the existence of clientelism, especially closer to elections, has resulted in CPCs comprising members who have used political associations to corrupt the independent status of this mechanism (Hevia de la Jara 2008).

CCTP in Mexico periodically seeks beneficiary feedback to improve the program. It uses biannual surveys (Sentinel Surveys) to collect stakeholders’ opinions and knowledge about the program (World Bank 2010, 2013). In 2014, *Prospera* office organized an “Exercise of Citizen Participation” with the intention to drive improvements in governance and in fighting corruption. CPC members, representatives of civil society and academics were in attendance. They presented various proposals for improving the program (*Prospera* www.prospera.gob.mx).

Beyond the CPCs and periodic feedback collection, the *Oportunidades* program is regarded as having very weak relations with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. Hevia de la Jara found that inadequate design of citizen participation and oversight mechanisms have contributed to their ineffectiveness. He also found that many CSOs were not concerned with overseeing the CCTP as many of their members were involved in its management. He concludes, “effective prevention, control and punishment of abuse of authority requires an institutional structure capable of embodying both direct [on part of family] and collective actions to oversee the program’s performance” (Hevia de la Jara 2008).

Ineffective civil society participation in the CCTP was also the finding of a recent research study (Velasco and Gonzales 2012). This study focused on the perceptions of civil society organizations with regard to the *Oportunidades* program mechanisms for fostering participation and building citizenship. Based on interviews with representatives from 42 CSOs that work in poor communities in different parts of the country, the authors observe that these organizations see the beneficiaries’ participation as passive and not geared toward creating a sense of civic responsibility. What is more, the participation of CSOs has itself been minimal.

Both studies (Hevia de la Jara and Velasco and Gonzales) emphasize that civil society participation has an important role to play in preventing the program from being used for clientelism and for empowering beneficiaries. They recommend that in such circumstances, there is an even greater need to disseminate information to beneficiaries as a means to empower them, limit administrative discretion, and further enhance transparency and accountability.

Social accountability in the Mexican CCTP is regarded as a weak point. This is evident from the findings of *Transparencia Mexicana (TM) Initiative for the Institutional Strengthening of Social Programs in Mexico (IPRO)*.¹¹ The IPRO program created a database on different dimensions of about 2,900 social policies and programs. It mapped four categories (rules and procedures, transparency and accountability mechanisms, control and accountability mechanisms, and citizen participation mechanisms) of institutional strength of social programmes through 20 attributes. The key findings and results (Paola 2015) were:

- Only one out of two social programs make their budget and expenditures report public and available to the citizens.
- Only half of the social programs analysed have any kind of independent evaluation.
- Less than half of social programs in Mexico include social participation of any kind. Almost 47% feature social audit. Citizen participation in the formulation of social programs occurs in 39.3% of them. Less than half the programs include citizen participation in execution. Finally, social participation in the evaluation happens in 38.2% of social programs nationally.
- Accountability and transparency mechanisms are not fully implemented despite Mexico having one of the most advanced laws and being a member of Open Government Partnership. The lack of transparency and accountability of social programmes has resulted in political abuse during electoral periods.

¹¹ This section on IPRO findings and results is based on a contribution by Mr. Paola Palacios of Transparency Mexico in a note titled “Beyond Prospera – Social Programs in Mexico”. This valuable contribution is gratefully acknowledged. For more information please see www.programassociales.org.mx.

- Awareness of social programs is low and in some cases, potential target population does not know they exist or how do they work.
- Finally, and most importantly, there have been federal and local efforts to improve the institutionalization of social programmes through specific changes in the attributes that IPRO has measured.

4.2.6 PERU

The Peru CCTP *JUNTOS* (meaning “together”) was launched in 2005. It covers nearly 3 million beneficiaries.

Information could be found on three social accountability mechanisms in use in the CCTP:

- **Disclosure of information.** Transparency of program information is promoted through its web page. Information available includes: institutional structure; regulations; board composition; reports; budget information; database of districts selected; and beneficiaries by districts. However, problems were reported in getting information on socioeconomic characteristics of households, verification of fulfillment of conditions, and low awareness among the beneficiaries and local communities about the eligibility criteria and the conditions to be fulfilled (U4 2010).
- **A National Committee for Public Oversight and Transparency.** The Committee is chaired by a representative of the President and includes representatives from churches, regional and local governments, National Association of Municipalities of Peru, civil society, and business associations. There are over 600 local committees (*Comités de Vigilancia*). These committees identify implementation issues through surveys and complaints, and make recommendations to the Executive Council of the CCTP. The local assemblies play a role in improving targeting. However, communities not being properly prepared to play this role have hampered this effort. The targeting system is reported to experience leakages and complaints about inclusion and exit. Civil society participation has contributed to transparency in the program implementation and targeting. Nonetheless, because of political reasons, *JUNTOS* suffers from design and management problems (U4 2010).
- *JUNTOS* uses **local promoters** to better manage risks associated with the fulfillment of co-responsibilities in health and education. The accountability relationship between beneficiaries and education and health institutions are reported to be weak. To rectify this the recruitment and training of local promoters is being expanded (World Bank 2012).

The U4 paper on the assessment of the JUNTOS program recommends strong surveillance mechanisms involving all key stakeholders such as political actors, government institutions, CSOs and media. Surveillance strategies should include: prioritization of programs to be monitored; disclosure of all key information on detailed budget, lists of beneficiaries, principles and mechanisms for targeting and selection of beneficiaries, allocation of resources, internal rules and norms, and complaint mechanism; conditions and safeguards for political use of program; and systematization of surveillance process.

4.2.7 INDONESIA

Indonesia launched a pilot CCTP called *Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)* in 2007. By 2012 it is reported to have covered 1.5 million households compared to nearly 60 million eligible households in Indonesia. The program expanded to over 4 million households by 2014. It remains one of many social assistance programs in Indonesia (Nazara and Ragayu 2013).

An impact evaluation using a randomized controlled trial revealed evidence on the positive impacts of the PKH on health and education outcomes. The evaluation also found that there were a number of process bottlenecks that resulted in the lack of enforcement of conditionality, incorrect payments, and confusion about co-responsibilities (World Bank 2012).

The evaluation highlighted the crucial role being played by facilitators in PKH success. PKH facilitators were noted to be the primary interface between the PKH program and households and typically the first source of information for households on PKH expectations and responsibilities. However, standards of facilitation varied, partly because some facilitators must cover much more ground but also because skills and knowledge vary widely. Among its recommendations, the report mentioned that facilitators could benefit from better organization and frequent skill upgrading.

4.3 GOOD PRACTICES IN USE OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS IN CCTPs

In our review of the available studies one significant point stands out: State-led integrity risk management measures in CCTPs are not enough and most governments and analysts recommend that mechanisms that engage citizens, including social accountability approaches, be used to complement the state-led efforts. The bibliography of this report lists relevant studies on CCTPs covering selected countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. The Philippines has the world's third largest CCTP with 4 million beneficiary households. Integrity and social accountability initiatives in the Philippines CCTP are covered in detail in the next chapter.

Based on the above literature review we identified the following good practices and lessons for greater engagement of citizens, CSOs and the use of social accountability initiatives in CCTPs.

- *CSOs and civil society volunteers can be important facilitators in implementation of the CCTP, by better linking authorities and beneficiaries.* Community facilitators (formal and informal) play an important intermediary role at the local level as well as in linking the grassroots to the national level (see cases from the Middle East and Africa, as well as Indonesia, and Peru in this report). However, their effectiveness can vary depending on the facilitators' caseload, skills, and knowledge. The effectiveness of such intermediation can be undermined when authorities within the CCTPs have weak relations with CSOs, since both sides may be wary of collaborating with each other due to the time and skills required. This is especially true at the local level. To counter such a possibility, the authorities need to take measures for CSOs to genuinely participate in program design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
- *Collaboration with citizen beneficiaries and civil society in CCTP decision-making processes is a good practice but has risks that need to be managed.* Several countries have set up collaborative decision-making bodies involving civil society,

community, and beneficiary representatives (e.g. Brazil, Peru, Philippines). They represent a good practice in helping beneficiaries access relevant program information, comply with their responsibilities, monitor program performance, provide feedback, and seek remedial actions against unjust practices. However, experience suggests that they can be effective only when the oversight of local government and political interference are limited, and performance-monitoring indicators are used. One study (Linder 2012) has proposed indicators to monitor performance of collaborative mechanisms in Brazil. They are relevant for other countries as well. Indicators would measure:

- Percentage of members of CSOs and of beneficiaries
 - Extent to which the mechanisms are functioning and meeting
 - Extent to which members have received standardized information of their role and taken part in a specified amount of training
 - Extent to which beneficiary lists are available regularly and timely
 - Extent of dissemination of information and public and beneficiary awareness of the collaborative mechanism
 - Extent to which local bodies interact with the central office
 - Extent to which local offices know who to contact and how to proceed in case of irregularities or problems
- *Quality and accessibility of information disclosed on CCTPs is a key determinant of social accountability initiatives and CSOs should assess the availability of information and advocate for greater transparency.* The “good practice” range of disclosed information (Brazil, Peru) includes: institutional structure; regulations; board composition; reports; budget information; database of local government units (LGUs) selected and beneficiaries by LGUs; and principles and mechanisms for the targeting and selection of beneficiaries, allocation of resources, internal rules and norms, and complaint mechanisms.
 - *Civil society participation improves the responsiveness of grievance reporting and other beneficiary feedback mechanisms by raising awareness and facilitating grievance filing and follow-up* (Philippines, Mexico). Grievance redress mechanisms are key components of all CCTPs. However, their performance varies over time and locations. CSOs can play an important role in checking performance and advocating improvements. Mexico’s use of biannual surveys to collect stakeholders’ opinions and knowledge about the CCTPs constitutes a good practice example. In 2014, the Mexican CCTP organized an “Exercise of Citizen Participation” with the intention to drive improvements in governance and in fighting corruption. Representatives of local-level collaborative committees, civil society, and academics were in attendance. They tabled various proposals for improving the program.
 - *Independent third-party monitoring by CSOs of the effectiveness of state-led integrity assurance systems is essential to enhance the integrity of CCTPs.* The major mechanisms for ensuring integrity in a cash transfer program are those established by government to oversee, monitor, and audit. Since these typically are not sufficient and/or function poorly, they need to be complemented by CSO monitoring, both of the delivery of the CCTPs and the performance of governments’ own oversight mechanisms for CCTPs (World Bank, Peru).

BOX 3: EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES TO IMPROVE TARGETING OF BENEFICIARIES IN CCTs

- In Brazil, the *Bolsa Familia* program uses several mechanisms to reward and improve municipalities' performance in managing the roster of beneficiaries. Municipalities receive performance-based financial incentives in the form of administrative cost subsidies to partially reimburse the cost of implementing a biannual recertification of eligibility of beneficiaries.
- In Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, the CCTPs coordinate with other institutions to reduce the number of poor people without documentation. This, in turn, allows beneficiaries to become eligible, reducing the risk of exclusion errors.
- In Jamaica, the government has instituted several mechanisms to reduce targeting errors (inclusion and exclusion), including the use of an objective and transparent Beneficiary Identification System (BIS) now being improved to produce a new scoring formula based on the latest household survey, home visits, recertification, database crosschecks, and the establishment of appeals committees to reassess the situation of households at the margin of eligibility.

Source: Adapted from World Bank, LAC 2011

- *Social accountability initiatives can be an effective complement to state-led control, but such accountability mechanisms engaging citizens/CSOs should not substitute existing internal management information systems of the CCTP already in use.* Several studies (World Bank, TI International, U-4) found that using a combination of top-down (e.g. supreme audit institutions, evaluation, spot checks) and bottom-up (e.g. beneficiary and civil society participation in key processes) approaches is most effective in mitigating risks. They caution that social accountability tools should be used as complements to internal and external audits and not as substitutes.
- *For greater effectiveness social accountability initiatives should be operationally and financially independent of CCTP implementing agencies.* As noted above collaboration by citizens and CSOs to in decision making and delivery of CCTP services can add value by enhancing responsiveness and integrity of CCTPs. However, once CSOs are part of implementation (and sometimes paid by government CCTP implementing agency) they are not in a position to do social accountability work to hold the implementing agency accountable. The GPSA provides a good practice model whereby constructive engagement between government implementing authorities is required but the funding for GPSA grantees does not flow through the implementing agencies. This arrangement assures independence and objectivity. The *i-Pantawid project*, for which this paper has been produced, is a good example of such an arrangement. A Memorandum of Understanding between the CCAGG and DSWD assures constructive engagement and cooperation but in all other respects CCAGG has operational and financial independence from DSWD. One way for countries to adopt this good practice is to consider collaboration between state oversight agencies and CSOs to carry out social accountability work to complement

the work of oversight agencies. A good practice example is growing practice of participatory audits being sponsored by Supreme Audit Institutions.

We found a relative dearth of studies independently assessing performance of CCTP integrity risk management in general and the use and impact of social accountability approaches in CCTPs in particular. This is in contrast with there is a rich body of CCTP impact evaluation studies that have been surveyed as part of the World Bank study on State of Safety Nets. We believe that there is much more information than reviewed for this paper that could be collected and analyzed for lessons and good practices in the use of social accountability initiatives for enhancing the integrity of CCTPs.

We recommend that the worldwide financiers of CCTPs (e.g. the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral development agencies) sponsor an international knowledge sharing and peer-learning program on the use of social accountability approaches in CCTPs. As far as we could determine the last international conference on CCTPs, organized by the World Bank, took place in 2006. The recent pioneering study by Transparency International (Gamba 2015) is a useful beginning but is limited to Latin America and addresses overall integrity with no specific mention of independent third party social accountability initiatives.

5. Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability in the Philippines CCTP

In this chapter we will present an overview of CCTP in the Philippines, called the Pantawid Pamilya program for short (Section 5.1). We include a discussion of the main control and accountability mechanism being used (Section 5.2). We present an assessment of effectiveness of integrity risk management in the Pantawid Pamilya program (Section 5.3). The chapter ends with recommendations to DSWD, CSOs, Donors and CCAGG for improving and expanding use of social accountability interventions to improve integrity of Pantawid Pamilya program (Section 5.4).

5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM IN THE PHILIPPINES

The CCTP in the Philippines, Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya), was introduced in 2007 and has grown into the government's flagship poverty reduction program. The Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is implementing it as the nodal agency. It targets poor households with children and/or pregnant women. The beneficiaries should comply with the following conditions:

- Pregnant women must avail pre- and post-natal care and be attended during childbirth by a trained health professional
- Parents must attend Family Development Sessions (FDSs)
- 0- to 5-year-old children must receive regular preventive health check-ups and vaccines
- 3- to 5-year-old children must attend daycare or preschool classes at least 85 percent of the time
- 6- to 14-year-old children must enroll in elementary or high school and must attend at least 85 percent of the time
- 6- to 14-year-old children must receive deworming pills twice a year

As of September 30, 2014 the P4 program covered over 4 million households (out of 5.2 million poor identified by the national poverty targeting mechanism) in 1,483 municipalities and 144 cities in 80 provinces.¹² In 2014, the total budget allocation was about US\$1.4 billion. This makes it the third largest CCTP in the world after the *Bolsa Familia* program in Brazil and the *Oportunidades* program in Mexico.

Emerging evidence is that the CCTP in the Philippines is succeeding in achieving its objectives. The World Bank research department evaluated the impact of the P4 implementation phase 1 (2008–2009) and found that overall the program was meeting its objectives (World Bank, July 2014). The program was found to be successful in keeping poor children in school by increasing enrollment among younger children (3 to 11 years old) and increasing attendance among 6 to 17 year olds, but did not have a significant impact on increasing enrollment on older children aged 12 to 17 years old. It also was meeting its

¹² DSWD website Progress Report as of September 30, 2014. <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/3q2014.pdf>.

objective of keeping poor children healthy and enabling poor households to increase their investments in meeting the health and education needs of their children. The report observed that the impacts found are comparable to other CCTPs around the world at this stage of program maturity, particularly in terms of the program's achievements in improved health service use and school enrollment.

A more recent report (DSWD, November 2014) on "Keeping Children Healthy and in School" also found that the Pantawid Pamilya program is on track in keeping children healthy and in school. This study was commissioned by the DSWD and supported by financial and technical resources by the ADB, the government of Australia, the Philippines Institute of Development Studies, and the World Bank. Key findings of the study are that the Pantawid Pamilya:

- Encourages trial use of modern family planning methods
- Promotes facility-based deliveries and access to professional postnatal care
- Improves children's access to some key healthcare services
- Keeps older children in school. Keeping the high school-aged cohort in school is particularly important because this is when children are more likely to drop out of school in order to work
- Increases households' investments in education
- Does not encourage dependency or spending more on vice goods
- Allows a parent to aspire for a better future for their children

The study also found that the Pantawid Pamilya program still faces some challenges that it needs to address. "It has to ensure that children receive full immunization following the Department of Health-prescribed schedule of vaccinations, improve deworming outreach to comply with the prescribed two pills per year, achieve the prescribed number of antenatal check-ups for mothers, and encourage wider use of PhilHealth insurance that is commensurate to coverage. These challenges may be attributed to the lack of adequate services to meet the rapid expansion of the program to serve more poor households, and/or due to the beneficiaries' lack of appreciation of the importance of specific interventions"(DSWD 2014).

5.2 CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS IN THE CCTP

The Pantawid Pamilya program uses several control and accountability mechanisms that were developed after reviewing the experiences of Latin American countries and after extensive consultation with civil society and other stakeholders in the Philippines. These include:

- *A targeting system* using geographic (to set priority areas) and proxy means tests.
- *A Compliance Verification System* to monitor on a monthly basis beneficiary compliance with the conditions for cash transfer, update databases, and process payments.
- *A Grievances Redress System* to capture and resolve grievances effectively and expeditiously in a transparent manner. It is intended to provide a venue for beneficiaries and the public at large to air their concerns, complaints, and suggestions to improve the program.
- *An Update System* to gather, validate, report, and record the changes that have occurred on the status or condition of any member of the beneficiary household while under the program.

- *SMS and Voice hotlines* to respond to queries and complaints regarding database of families in need of social protection programs and services (*Listahanan*).
- *A Family Development Sessions (FDS)* program contracted out to CSOs. FDS helped educate households on responsibilities and benefits of compliance with conditions.
- *Spot checks* by an independent institution to assess all major steps in the Pantawid Pamilya process, including: (1) payment; (2) dissemination, training, and orientation; (3) verification of compliance; (4) availability of supply-side services; and (5) the grievance redress system.
- *Random supervision and financial audits* by DSWD to check that grant payments are according to compliance verification of conditions.
- *A National Advisory Committee* comprising all relevant departments of the government to ensure interagency coordination. Similarly *Municipal Advisory Committees (MACs)* to ensure coordination at the local level.
- *An Independent Monitoring and Advisory Committee* composed of eminent persons from civil society.
- *External audit* by the Commission of Audit (COA)—the supreme audit institution in the Philippines.
- *Annual inquiry on the status of CCTP implementation by Congress of the Philippines* during the deliberation of the budget
- *Involvement of CSOs* to strengthen third-party monitoring.

Design considerations in most of these systems are explained in a 2011 World Bank publication called *Building Governance and Anti-Corruption in the Philippines' Conditional Cash Transfer Program* (Arulpragasam 2010).

The Pantawid Pamilya has also given importance to defining roles and responsibilities in the institutional arrangements for program implementation through a series of government administrative orders.¹³ This institutional structure helps ensure that the responsibilities and lines of authority are clear between agencies and levels of government in terms of who is expected to do what. The national, regional, and municipal advisory committees are mandated to ensure coordination between relevant government departments and ensure the availability of health and education services in the targeted areas. These municipal advisory committees (MACs) are important in the program design to bring in community participation in the oversight of the CCTP. A MAC is organized in all Pantawid Pamilya municipalities, with the mayor as chair and with the participation of relevant municipal-level representatives of the National Advisory Committee (NAC) member-agencies.¹⁴ The Advisory Councils at each level also serve as the Grievance Committee to handle public complaints.

Table 6 is a summary of the risks and mitigation measures in the P4 program. The table is reproduced from the World Bank [case study](#) of Grievance Redress System in the P4.

¹³ The institutional arrangement among government agencies in the implementation of Pantawid Pamilya was formalized in the following: Memorandum Circular 9 Series of 2007, Creating the Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino (APP) Program National Advisory Committees and Defining Their Roles and Responsibilities; Administrative Order 16, Series of 2008, Guidelines on the Implementation of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya); and Joint Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2009, Defining the Institutional Arrangements for the Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya).

¹⁴ The NAC comprises representatives from the DSWD, National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and the National Nutrition Council.

TABLE6: RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES IN PATAWID PAMILYA

Implementation Process	Potential Risks	Mitigation Measures
<p>Geographic targeting sets priority areas in which program is rolled out in phases based on incidence of poverty</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government officials or politicians may implement the CCTP in favored areas (corruption) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Geographic areas are selected based on official statistics on poverty incidence Corruption cases are referred to the GRS Unit in NPMO or Regional Grievance Committees
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Politicians may claim credit for the CCTP to manipulate their constituency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass communication efforts, especially before elections, inform citizens of this national, politically unbiased program
<p>A supply-side assessment ensures that beneficiaries have access to health and education services</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate education and health services do not allow beneficiaries to comply with program conditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DSWD conducts supply-side assessment Local government units commit to adequate provision through memorandum of agreement
<p>Selection of poor households is based on a proxy means test and with children/pregnant women to be eligible beneficiaries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Households may provide false information to be eligible for the program (fraud) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beneficiary selection is strictly based on proxy means test
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inclusion errors which include non-poor in the program Exclusion errors which exclude actual poor from the program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A GRS receives grievances related to inclusion/exclusion errors Verification of data from household assessments to rectify errors
<p>Registration of beneficiary households through community assembly</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Politician may register supporters or exclude opponents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Households are centrally selected by the DSWD based on standardized criteria and without political interference.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household may not report updated status to keep eligibility for receiving CCT grants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expedited updates capture changes in beneficiaries' eligibility status Education and health facilities are monitored
<p>Compliance verification through schools and health centers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schools and health centers may not report compliance verification of beneficiaries Fraud and error in filling out and encoding compliance verification forms Staffing and MIS may not be adequate to handle compliance processing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A GRS receives compliance-related grievances that investigates whether beneficiaries actually complied with program conditions or not

Payments generated based on the results of compliance verification; grants received via cash card or over the counter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak processing capacity of implementation agency and financial conduits may result in delay and inaccuracy in payout to beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening and diversifying financial conduits to deliver grants to beneficiaries efficiently and timely
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beneficiaries may be charged illegal fees or obliged to give shares to others without any diligent reasons (extortion) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A GRS receives payment-related complaints, which are validated with payroll, compliance results, and beneficiaries' information; grants are retroactively processed to beneficiaries as needed based on validation.

Source: World Bank, June 2014, based on inputs from Arulpragasam et al. (2011).

5.3 ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE PANTAWID PAMILYA PROGRAM

The performance assessment presented here is based on the findings of: (a) fieldwork in the Abra area by a PTF Adviser¹⁵ in July 2013 (detailed report in Annex 2) and (b) eight independent assessments of integrity risks and their mitigation (see the following list). Main findings and conclusions of these studies are summarized in this section. The small number of independent assessments was disappointing for us given the government's open door policy toward third party monitoring and CSOs Commitment pledge mentioned above. We expected to find many more studies in public domain.

1. Sectoral Performance Audit by the Commission of Audit (COA 2011)
2. Accountability Mechanisms in the Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs by Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department, the Philippines (Asuncion 2011)
3. A 2012 World Bank assessment of the governance risks in Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino program conducting in consideration of additional financing for the program (World Bank 2012)
4. The Conditional Cash Transfer Program Watch Project by Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government- funded by PTF (CCAGG 2012)
5. Applied Social Accountability at the Community Level by RECITE – funded by PTF (2013-14)
6. Grievance Redress System in the Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the Philippines (World Bank 2014)
7. Citizen Watchdog for Good Governance: A Research and Monitoring Project for DSWD Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Cagayan de Oro City(GROUP, Inc.2014)
8. Consolidated Annual Audit Report on the DSWD for the year ended December 2013. Commission on Audit, Republic of the Philippines (COA 2014)

Sectoral Performance Audit by COA (Asuncion 2011).The audit was conducted to determine whether the program is effectively implemented, taking into consideration selection of

¹⁵ PTF Adviser Dr. Shomikho Raha visited Abra, Philippine in July 2013 and assessed the functioning of accountability mechanisms in the Pantawid Pamilya program. He has since joined the World Bank as a Governance Specialist (sraha@worldbank.org).

beneficiaries, fund utilization, and monitoring of beneficiaries' compliance with program conditions. The period covered was 2007–2009 in seven municipalities and four cities in 3 provinces and the National Capital Region. The audit found deficiencies in all functional areas audited and recommended administrative measures to fix them.

Accountability Mechanisms in the Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (Asuncion 2011). This paper was prepared as a policy brief for the Philippines Congress (parliamentary body). It reviewed the administrative systems and challenges involved in the Pantawid Pamilya program. It revealed integrity risks and made suggestions to mitigate these risks. It concluded that there are implementation issues that urgently need government attention so as to mitigate the risks of error, fraud, and corruption. It noted that the program has the potential to achieve its poverty reduction objectives as shown by good compliance rates of beneficiary households on education and health conditions. It concluded that all of these, however, “depend on the efficient delivery of services within the program. The DSWD should therefore ensure the effective implementation of the program by putting in place accountability mechanisms to achieve the expected goals.”

The World Bank assessed the governance risks in the P4 program in 2012 when approving additional financing for the P4 program and noted: “Accountability and oversight, and approval and authorization of processes are in place and are functional. DSWD has also been conducting regular field visits, systematic Spot Checks, and has a functioning Grievance Redress System in place. Despite these functioning systems, there are still risks of local level manipulation of beneficiary selection, verification of eligibility, and management of grants,” (World Bank 2012).

The Conditional Cash Transfer Program Watch Project (CCAGG 2012). This project was funded by PTF and implemented by a CSO (CCAGG) during 2011–2012 in 12 municipalities in the Abra province. It has two objectives: the inclusion of the poorest of the poor as beneficiaries of the program; and to ensure that government (public) money is not wasted. The findings and results of the CCTP Watch Project were as follows:

- Confirmed the list of beneficiaries was largely accurate in targeting the poor but inclusion and exclusions errors were found
- Validated the level of compliance of beneficiaries in meeting the CCTP conditions as significantly high in most cases
- Highlighted specific instances of underpayment to beneficiaries
- Highlighted cases of minor grievances and issues faced by parents and beneficiaries
- Discovered several *barangays* (villages) that were not holding Family Development Sessions
- Engaged constructively with DSWD local offices to remedy the deficiencies found
- Developed community monitoring and feedback tools
- Revealed supply-side weaknesses (such as fewer schools and less accessible clinics) contributing to household noncompliance
- Discovered difficulties in transferring cash to the beneficiaries in the absence of ATMs or bank branches

Applied Social Accountability at the Community Level by RECITE (2013-14). This PTF funded project demonstrated how the Family Development Sessions of the CCT program can be used to prepare citizens for a larger role in social accountability at the community level. Ninety-seven Parent Leaders were trained as community facilitators. These leaders helped improve compliance. Score-cards were developed to monitor health and education services performance and results were shared with service providers resulting in service

improvements.

Citizen Watchdog for Good Governance: A Research and Monitoring Project for DSWD Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Cagayan de Oro City by GROUP, Inc. (2014). In this PTF funded subproject the CSO GROUP, Inc. aimed to gain a better understanding of shortfalls in benefits received by CCT beneficiaries and the poverty impact of the CCT program. This was to be achieved through an extensive survey and social accountability activities. The monitoring found that: most eligible women do not visit Barangay health visits for check-ups; absences from school were widespread; and inclusion errors were about 2%. The subproject resulted in a series of policy recommendations to national government agencies (especially DSWD, DOH and DepEd), agencies of the city government of Cagayan de Oro, and CSOs.

Grievance Redress System (GRS) in the Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the Philippines (World Bank, June 2014). The objectives of this case study are to assess results, strengths, and areas of improvement of the Grievance Redress System in 4P and share the experience with CCTP and GRS practitioners' in the Philippines and worldwide. During 2009–2013, the GRS has received over 485,000 grievances (varying between 1.6 to 5.5 percent of beneficiary households). In addition, more than 300,000 complaints claimed in 2013 that they were excluded from P4 by error; these complaints are handled separately from GRS through the targeting system; local governments can file exclusion appeals. These numbers suggest that the GRS is effective. *Key strengths of the GRS* were noted as: strong government commitment; motivated and well-trained staff; multiple channels; efficient processing procedures; regular reporting and monitoring; good communications; and trust between officials and beneficiaries. *Areas noted for improvement* were: better user friendliness; better direct communication with complainant; better timeliness; better analysis of GRS data to improve systems; and enhanced staff training.

The Annual and Value for Money Audit of DSWD by the Commission of Audit (COA 2014). This audit reviewed accounts and operations of the DSWD (implementing agency for the Pantawid Pamilya program among others) and performed a value-of-money audit on the program aimed at ascertaining the economy and efficiency of its implementation. The key audit observations, being clarified and addressed by the DSWD, related to the Pantawid Pamilya program were as follows:

- Nonpayment to beneficiaries of the released/transferred funds
- Double entries in the program database/payroll
- Inadequate documentation of refunds and/or unclaimed grants
- Household beneficiaries not found in the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction Programs (NHTS-PR) creating potential for unauthorized/unnecessary expenditures
- Discrepancies between NHTS-PR database vis-à-vis regular Pantawid Pamilya payroll
- Deficiencies in beneficiary validation (inclusion errors)

The findings of these independent reviews indicate that the control and accountability mechanisms in the Pantawid Pamilya program work reasonably well but deficiencies exist and integrity risks mitigation can be improved. A field review by PTF (Annex 2), as well as the findings of the above independent studies of accountability system performance, found that integrity risks were present in all key functional areas: targeting; compliance verification; benefit payments; grievance redress; exit; delivery of services; and interagency

coordination mechanisms, particularly at the municipal level. Targeting errors and access to and quality of health and education services seem to be areas of particular concern.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN INTEGRITY RISK MANAGEMENT

Recommendations to improve integrity risk management, presented in this section, are driven by the findings that investing in social accountability initiatives in the Pantawid Pamilya program can generate significant financial and economic returns on public investment being made in this program. As noted in the section 5.3 above, the integrity risk management system in the Philippines is working reasonably well but at the same time the abovementioned independent assessments have revealed deficiencies exist in area such as: inclusion and exclusion errors; compliance verification; benefit payments; and quality of health and education services.

Significant opportunities thus exist to increase financial returns from improving integrity risk management of the program. For example, as a result of a \$35,000 PTF grant to CCAGG for a CCT Watch project \$95,500 in erroneous payments to ineligible beneficiaries were discovered and rectified (CCAGG 2012). While it can be argued that eventually the DSWD eligibility update system would have discovered these errors, the fact remains that they existed for several years until discovered by CCAGG.

In addition to the financial returns of improving integrity risk management, there are also significant economic returns due to improvements in poverty alleviation as exclusion errors are discovered and rectified. The CCAGG project mentioned above also discovered and helped rectify exclusion errors. Without CCAGG intervention about 10 percent of the poor households in the project area would have been left behind in this important poverty alleviation program. It is clear that this social accountability initiative generated returns that were several times higher than the investment. Other significant results/impacts of social accountability initiatives include improvements in compliance with co-responsibilities and grievance resolution and enhanced public trust and support due to independent third party monitoring. The CCAGG project also contributed in all of these areas and the scaled-up *I-PANTAWID* project funded by GPSA is projected to produce similar results.

The enabling environment for civil society to extensively engage in improving implementation and integrity risk management of CCTP in the Philippines exists. The government of the Philippines recognizes the value added of social accountability initiatives in the Open Government Action Plan¹⁶. More specifically:

- 1. The DSWD regards the CSO and volunteer partners as the “third eye” of the DSWD.**¹⁷ The program uses the current government’s platform of Good Governance and Poverty Reduction to facilitate public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements of cooperation between the DSWD and CSOs for the purpose of delivering basic social services to the poor, implementing development projects of the government, and instituting transparency and accountability mechanisms to fight corruption. According

¹⁶ Philippines is a founding member of the Open Government Partnership (<http://www.opengovpartnership.org>) and has published an action plan that can be accessed at <http://www.gov.ph/2012-philippine-government-action-plan/>.

¹⁷<http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/civil-society-organizations>.

to the DSWD, this is being done in the following four ways:

- a. *Bantay*—CSOs as watchdogs against corruption in projects and activities
- b. *Tulay*—CSOs facilitating action, feedback, and monitoring
- c. *Gabay*—CSOs extending technical assistance, using social technologies they have that the government can draw upon
- d. *Kaagapay*—CSOs as partners, especially in microenterprise networks and organizations for a sustainable livelihood as part of our Transition Strategy

2. Civil society membership in the Independent Monitoring and Advisory Committee consisting of eminent persons from the academe, nongovernment organizations, religious sector, and private sector who provide strategic advice. Members have agreed to serve as external monitors of the Pantawid Pamilya program to ensure transparency and social accountability.

3. CSOs and Volunteers declaration of Commitment¹⁸ to the Pantawid Pamilya program to help with program implementation in any one of the following ways¹⁹:

- a. Assist in the implementation or monitoring of the program
- b. Participate in Community Assemblies as part of beneficiary identification
- c. Audit the Compliance Verification System²⁰
- d. Assist in the Beneficiary Update and Grievance Redress Systems
- e. Oversee the enhancement and implementation of the Family Development Sessions
- f. Initiate the formation of an oversight structure and undertake measures to sustain the gains of the program

However, there is scant evidence of CSOs in the Philippines serving as the “third eye” of DSWD and/or fulfilling their Commitments. Taken together the provisions for civil society engagement and social accountability initiatives in the Philippines CCTP have significant potential for minimizing the deficiencies in integrity risk management as noted in section 5.3. However, our survey did not reveal any significant reports of CSO activities and results in areas noted in the Commitment and “Third Eye” program. The only two areas of involvement of CSOs in the Pantawid Pamilya program seem to be: (a) as implementing partners of DSWD to perform certain services for the [Family Development Sessions](#)²¹ (FDS) program; and (b) as members of multi-stakeholder advisory mechanisms at central and local government level. Even here there is no available information on activities and results.

Many of the good practices identified in this paper from the survey of international experiences with use of social accountability interventions in CCTPs can help improve and augment the integrity risk management systems that are in use in the Philippines and address the deficiencies that have been noted by independent assessments.

The impending national elections in the Philippines in 2016 make now an opportune and urgent time to expand civil society led social accountability initiatives and make

¹⁸ CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the P4 program accessed at <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/csostatement.pdf>.

¹⁹ CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the P4 Program accessed at <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/csostatement.pdf>.

²⁰ Details of Compliance Verification, Grievance Redress and Beneficiary Update systems are available at http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/Pantawid_Pamilya-systems.

²¹ For more information on how the CSOs work to promote FDS please see <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/pantawid-pamilya-cso-faq>.

them a force for safeguarding the integrity and sustaining the gains of the program. International experiences tell us that integrity risks in CCTPs are escalated around elections and change of government. They also tell us that strong civil society engagement in CCTPs helps mitigate risks of political abuse.

We recommend that DSWD, civil society (especially those who signed the Commitment) and donors supporting the Pantawid Pamilya program make a determined effort to significantly expand the use of social accountability interventions in the program to complement the state led control and accountability mechanisms with a view to mitigate risks and improve results. This effort should begin with an analysis of why CSOs are not engaging in significant ways in the CCTP despite a favorable enabling environment and culminate with an action plan and resources to implement it. The action plan should detail what needs to be done by whom to expand CSO engagement in areas noted in the DSWD “third eye” policy and Commitment declaration by CSOs.

Recommendations for DSWD

The analysis presented in this paper led us to recommend to DSWD, in March 2015, the following actions to improve and expand civil society engagement to strengthen state-led integrity mechanisms in the i-PANTAWID program.

- *Information disclosed on the [Pantawid Pamilya website](#) could be substantially expanded.* In line with international good practices (Peru, Brazil), it should consider posting on its website the following additional information: the operations manual; names of beneficiaries by municipalities and cities; detailed budget information by provinces and municipalities; detailed annual reports on grievance redress systems, including distribution of grievances by location and type; reports of spot checks done by the independent agency; schedule and minutes of Independent Monitoring and Advisory committee meetings; COA audit reports; composition frequency and minutes of multi-stakeholder advisory committee meetings; and independent evaluation results. Such disclosure is an essential foundation for social accountability of the CCTPs.
- *Introduce a system of periodic beneficiary satisfaction and feedback surveys.* Mexico offers a good practice example for beneficiary feedback collection that uses biannual surveys to collect beneficiary feedback.
- *Initiate actions to monitor and improve the functioning of the Municipal Advisory Committees (MACs).* Our fieldwork in one region found that MACs are not performing the roles expected of them. This finding is consistent with experiences of Social Control Councils in Brazil. The Pantawid Pamilya program covers more than 1,600 municipalities and cities, which makes monitoring their performance challenging. Two ways to help improve their performance are to: (a) establish a performance monitoring system for MACs using key performance indicators; and (b) encourage grassroots CSOs to monitor, report, and advocate performance of MACs. Drawing on international practice (Brazil), some measures of MAC performance that CSOs could report on include:
 - Percentage of member CSOs and of beneficiaries in the MAC
 - Extent to which the MACs are functioning as indicated by the number of meetings held
 - Extent to which MAC members have received standardized information of their role and taken part in the specified amount of training

- Extent to which beneficiary lists are available to MACs on a regular and timely basis
 - Extent of dissemination of information and public and beneficiary awareness of the MAC
 - Extent to which MACs interact with the DSWD National Program Office
 - Extent to which MACs know who to contact and how to proceed in case of problems
- *Set up incentives and funding for CSOs to engage in social accountability activities.* A practical challenge faced in providing funding to CSOs for social accountability initiatives is to safeguard their independence while potentially criticizing government and the DSWD. One possibility of addressing such a conflict of interests is by keeping the funding source for third-party monitoring entirely separate from the DSWD, the implementing agency for the Pantawid Pamilya.²²

On April 13, 2015, DSWD Secretary Corazon J. Soliman approved the creation of Risk Management and Quality Assurance Division (RMQAD) under the Pantawid Pamilya National Program Management Office (NPMO). NPMO has advised us that: (a) the integrity risks identified in the paper including the Opportunities Framework for Social Accountability interventions can serve as reference and one of the takeoff points of the RMQAD; and (b) the above recommendations shall be studied and NPMO will consider mechanisms to implement them. RMQAD Division would take the lead in addressing the risks in CCTP implementation and ensure that its integrity is guarded.

Recommendations to CSOs and DSWD

As identified in the CSOs' Statement of Commitment to the Pantawid Pamilya program, **significant opportunities exist for CSOs to enhance the integrity and results of the Pantawid Pamilya program.** CSOs can validate beneficiary lists, report on targeting errors, and assist with recertification. CSOs can collect beneficiary feedback on access and quality of supply-side services in health or education programs, along with advocating and assuming co-responsibility for overcoming supply bottlenecks. CSOs may also improve their involvement in the Pantawid Pamilya program by broadening awareness and sustaining public and political support for it. A significant misconception about the Pantawid Pamilya program among citizens is that it is a dole-out, rather than a development, program. CSOs can help dispel this misconception. This will reinforce the credibility of the program.

It is recommended that CSOs and the DSWD analyze the social accountability initiatives in the Pantawid Pamilya program and develop a follow-up action plan. Three building blocks for such an initiative exist in the Philippines. *First*, the government of the Philippines has policies and action plans for engaging with civil society as part of its founding membership with the Open Government Partnership. *Second*, the DSWD recognizes CSOs and volunteer partners as the "third eye" of the DSWD. *Third*, the CSOs and Volunteers Statement of Commitment to the Pantawid Pamilya program can be a foundation for such initiatives. The government can help CSO involvement by increasing the information available on the Pantawid Pamilya and setting up incentives and funding for CSOs to get involved. A practical challenge faced in providing funding to CSOs for social accountability initiatives is safeguarding their independence while potentially criticizing the government and the DSWD. One possibility of addressing such a conflict of interests is to keep the funding source for third-party monitoring entirely separate from the DSWD.

²²A similar arrangement to the suggestion here exists in Mexico.

It is also recommended that the DSWD convene, with the help of the ADB, the World Bank, and other development partners involved in the Pantawid Pamilya program, an international knowledge sharing and peer-learning event on the use of social accountability approaches in CCTPs. Such an event could help improve the integrity and impact of the Pantawid Pamilya program as well as CCTPs in other countries. The last international conference on CCTPs, organized by the World Bank, took place in 2006.

Recommendations for CCAGG

The i-Pantawid project by the CCAGG features many of the efforts at engaging citizens, including social accountability good practices, for enhancing integrity of CCTPs but there is room for improvement. The project plans to implement the following social accountability interventions:

- Conduct social audits to monitor targeting, compliance verification, payment, and grievance redress in 30 municipalities in the Northern Luzon region
- Administer community score cards on the delivery of social services including health and education
- Assist with grievance resolution
- Conduct Family Development Sessions and train Parent Leaders as facilitators
- Build the capacity of grassroots CSOs and communities for engagement with authorities and to practice social accountability
- Generate and share project results and lessons learned with CSOs and other stakeholders through the knowledge portal of the GPSA

A good practice innovation in the *i-Pantawid* program is that the CCAGG has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DSWD that provides a framework for constructive engagement including sharing of information and findings.

International good practices suggest three additional areas where the CCAGG could play a useful role. These may be considered as the project develops. *First*, the CCAGG could verify which information about the Pantawid Pamilya program is publicly available and how it compares to international good practices. Such a report could be a basis for advocating improved transparency in the Pantawid Pamilya. *Second*, the CCAGG could partner with the Transparency International chapter in the Philippines to carry out and publish an independent integrity risk assessment using the GAMBA 2015 methodology being developed by Transparency International. *Third*, the CCAGG could (and should) carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the *i-Pantawid* project.

The following table summarizes the current and recommended citizen engagement and social accountability interventions in the *i-Pantawid* project.

International good practices of citizen engagement and social accountability interventions in the CCTPs	Citizen Engagement and Social accountability interventions in <i>i-PANTAWID</i> project	
	Already Planned	Recommended
Improve transparency by verifying and advocating quality and user-friendliness of access to information		X
Vet lists of beneficiaries to help minimize targeting errors	X	
Work with beneficiaries and service providers to improve compliance with conditions	X	
Facilitate beneficiary feedback collection	X	
Act as a social intermediary between CCTP implementers and beneficiaries at the local level	X	
Help strengthen links between local and national level consultation and implementation processes	X	
Assess integrity risk vulnerabilities and performance of integrity mechanisms and engage with authorities to improve integrity	X	
Partner with Transparency International Philippines to assess integrity risk vulnerability at the CCT program level using TI methodology.		X
Carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the <i>i-Pantawid</i> project in partnership with an independent research partner		X

Annex 1. Overview of Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability Tools

Tool	Definition/Uses
Budget Literacy Campaign	Budget Literacy Campaigns are efforts—usually by civil society, academics, or research institutes—to build citizen and civil society capacity to understand budgets in order to hold government accountable for budget commitments and to influence budget priorities.
Citizen Charter	Citizen Charter is a document that informs citizens about the service entitlements they have as users of a public service, the standards they can expect for a service (timeframe and quality), remedies available for non-adherence to the standards, and the procedures, costs, and charges of a service. The charters entitle users to an explanation (and in some cases compensation) if the standards are not met.
Citizen Report Card	Citizen Report Card is an assessment of public services by the users (citizens) through client feedback surveys. It goes beyond data collection to being an instrument for exacting public accountability through extensive media coverage and civil society advocacy that accompanies the process.
Citizen Satisfaction Surveys	Citizen satisfaction surveys provide a quantitative assessment of government performance and service delivery based on citizens' experience. Depending on the objective, the surveys can collect data on a variety of topics ranging from perceptions of performance of service delivery and elected officials to desires for new capital projects and services.
Citizen/User Membership	Citizen/User Membership in decision-making bodies is a way to ensure accountability by allowing people who can reflect users' interests to sit on committees that make decisions about project activities under implementation (project-level arrangement) or utility boards (sector-level arrangement).
Citizens' Juries	Citizens' Juries are a group of selected members of a community that make recommendations or actions participatory instruments to supplement conventional democratic processes.
Community Contracting	Community Contracting is when community groups are contracted for the provision of services, or when community groups contract service providers or the construction of infrastructure.
Community Management	Community Management is when services are fully managed or owned by service users or communities. Consumers own the service directly (each customer owns a share) when they form cooperatives.
Community Monitoring	Community Monitoring is a system of measuring, recording, collecting, and analyzing information, and communicating and acting on that information to improve performance. It holds government institutions accountable, provides ongoing feedback, shares control over M&E, engages in identifying and/or taking corrective actions, and seeks to facilitate dialogue between citizens and project authorities.

Community Oversight	Community Oversight is the monitoring of publicly funded construction projects by citizens, community-based and/or civil society organizations participating directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. It applies across all stages of the project cycle, although the focus is on the construction phase.
Community Scorecard	A Community Scorecard is a community-based monitoring tool that assesses services, projects, and government performance by analyzing qualitative data obtained through focus group discussions with the community. It usually includes interface meetings between service providers and users to formulate an action plan to address any identified problems and shortcomings.
Focus Group Discussions	Focus Group Discussions are usually organized with specific goals, structures, time frames, and procedures in mind. Focus groups are composed of a small number of stakeholders to discuss project impacts and concerns and consult in an informal setting. They are designed to gauge the response to the project's proposed actions and to gain a detailed understanding of stakeholders' perspectives, values, and concerns.
Grievance Redress Mechanism	Grievance Redress Mechanism (or complaints-handling mechanism) is a system by which queries or clarifications about the project are responded to, problems with implementation are resolved, and complaints and grievances are addressed efficiently and effectively.
Independent Budget Analysis	Independent Budget Analysis is a process where civil society stakeholders research, explain, monitor, and disseminate information about public expenditures and investments to influence the allocation of public funds through the budget.
Input Tracking	Input Tracking refers to monitoring the flow of physical assets and service inputs from central to local levels. It is also called input monitoring.
Integrity Pact	An Integrity Pact is a transparency tool that allows participants and public officials to agree on rules to be applied to a specific procurement. It includes an "honesty pledge" by which involved parties promise not to offer or demand bribes. Bidders agree not to collude in order to obtain the contract; and if they do obtain the contract, they must avoid abusive practices while executing it.
Participatory Budgeting	Participatory Budgeting is a process through which citizens participate directly in budget formulation, decision making, and monitoring of budget execution. It creates a channel for citizens to give voice to their budget priorities.
Participatory Physical Audit	Participatory Physical Audit refers to community members taking part in the physical inspection of project sites, especially when there are not enough professional auditors to inspect all facilities. Citizens measure the quantity and quality of construction materials, infrastructure, and facilities.
Participatory Planning	Participatory Planning convenes a broad base of key stakeholders, on an iterative basis, in order to generate a diagnosis of the existing situation and develop appropriate strategies to solve jointly identified problems. Project components, objectives, and strategies are designed in collaboration with stakeholders.
Procurement Monitoring	Procurement Monitoring refers to independent, third-party monitoring of procurement activities by citizens, communities, or civil society organizations to ensure there are no leakages or violation of procurement rules.
Public Displays of Information	Public Displays of Information refers to the posting of government information, usually about projects or services, in public areas, such as on billboards or in government offices, schools, health centers, community centers, project sites, and other places where communities receive services or discuss government affairs.

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys involves citizen groups tracing the flow of public resources for the provision of public goods or services from origin to destination. It can help to detect bottlenecks, inefficiencies, or corruption.
Public Hearings	Public Hearings are formal community-level meetings where local officials and citizens have the opportunity to exchange information and opinions on community affairs. Public hearings are often one element in a social audit initiative.
Public Reporting of Expenditures	Public Reporting of Expenditures refers to the public disclosure and dissemination of information about government expenditures to enable citizens to hold government accountable for its expenditures.
Social Audit	Social Audit (also called Social Accounting) is a monitoring process through which organizational or project information is collected, analyzed, and shared publicly in a participatory fashion. Community members conduct investigative work at the end of which findings are shared and discussed publicly.
User Management Committees	User Management Committees refer to consumer groups taking on long-term management roles to initiate, implement, operate, and maintain services. User management committees are for increasing participation as much as they are for accountability and financial controls.

Source: World Bank

Annex 2 - Summary of Commission of Audit Findings On Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), (COA 2014)

- 1. Duplicate Names in 4Ps Database.** COA Audit found that P 46.50 m was paid to 4,320 duplicate names in Payroll in 2013 resulting in double payments. (Page iii, 51). It also noted that it is one of the perennial findings. The double entry/duplicate 4Ps HH translates into huge amount, if accumulated over the years.
- 2. Discrepancies between 4Ps Payroll and NHTS-PR database.** COA Value for Money Audit (VOMA) reported (page 88) that grants of Pesos 1,080 million (\$24.54 m) were paid to 364,636 Households (HH) under CCT and MCCT, which could not be found in the NHTS-PR database thus resulting in additional costs to the government. Many of these discrepancies were resolved by the DSWD.
- 3. Grants to Non-Poor (Inclusion Errors).** COA Value for Money Audit (2013) found that some households (HH) on the 4Ps payroll were Not-Poor thus ineligible. This includes HHs that are not found in the NHTS-PR²³ registry and HH found to be Non-Poor in field validation. Payments to them, in several million pesos, were unauthorized/unnecessary expenditures.
- 4. Poor not in 4Ps (Exclusion Errors).** COA Value for Money field verification of the location of non-poor HH beneficiaries included in the 4Ps payment of grants revealed significant number (32,454) of poor HH beneficiaries who could have availed of the grants (page 89).
- 5. Cases of school dropouts.** COA Value for Money audit found that out of 30,646 children of 22,279 HH 5,651 (18.4%) were school dropouts. Main reasons cited for dropout are lack of finances and/or working as laborers, housemaids, and sales girls/boys to support their families. (Pages 92-93).
- 6. Access to health centers/services.** COA found that in many of the sampled barangays beneficiaries faced extreme difficulty to comply with health conditionality due to absence of health centers. (Page 97).
- 7. Unclaimed grants.** COA audit found Pesos 330 m in unpaid grant amounts intended for beneficiaries in eight regions (Page iii). It also found many cases of non-payment of grants to active beneficiaries (Page 99).. It pointed out that the unpaid amounts could have been reduced had revalidation been intensified on identified beneficiaries. Following reasons for non-payment (Page 47) were cited:
 - a. Active members who have not received claims
 - b. Grievance redress (GRS) fraud/inclusion error/grants on hold
 - c. Duplicate names
 - d. No 0-14 children beneficiaries can be verified
 - e. No eligible members of HH for CVS monitoring
 - f. Not in the Registered Clean and Active List
 - g. Missin

²³ National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction Program (NHTS-PR)

Annex 3. Integrity Risk Management in the Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program (Pantawid Pamilya): PTF Review

The Pantawid Pamilya has now become one of the largest antipoverty and social protection programs in the Philippines, implemented by the Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as the nodal agency. The Pantawid Pamilya CCTP has drawn on the experiences of several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region in informing its design to address accountability challenges.

DATA SYSTEMS FOR ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY

The information to be used by the DSWD project administrators in monitoring program outputs will come from the following main sources:

- Program administrative records and the MIS systems will produce the information required for informed and timely policy decisions and adjustments.
- Spot checks to monitor targeting implementation and the Pantawid Pamilya program will be undertaken as a source of information to monitor implementation processes and outputs and as a form of social audit. The actual implementation of the spot checks and the preparation of reports verifying these data against program administrative records will be carried out by an independent, external party chosen based on its credibility and technical capacity.
- The key demand-side accountability mechanism built into the Pantawid Pamilya is the Grievance Redress System (GRS). The GRS design for Pantawid Pamilya includes a grievance database, which tracks the nature, origin, location, and status of complaints such as targeting errors, payment irregularities, fraud, and corruption. Multiple channels can be used to submit grievances—through the Municipal Link—directly to the Pantawid Pamilya offices via an SMS hotline, email, letter, fax, or drop boxes at the *barangay* (village) level. There have been simple GRS forms developed for wide distribution to beneficiaries, Parent Leaders, Municipal Links, Barangay Captains, government officials, and local NGOs. As institutional support to the GRS, the DSWD has established a two-person Grievance Redress Unit at the Central Level and designated grievance redress staff at the regional level to resolve complaints within a set timeframe stipulated in a GRS Manual.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY

The Pantawid Pamilya has also given importance to defining roles and responsibilities in the institutional arrangements created for program implementation, in order to bring clarity on the accountability of different functionaries in the results chain. Upon the creation of the Pantawid Pamilya in 2007, the government formalized the institutional arrangement among the agencies involved through a series of government administrative orders.²⁴ This

²⁴ The institutional arrangement among government agencies in the implementation of Pantawid Pamilya was formalized in the following: Memorandum Circular 9 Series of 2007, Creating the Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino (APP) Program National Advisory Committees and Defining Their Roles and Responsibilities; Administrative Order 16, Series of 2008, Guidelines on the Implementation of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya); and Joint Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2009, Defining the Institutional Arrangements for the Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya).

institutional structure helps ensure that the responsibilities and lines of authority are clear between agencies and levels of government in terms of who is expected to do what. In addition national, regional, and municipal advisory committees have been mandated by the CCTP to ensure smooth coordination between relevant government departments and ensure the availability of health and education services in the targeted areas.

These municipal advisory committees (MACs) are important in the program design to bring in community participation in the oversight of the CCTP. A MAC is organized in all Pantawid Pamilya municipalities, with the mayor as Chair and with the participation of relevant municipal-level representatives of the National Advisory Committee (NAC) member-agencies.²⁵ The Advisory Councils at each level also serve as the Grievance Committee to handle public complaints.

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY

The DSWD, in more recent times, has reached out to civil society groups to assist in the implementation and oversight of the Pantawid Pamilya. CSO and volunteer partners are viewed by the CCTP as the “third eye” of the DSWD. The program uses the current government’s platform of Good Governance and Poverty Reduction to facilitate public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements of cooperation between the DSWD and CSOs for the purpose of delivering basic social services to the poor, implementing development projects of the government, and instituting transparency and accountability mechanisms to fight corruption. According to the DSWD, this is being done in any of the following four ways:

- *Bantay*—CSOs as watchdogs against corruption in projects and activities
- *Tulay*—CSOs facilitating action, feedback, and monitoring
- *Gabay*—CSOs extending technical assistance, using social technologies they have that government draw upon
- *Kaagapay*—CSOs as partners especially in microenterprise networks and organizations for sustainable livelihood as part of our Transition Strategy

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FDS

In the Pantawid Pamilya, one of the conditions of the program is the mandatory attendance of Family Development Sessions (FDS). The FDS serves as a unique venue created by the CCTP where topics on effective parenting, husband and wife relationships, child development, laws affecting the Filipino family, and gender and development and home management are being discussed. Of importance to the subject of this paper is that through the FDS parents are also informed of their rights as individuals as well as their obligations as citizens. This provides an opportunity for building collective action toward social accountability that makes the Pantawid Pamilya different from other CCTPs, such as the *Oportunidades* in Mexico where there had been concern that the CCT failed to make beneficiaries truly aware of the reasons why their participation in the program was important in the long term (see Hevia de la Jara, 2008).

²⁵ The NAC comprises representatives from the DSWD, National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and National Nutrition Council.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AT THE FRONTLINES²⁶

As is often the case with most programs, there is a gap between how the program is implemented in the frontlines of engagement with the beneficiaries and the way the program was designed to be implemented at the local level. The case of the Pantawid Pamilya is no exception. In the field visits undertaken to Pangasinan and Abra provinces in Northern Luzon, the majority of the parent leaders and the beneficiaries were much less aware of the mechanisms of the Grievance Redress System than would have been ideal in order for the program to make full use of the GRS. In several focus group discussions undertaken, there were almost negligible instances of beneficiaries having made proper use of the formal grievance redress mechanisms, partly due to the lack of awareness and partly due to the lack of expectations that the GRS would yield timely results.

The cursory knowledge on the Pantawid Pamilya among key health officials in Abra alongside the responses from parent leaders and municipal links also made it apparent that the Municipal Advisory Committee (MAC) was not a truly functional entity. The MAC, according to program design, is expected to be an institutional mechanism to bring the supply-side department officials (i.e., health, education, local government units) into regular periodic consultations with the CCTP in addressing weaknesses in program implementation. The MAC also serves as a local forum and unit for grievance redress for beneficiaries of the CCTP. The failure to have fully functional MACs was also reflected in the apathy of some of the local municipal mayors toward the CCTP and their lack of awareness on the operation of Pantawid Pamilya within the *barangays* of their jurisdiction.²⁷

Civil society organizations, however, were providing an important role in monitoring the functioning of the Pantawid Pamilya and were a channel of intermediation between the families of beneficiaries and the officials of the DSWD. CSOs were either explicitly implementing projects that aimed to monitor the functioning of the Pantawid Pamilya by engaging with the community or were, alternatively, information gatherers from the community of beneficiaries through regular engagement with them by convening Family Development Sessions or providing other pastoral services. There was a level of trust between the beneficiaries and the CSOs encountered during field visits that had been harder to establish between program authorities, municipal links, and the beneficiaries. The building of trust between CSOs and beneficiaries also partly stemmed from the FDS+ initiative of the DSWD, under which CSOs facilitated additional sessions (beyond the CCTP) for the CCT beneficiaries (mostly women), such as classes on adult literacy, livelihood skills, and building citizenship through a community-oriented module.

Finally, it is important to question the assumption that parent leaders of the Pantawid Pamilya are motivated to undertake the jobs with which they are tasked. The list of activities here can be considerable, especially in certain periods. These include:

1. Update school records
2. Assist other members/parents
3. Conduct Family Development Sessions

²⁶This section is based on field visits that were facilitated by the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) and the Pangasinan-based CSO, Responsible Citizens, Empowered Communities and Solidarity towards Social Change (RECITE). The author is grateful to both CSOs and especially to Emy Perez for her assistance in the focus-group discussions and interviews.

²⁷ Due to the distaste of the municipal Mayors regarding the Pantawid Pamilya and their own ignorance of the program, both a mayor and program beneficiaries during the field visit have reported that the latter are often given a kind of second-class citizenship, being forced to carry out community work, such as sweeping the streets or working in healthcare posts. If they denounce such practices, the beneficiaries fear losing their benefits altogether.

4. Assist in problem/conflict resolution
5. Assist beneficiary members in the allocation of the grants
6. Coordinate with the *Barangay* officials
7. Standing for *Barangay* Captains in attending meetings
8. Reproduce forms given by MLs
9. Follow-up on compliance of member visits to rural care units
10. Serve as member of the community health team

The long list of activities that parent leaders are confronted with after their “election” often comes as a surprise to them, effectively taking them away from their more immediate daily family chores, and at times resulting in personal expenses that are never reimbursed. Several of the parent leaders reported seeing their own work as a “thankless role,” caught in between overworked Municipal Links and uncooperative members within their community of beneficiaries who don’t recognize them as “leaders.” Given the important role that parent leaders actually play in the proper functioning of the CCTP in the frontlines, regardless of the role that may have been defined for them in program design, they are not additionally incentivized at all to carry out their tasks. Those parent leaders who are champions within their communities presently undertake their tasks entirely out of an intrinsic motivation to serve other CCT beneficiaries. No monetary incentives are provided deliberately by design.

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